

COMMON COUNTRY ASSESSMENT IRAQ

2009



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---------------|--|
| AIDS | Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome |
| CCA | Common Country Assessment |
| CFSVA | Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women |
| COSIT | Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology |
| CRC | Convention on the Rights of the Child |
| CSO | Civil society organization |
| EFA | Education for All |
| ESCWA | Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia |
| GDP | Gross domestic product |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GEF | Global Environment Facility |
| GoI | Government of Iraq |
| HIV | Human immunodeficiency virus |
| HRBA | Human rights-based approach |
| IAU | Information and Analysis Unit |
| ID | Iraqi dinar |
| IDP(s) | Internally displaced person(s) |
| IFHS | Iraq Family Health Survey |
| IHSES | Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| IKN | Iraq Knowledge Network |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRFFI | International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq |
| IT | Information technology |
| KRG | Kurdistan Regional Government |
| KRSO | Kurdistan Regional Statistical Office |
| MDG(s) | Millennium Development Goal(s) |
| MICS | Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey |
| MMR | Maternal mortality ratio |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoMPW | Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works |
| MoPDC | Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NGO(s) | Non-governmental organization(s) |
| NIP | National Investment Plan |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN) |
| PDS | Public Distribution System |
| RC/HC | Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (UN) |

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| SSI | Security Section Iraq (UNAMI) |
| SSN | Social Safety Net |
| TVE | Technical and vocational education |
| TWG | Thematic Working Group (UN) |
| UNAMI | United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq |
| UNCT | United Nations country team |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UN DOCO | United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDSS | United Nations Department of Safety and Security |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UN-HABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UN PSG | United Nations Peer Support Group |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Foreword and Executive Summary

TWO years ago, Iraq showed little prospect of being ready to embark on a Common Country Assessment (CCA) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) process. The impact of recent violence was too immediate and widespread, and the political climate too fragile. The creation of this document therefore represents a significant development milestone for a country and people that have suffered deeply and long. It is indicative of their desire for a better future, and their determination to work towards one.

Iraq has made visible security and political progress since the peak of the post-2003 conflict. Violence has diminished considerably, particularly inter-sectarian conflict. Confidence in the state and a basic level of social trust are returning – albeit slowly in many areas. Still, the consequences of nearly three decades of detrimental economic and social policies, added to the burden of war and violence, are becoming ever more apparent as the real work of governance begins. These are the issues of peace consolidation that this CCA, and the UNDAF to follow, set out to tackle, in support of the efforts of the Government of Iraq (GoI).

This CCA coincides not only with Iraq's return to full sovereignty on a promising security trajectory, but also with a Government initiative to set a strong development course through a five-year National Development Plan (NDP) for 2010-2014. The CCA and NDP analyses have been produced concurrently and through a mutually reinforcing process, to reflect one view of the country and propose a common platform for action. The intensive engagement with GoI throughout the CCA and NDP processes has strengthened both documents, and augmented the quality of supporting evidence. We were also fortunate to have a high level of international support for the production of the CCA, through the UN System Staff College, the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UN DOCO) and a regional UN Peer Support Group (PSG). International consultants with expertise in conflict analysis, gender and disaster response and recovery were also involved in the conceptual and drafting process.

This CCA describes a complex development context for a more detailed perspective on Iraq's development gaps and their immediate, underlying and root causes. The impact of conflict on the country's development trends and the continued challenge of political disputes are overarching themes that impede development progress. The various effects of these factors on different regions of Iraq have created widespread disparities at the district level, which require area-specific responses. Over-reliance on oil as a revenue source, combined with poorly distributed economic wealth, have exacerbated poverty even in once-prosperous areas. Lack of social participation in governance for a fast-growing and youth-heavy population, combined with environmental degradation that accelerates urbanization beyond the capacity of Iraq's cities, risk undermining political efforts towards social stability. The return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees in already poor communities have had the same effect at the local level. Iraq's ability to manage these factors and move its own agenda forward requires stronger capacities for national data management and emergency preparedness and response planning.

Within this overall context, the CCA identified three key thematic areas for UN analysis. These are governance, inclusive economic growth and ensuring quality essential services. The thematic areas, selected in partnership with GoI, were chosen because of their direct relationship to Iraq's accelerated achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their strong causal link to peace

consolidation priorities delineated within the NDP. Cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender, protection and environment were mainstreamed throughout the analysis.

Key factors considered within **governance** are: (i) issues with the legitimacy of the state; (ii) rule of law, security, accountability and application of human rights principles, and; (iii) capacity of the state to perform its functions. Stakeholder capacity gaps were linked to a challenging political security climate for open and participatory governance, political obstacles to legislative reform, a lack of structural logic within ministries, undefined relationships between central and local governance, a dearth of skilled professionals for a range of governance functions, and a lack of best practices for restructuring and reform initiatives.

Key factors considered within **inclusive economic growth** are: (i) volatile and unsustainable growth; (ii) non-diversified economic output and a suppressed private sector; (iii) unemployment and low non-state employment, and; (iv) poverty and social exclusion. Stakeholder capacity gaps were linked to over-reliance on a single revenue source (oil), a lack of legislative and policy coherence on monetary, fiscal and budget management, an overly complex investment climate, Iraq's long-standing anti-enterprise culture of state dominance, the absence of vocational training opportunities and skills, and a social safety net strategy defined by conflict and hardship and now weakened by corruption and mismanagement.

Key factors considered within **ensuring quality essential services** are: (i) the right to education; (ii) the right to health; (iii) the challenge of social protection, and; (iv) the need to improve availability and quality of key housing and other infrastructure and to ensure environmental sustainability of services. Stakeholder capacity gaps were linked to the long-term impact of conflict and sanctions on services investment, weak national-local relationships regarding service delivery, loss of human capital and skills, socio-cultural habits of gender marginalization, politicized marginalization of specific groups or areas, a weak culture of social participation in demand for services and good governance, poor mainstreaming of human rights knowledge, corruption, and the significant policy and practical challenges of environmental change and population growth.

This thematic analysis suggests strong inter-linkages between the immediate, underlying and root causes of a wide range of sectoral problems. Therefore, the CCA concludes by drawing out six priority areas for attention and consideration within the UNDAF, emerging directly from the causal and capacity gap analyses as potential drivers of significant progress across all core sectors supporting NDP priorities. These are:

1. Building the legitimacy, accountability, and responsiveness of the state;
2. Realizing human rights and participatory justice through rule of law;
3. Linking sustainable economic growth to social justice (jobs, services and social protection);
4. Mitigating environmental pressures from climate change of population growth;
5. Building equity and quality into social services for poverty reduction and reconciliation;
6. Investing in human capital (including Iraqi women and children).

The UN cannot, and should not attempt to, tackle these issues on its own. Rather, UN comparative advantages must be carefully leveraged in a context where political negotiation still defines development possibilities, and in a nation with its own significant potential to better manage and invest resources with a wide range of other international donors.

Learning lessons from its past engagement in Iraq, the UN recognizes that its comparative advantage does not lie in its resources but in its impartiality and international legitimacy, its technical expertise, its normative and human rights-based values, and its capacity as a convener. Therefore, the UN role and comparative advantages in addressing Iraq's priority development gaps through an UNDAF can be divided into a perception advantage, a technical advantage and a coordination advantage.

In terms of perception, the UN has a key role to play as an honest broker on political roadblocks to development progress, and as an advocate for the necessary legislative frameworks that will allow for implementation of development initiatives. Regarding technical support, the UN has access to global technical capacities, which in the context of Iraq can position the UN as a centre of knowledge to assist the GoI in scaling up its own development agenda. This would be a departure from the UN's practice in recent years of implementing a number of programmes and diverse projects directly. In many cases the UN should not be a direct implementer of reform programmes, but a convenor of other actors, providing strategic guidance and vision. Partnership and a focused division of labour with other actors, particularly the World Bank, will be critical to overall UN effectiveness in Iraq. In its coordination role, the UN should support the GoI's implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, to bring the international community and the GoI into a more cohesive partnership, and to ensure that the GoI can maximize its own use of resources towards self-sufficiency and in fulfilment of its international obligations.

Finally, this CCA sets the platform for an ambitious programme of action for the UN, and indeed for the Government of Iraq and its international supporters. It reflects a core belief that the current scenario – that of steadily improving capacity – will continue over the coming years. It also depends on Iraq's own will and leadership to plant the seeds of change and progress across government and society and to make the investments necessary to help those seeds take root and grow. If the challenges are tremendous, so is Iraq's potential through its resilient, courageous people. This CCA is presented on their behalf, and towards their own hopes and aspirations.

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Iraq

SECTION 1: Introduction

1.1 Country background

IRAQ holds a unique place in the history of the Middle East. It has been a powerful engine of regional economic growth and trade, and a global beacon of culture and learning. However, the catastrophic events of the past three decades have had a deep impact on Iraq and its citizens. Its capacity has been dimmed, but not its potential.

Since the early 1980s, the Iraqi people have lived through repression, economic sanctions, war and, since 2003, occupation and protracted civil conflict. Iraq's once-strong development indicators have generally declined over this period, contrary to regional and global trends. The impact of this has varied across the country. As a result, multi-layered geographical and ethnic disparities have emerged – in wealth, literacy and access to services – creating a complex environment for peace consolidation.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the spiral of violence that gripped the country when inter-sectarian conflict accelerated in 2006 worsened an already critical situation for many Iraqi families, adding acute humanitarian needs to the country's longstanding reconstruction and development problems. This decline in Iraq's fortunes has also affected regional dynamics, challenging region-wide reconciliation initiatives and creating socioeconomic burdens for Iraq's neighbours through refugee flows.

Against substantial odds, Iraq's security situation has shown significant improvement in 2008-2009. The country has now reached a pivotal moment of opportunity, as it moves to consolidate political gains through a national election slated for early 2010. However, several longstanding and potentially destabilizing political disputes remain unresolved. New challenges are also on the horizon, as Iraq seeks to exercise its full responsibility as a sovereign state to deliver the anticipated fruits of democratic governance to Iraqi men, women, girls and boys.

Iraq is not starting from scratch in this effort. The country has resources, experience and capacity to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¹, improve the standard of living of the most vulnerable segments of Iraqi society, and meet human rights treaty obligations. However, more than six years after the most recent Iraq war, overall progress towards achieving the MDGs continues to be slow and uneven, despite the recent rallying of some indicators. Of particular concern are the MDGs related to poverty, education, health, gender and the environment. Poor economic management of Iraq's resources, of which over-dependence on oil revenues is one manifestation, is undermining a much-needed major scaling up of gender-sensitive basic services. It is also hindering wider initiatives to stop poverty from taking permanent root in urban and rural areas. A culture of respect for human rights, rule of law and gender equity is still far from realized throughout the country.

In creating a National Development Plan (NDP) for 2010-2014 and a National Investment Plan (NIP), Iraq's government has recognized that quality services and sustained economic growth, including all segments of the population, are fundamental precursors to a stable society. Momentum is also growing for wide-reaching governance reform, to ensure that the MDGs are prioritized within national budget lines and the government is accountable for meeting those goals (see Box 1). This momentum is fragile and requires broader buy-in from all levels of state. Cohesion between Iraq's own objectives and the various international strategies for Iraq is also fundamental. At this point in Iraq's history, Iraqi leadership – from the state but also from the Iraqi people themselves – is the only key that can truly unlock the country's latent potential.

1. MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; MDG 2: Achieve universal primary education; MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; MDG 4: Reduce child mortality; MDG 5: Improve maternal health; MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; MDG 8: Develop global partnerships for development (www.un.org/millenniumgoals)

1.2 Objective and scope of the CCA

This Common Country Assessment (CCA) seeks to identify the priority development challenges that must be met to consolidate peace and stability in Iraq, and assure fundamental rights for all people in Iraq. It also aims to provide an evidence-based foundation for a scaled-up United Nations (UN) effort in the country.

The CCA has been strategically timed to coincide with the following major contextual developments:

1. Transition of the political and security situation in Iraq from conflict to greater stability, and the formation of a new democratically elected government: This has allowed the United Nations country team (UNCT)² Iraq and its Iraqi counterparts to shift into a new phase of development planning and strategic engagement through a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2011-14. The CCA will form the analytical basis for the UNDAF.
2. Production of Iraq's NDP 2010-2014: This strategic plan will define Iraq's development vision and priorities over the medium term and has the full support and commitment of the international community. To ensure that the CCA complements and supports the NDP, the UNCT participated in Government-led sectoral analyses throughout the NDP process.³ The CCA reflects this close cooperation and cross-fertilization of Government of Iraq (GoI) and UN thinking. National analysis for the NDP has been consequently enhanced, and the UNDAF will be strategically aligned with the NDP.

The CCA categorizes its analysis of core development challenges for Iraq under three thematic pillars: governance, inclusive economic growth and essential services. Each thematic analysis addresses the root causes faced by the respective stakeholders and duty bearers, along with capacity gaps to either claiming their rights or undertaking their duties in terms of fulfilling the rights of the claimants. In certain instances, an immediate cause in one theme may be a root cause in another. For example, while the conflict is understood as a root cause for poor infrastructure that prevents the delivery of essential services, it is also understood as an immediate cause of weak governance mechanisms that have more deeply rooted and structural causes related to traditional power structures and the wider political environment. The UNCT will draw on these analyses to identify priority issues to be addressed through the UNDAF.

Finally, the CCA aims to describe how UN comparative advantages should be leveraged to address these priority issues within an extremely complex aid environment.

1.3 The CCA process and partners

The CCA process has been guided by the UNCT and operationalized through the CCA/UNDAF Task Force chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) and composed of representatives from each resident agency, the UNCT Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), UNAMI and the World Bank. In May 2009, the Task Force endorsed a CCA/UNDAF Plan of Engagement and timeline (see Annex D), and tasked the IAU to lead the CCA drafting process.⁴

A preliminary analysis was initiated to consolidate existing information and identify key areas for deeper study, with participation from Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) and the Kurdistan Regional Statistical Office (KRSO). An international expert con-

2. The UNCT comprises seventeen resident agencies: FAO, ILO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNDSS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNOPS, WFP and WHO; and three non-resident agencies: ESCWA, UNCTAD and UNEP.

3. The draft GoI sectoral analyses are available at the following link: www.iauiraq.org/reports_assessments.asp#Government_of_Iraq

4. Established in February 2008, the UNCT Information and Analysis Unit comprises analytical staff members from the UNCT and NGOs. Reporting directly to the RC/HC, the Unit aims to improve effectiveness of programming, advocacy, policy and coordination of the international response.

ducted a conflict-sensitive analysis of the papers. The final pre- CCA analysis report – a joint UN-Government effort – fed into the work of Thematic Working Groups (TWGs) and the CCA analysis.⁵ (*Annex B provides a framework of indicators used in the pre- CCA analysis and CCA, together with values, disaggregated by urban/rural location, by gender and by availability of information at the governorate level.*)

Concurrently, at the GoI's invitation, the UNCT provided detailed inputs to the NDP sectoral analysis papers. A team of national consultants provided technical support to the GoI in finalizing these NDP sectoral papers, which, together with the CCA, will form the basis for the UNDAF.

The formal CCA process was launched in June 2009 by the UN Resident Coordinator a.i. and Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) on behalf of the GoI at the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshops in Baghdad and Amman, with support from the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UN DOCO), the UN System Staff College and broad participation from the GoI, as well as donors and the World Bank. Based on the pre-CCA analysis and training provided on the human rights-based approach (HRBA), conflict analysis and results-based management, three themes for the CCA were identified: inclusive economic growth; governance; and essential services. These would be addressed by three corresponding TWGs led by UN-HABITAT, UNDP and UNICEF respectively. It was also agreed that the CCA would be a complementary document to the NDP.

The TWGs were co-chaired by the UN and the GoI, with participation from a broad spectrum of UN agencies, UN international technical support staff, GoI line ministries, NGOs and civil society. The TWGs met in August 2009 to identify main development challenges based on a detailed causal analysis. Conflict, gender, human rights and poverty were integrated into the TWG analyses, along with cross-cutting themes including MDGs, employment, women's empowerment, youth, environment, protection and disaster risk reduction. The three resulting TWG papers formed the basis for the present final consolidated CCA. (The TWG papers are available on the IAU website at www.iauiraq.org/twg.asp.)

The entire CCA process has benefited from feedback provided by UN DOCO, the UN Peer Support Group (PSG) and UNAMI's Political Affairs Section and Human Rights Office. The World Bank supported the CCA process through the provision of raw data from the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES), sharing of the draft Poverty Assessment report, and extensive review of the TWG and CCA draft reports. This cooperation has provided a harmonized information base for the development of the UNDAF as well as the Poverty Reduction Strategy.

Supplementary capacity was also brought in by the UN agencies in support of the CCA process, including consultant experts recruited through UNICEF, UNFPA and UNIFEM and an expert team on disaster risk reduction issues recruited through OCHA and UNDP. Other agencies, such as ILO and WHO, utilized the capacity of regional advisors to support the process.

National ownership of the CCA process has been critical throughout, from engagement by COSIT and KRSO to create and co-present the pre-CCA analysis to GoI co-chairing of, and participation in, the TWGs, as well as ongoing, concurrent engagement to align the CCA and NDP processes. The draft CCA document was submitted to the GoI for comment in September 2009, and was endorsed by the GoI at the end of October 2009.

5. The IAU's pre-CCA analysis report and presentation can be found at the following link: <http://www.iauiraq.org/cca-undaf.asp>.

Box 1: Progress on the MDGs

IRAQ has embarked on a valuable process of tailoring global Millennium Development Goals and targets to reflect national circumstances and priorities, thereby increasing their relevance and building them into national development strategies. Further efforts are needed to incorporate these goals into budgets and ministry priorities, and to integrate them into UN assistance frameworks and programmes.

The current status of MDG achievement presents a mixed picture. Some indicators have deteriorated or stagnated over the last 15 years, such as dietary energy consumption, the share of women in non-agricultural employment, tuberculosis-related health indicators, and access to clean water sources. Others have improved – some significantly – over the same period. Extreme income poverty has fallen, child and maternal mortality rates have dropped, malaria incidence is nearly at zero, and the gender gap in education has narrowed. Overall, progress towards achieving the MDGs is slow and uneven, and the achievement of most goals by 2015 remains a challenge. Of particular concern are the education, health and gender goals, as well as environmental protection to ensure sustainable rural livelihoods. Additionally, wide regional disparities concerning all MDGs exist within the country.

If the MDGs are to be achieved in Iraq by 2015, a massive scaling-up is needed in delivery of basic services and resources for development. This requires a considerable improvement in the current capacity to plan and manage development programmes and coordination of resources.

In addition to political will and increased capacity, Iraq will need to pursue inclusive growth to allow for continuous targeted government spending on the neediest population groups, efficient service delivery mechanisms to scale up efforts to achieve the MDGs, and more effective civil society participation and empowerment of the claim holders to foster political accountability, accompanied by institutional reforms and enabling policies.

A table reporting Iraq's MDG progress in the achievement of a number of tailored indicators against baselines and targets is provided in Annex C. This table highlights differences between urban and rural, and male and female groups in terms of current status in relation to targets according to the various indicators. A second table provides a breakdown of values of these indicators at the governorate level, highlighting those governorates facing the greatest challenges. This exercise also identifies the gaps in information for monitoring progress towards meeting the MDGs.

SECTION 2: Country Analysis

2.1 Overarching human development context and challenges

1. Iraq's longstanding vulnerability to conflict

THIRTY years ago, Iraq ranked among the most developed countries in the Middle East. Today, after three decades of war, armed violence, invasion, insecurity, neglect of state functions, misallocation of public goods and a decade of economic sanctions, human development indicators have plummeted. Since the 2003 U.S.-led military offensive against Iraq, and the subsequent occupation and armed conflict,⁶ profound political and social divisions have arisen out of the ensuing political, security and institutional vacuum.

The result has been the destruction and neglect of infrastructure and the loss of human and institutional capacity throughout the economy, polity and society. Conflict has reinforced existing divisions, deeply traumatized the population, and further reduced trust in the state.

A clear example of the impact of the conflict in Iraq is that life expectancy at birth today is 58 years (down from the average of 65 registered thirty years ago), ten years less than that of the region (67.5 years) and the world (68 years).⁷ When comparing its development progress with its neighbours, Iraq can be seen to have fallen behind, stagnated, or progressed more slowly. For example, Iraq is the only country within the immediate region (Egypt, the Gulf States, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey) to show a decline in access to a safe source of drinking water from 1990 to 2006 (from 83 per cent to 77 per cent). Over this period Iraq also fell below the regional access average for Western Asia (86 per cent in 1990 and 90 per cent in 2006) while other neighbours kept pace with or exceeded this improving regional trend.⁸ Iraq's reported 2008 maternal mortality ratio is much higher than those of neighbouring countries (84 deaths per 100,000 live births compared with 41 and 65 in Jordan and Syria respectively⁹) – a significant reversal for a country once renowned as a regional leader in medical service provision.

Despite this grim legacy of conflict, Iraq has scored some positive developments in the past few years. Security incidents have fallen by more than 84 per cent since August 2007.¹⁰ Where once fear of violence stifled normal socioeconomic activity in south and central Iraq, people's perception of security has improved.¹¹ Iraq's northern Kurdistan Region has been able to enjoy improving stability and investment since 2003. The political process is coalescing – Iraq has regained its sovereignty and held successful provincial elections in 2009 – and people's trust in the state is increasing.¹² Some human development indicators have also shown improvement. Food security has risen between 2005 and 2007 and the prevalence of wasting in children under five years of age is down.¹³ Schooling has improved, with an overall increase in enrolment and a narrowing in the gender gap in education achievement.¹⁴ Antenatal care is relatively high (87 per cent of pregnant women made at least one

6. Even though violence has fallen significantly since its peak in mid-2007, it remains at dangerously high levels. During 2009, between 700 and 900 security incidents were reported each month by UNAMI Security Section Iraq (SSI). A security incident is defined as a violent activity that may impact on the safety and security of UN operations in Iraq. The focus is on incidents of political violence (e.g. terrorist/insurgent/militia-related). Data must be reported by at least two sources before incidents are reported by SSI. Levels of violence are expected to increase as the elections approach in early 2010.

7. GoI Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008 (2008)

8. WHO/UNICEF, Joint Monitoring Programme Report on Progress Towards MDG7 (2008)

9. Data from WHO/COSIT/KRSO, Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) 2006-2007, cited in WHO, COSIT, KRSO, Government of Iraq Ministry of Health, Republic of Iraq: Iraq Family Health Survey – Final Report (2007) (unless otherwise stated, all data from IFHS is from this source); UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2008 (2007)

10. UNAMI SSI (September 2009)

11. National averages tend to hide concentrations of insecurity in specific geographic areas, and more recent outbreaks of violence have demonstrated the fragility of this progress. In addition, despite the improvement, Iraq still suffers from high numbers of casualties, the majority of which are civilian. Between January and September 2009, there was a monthly average of at least 443 casualties, of which 254 were civilian.

12. ABC/BBC/NHK, Iraq: Where Things Stand (2009)

13. Food insecurity reduced from 15 to 3 per cent; prevalence of wasting reduced from 9 per cent in 2005 to 4.7 per cent in 2007 (Data from WFP/COSIT/KRSO Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Survey (CFSVA) 2007, cited in WFP/COSIT/KRSO, Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq (CFSVA): Iraq (2008); unless otherwise stated, all data from CFSVA 2007 comes from this source)

14. According to COSIT, enrolment ratios of females to males increased between 1990 and 2007 for all educational levels, for primary (79.5 to 94.2 per cent) and secondary (64.1 to 88.4 per cent) school, and particularly for levels in university (50.9 to 86.6 per cent) and higher education (25.3 to 61.6 per cent) (1990 figures from COSIT Directorate of Social and Educational Statistics; 2007 figures from World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) 2007, cited in World Bank, COSIT, KRSO, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey: IHSES-2007 – Tabulation Report (2008) (unless otherwise stated, all data from IHSES 2007 comes from this report)).

visit)¹⁵ and 80 per cent of births are attended by skilled personnel.¹⁶ The health information system related to surveillance of most communicable diseases has improved. However, Iraq remains vulnerable to violence and insecurity, as some of the fundamental causes of conflict still need to be addressed.

2. A fragile political context

Iraq's vulnerability to conflict and its development prognosis are both affected by the nation's failure to resolve key constitutional and political disputes. Amongst the most pressing of these are the outstanding Hydrocarbon Law – a package of critical legislation on division of oil revenues between federal and regional/governorate state structures – and the territorial dispute between Kurds and Arabs over the status of Kirkuk governorate as well as over a number of districts in the governorates of Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al-Din.

Both of these issues highlight profound divisions within Iraqi state structures concerning the ideal relationship between central and local government. Moreover, the deadlocked Hydrocarbon Law means withholding critical resources from the Iraqi people by preventing the full development of Iraq's oil wealth (currently the primary source of revenue in the country). The disagreement over the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories has a dual impact on the legitimate function of the Iraqi state, depriving the inhabitants of these territories with access to security, rights and services while threatening the smooth progress of critical national legislation through the Council of Representatives (notably for electoral laws in 2008 and again in 2009).

The lack of understanding between Arabs and Kurds concerning administrative jurisdiction of these territories, and absence of clarity on the relationship between the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with regard to the exercise of their respective competencies and responsibilities in those areas, presents a challenge to internal security in Iraq. It also undermines the credibility and capacity of the Iraqi state to rule by law, ensure security, protect and respond to citizens' rights.

Iraq has made profound efforts to move away from ethno-sectarian politics since mid-2007, characterized by a successful provincial election in early 2009 that was based largely on a service-delivery and anti-corruption platform. The challenge is now to continue this pragmatic approach into national elections in 2010, against a backdrop of escalating attempts at inter-sectarian provocation. The shadow of elections in 2010 was also reducing GoI momentum to further dialogue and compromise on some of the most urgent political disputes – notably with the KRG. Not only does this approach exacerbate existing political tensions, it also risks stalling Iraq's development initiatives until a new government is formed and operational by the second quarter of 2010.

3. Poor state accountability, service delivery and political environment

Iraq's fragile political context and consequent development challenges date back to the inception of the state after World War I. The failure to create a Kurdish state in accordance with the principle of self-determination, coupled with inequities in economic resource distribution and political power-sharing across ethnic lines, set the stage for a fractured governance environment and regional tensions between Iraq and its neighbours. Internal fault lines were further strained during the 1970s and 1980s in Iraq due to the policies of the Saddam Hussein government. His treatment of many Iraqi ethnic groups (in particular the Kurds) generated a profound sense of social injustice and created a staggering burden of expectations for post-Saddam Iraqi structures to swiftly rectify a wide range of past wrongs. The post-2003 Coalition Provisional Authority was unable to effect inclusive governance reforms that could enable a future Iraqi state to perform core functions efficiently and effectively.

15. This figure drops to 50 per cent by the fourth visit (GoI MoH)

16. WHO/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, IFHS 2006-2007

Key challenges that affect state performance include: friction in the disputed areas in northern Iraq resulting in poor service delivery, extreme poverty and minimal public and private investment; a non-inclusive and non-transparent political system, weak rule of law and persistent human rights violations; a centralized, inefficient public sector and a bloated, under-skilled civil service;¹⁷ a decentralization process that needs to redefine roles and responsibilities at national and sub-national levels; corruption that affects state performance and undermines trust in the state; and limited institutional capacity to address regional disparities, engage the most vulnerable and neglected sections of the population, and manage the demands of competing groups, including returnees. Weak capacity to anticipate tensions linked to demographic patterns and competition for natural resources, as well as poor management of external shocks and natural disasters are also major concerns.

During a period of global economic decline and given a fragile internal political environment, Iraq will continue to suffer from a reduced state budget¹⁸ and low capacity to administer available funds. The U.S. government reported that Iraq's service ministries spent only 11 per cent of their capital budget in 2008. For example, while the U.S. has spent 87 per cent of the US\$11 billion allocated for reconstruction in oil, electricity and water since 2003, Iraq has spent only 12 per cent of a US\$17 billion investment budget for these sectors.¹⁹ It remains highly unlikely that Iraq will achieve the MDGs unless a concerted effort is made to improve the current governance environment.

4. Regional inequities and disparities

Iraq was once seen as easily divisible into distinct zones for development investment: a poor, rural and chronically under-developed south; a more urbanized and educated centre that was hit hardest by post-2003 violence, and the northern Kurdistan Region enjoying relative stability and development progress. However, data analysis disaggregated to the sub-district level reveals that such divisions are too simplistic. Extreme disparities exist even within districts, making macro-level indicators too blunt a tool for effective development investment planning. For example, the governorate-level figure indicating "no sanitation" (i.e., use of hole or outside disposal of faeces) in Diyala is relatively low at 8 per cent; the figure in Al-Khalis district in Diyala shows a much lower figure of 1 per cent, while directly adjacent to Al-Khalis, Baladrooz district has 39 per cent of inhabitants using an unimproved hole for sanitation. This type of disparity is evident across many indicators and almost every governorate.²⁰

Development vulnerability in Iraq is more accurately described under four categories of unmet needs: those due to recent violence (post-2003, including needs resulting from displacement, infrastructure damage, and lack of access to services and humanitarian assistance, particularly in Salah al-Din, Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Wassit); those due to chronic under-investment and marginalization (since the 1970s, most notably in Basra, Missan, Muthanna and Thiqr in southern Iraq and Dohuk, Ninewa and Suleimaniya in northern Iraq); those due to internal administrative disputes (such as the Arab-Kurdish "green line" spanning Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din), and those along Iraq's national borders (in particular the Iran-Iraq border, due to pervasive landmines, and the Iraq-Turkey border, due to ongoing shelling of border areas targeting the PKK).²¹

Some sub-districts and communities with high access to services are directly adjacent to those with none at all. This challenges UN agencies to be far more targeted in their analysis of needs- and area-based programming, and to avoid making broad decisions on fund allocations based on generic or macro indicators.

17. The number of Iraqis employed in the public sector has doubled since 2005, with the public sector currently providing 43 per cent of all jobs and almost 60 per cent of all full-time jobs. High public sector salaries are straining the public budget, consuming over a third of planned expenditure in 2009 (IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 (2009)).

18. The Gol's investment budget shrank from US\$21 billion in 2008 to US\$12.7 billion in 2009, a drop of 41 per cent. The approved 2010 budget of US\$17 billion, while an improvement, still falls short of 2008 levels and those planned for 2009 before the drop in oil prices.

19. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, Report to Congressional Committees (March 2009)

20. Data from WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007, cited in IAU, Vulnerability Analysis: Indicators from the WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq (CFSVA) 2007 (2008)

21. IAU, Iraq's Transition: Issues and Priorities (2009); data from WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007, cited in IAU, Vulnerability Analysis: Indicators from the WFP WFP/COSIT/KRSO CFSVA 2007 (2008)

5. Poverty and economic context

Almost a quarter of the population – 23 per cent, or nearly 7 million persons – lives below the nationally defined poverty line of US\$2.2 per person per day.²² The rural population is nearly twice as poor as the urban population. Households without a civil servant wage-earner or headed by a poorly educated person are also consistently more vulnerable to poverty.²³ The first goal of the MDGs – to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – is unlikely to be achieved by 2015, given the weak performance of the employment sector and the poor education and high fertility of women. Fifteen per cent of the economically active population is unemployed²⁴ and an additional 29 per cent are underemployed. One in three men aged 20-24 is unemployed and economic activity rates in Iraq among women are low at 17 per cent.²⁵ A major obstacle for the achievement of the MDGs is the weak performance of the economy and the inability to generate productive and decent work.²⁶ As perceptions of security improve, jobs are becoming the top priority for a great number of Iraqis.²⁷

Food prices in local Iraqi markets have doubled between 2004 and 2008, rising at a steeper rate than global food prices and contributing to increased poverty.²⁸ Only a small proportion of the population (3 per cent) suffers from food insecurity, due mainly to the highly subsidized distribution of food through the Public Distribution System (PDS). However, a sizable proportion of the population (22 per cent) is vulnerable to food insecurity, partly due to this high dependence upon the PDS, which itself suffers from major inefficiencies.²⁹ The PDS strains the fiscal budget and, as acknowledged by the GoI, needs to undergo reform while also ensuring that Iraq's most vulnerable and food insecure are protected. This situation calls for the urgent acceleration of Iraq's socioeconomic development, which is also critical to sustain peace.

Although Iraq was once among the most diversified economies of the region, its high dependence on oil revenues is now a critical problem and a source of vulnerability to conflict. The oil sector generates few jobs, and fluctuations in oil revenues strain political fault lines, which in turn fuel disagreement over the ownership and division of revenue sources.

Dependence on oil revenues has also created a system of patronage, leading to weak participation of civil society and lack of transparency in the use of resources. One of the main challenges currently facing Iraq is the use of oil revenues to diversify production and create viable alternatives in non-oil sectors. Meanwhile, increased oil production in the short term is unlikely, given the legislative, investment and security conditions. Consequently, exports in the short term will remain at levels far below what is needed to fund the country's growing development needs, unless the budget is rebalanced.³⁰ Overdependence on oil revenues is also at the root of many obstacles to improving governance and accountability for development results. Diversification of the economy will require a longer-term vision of development and strategic investment, with a clear framework of accountability to monitor effectiveness.

The economic crisis bodes ill for Iraq. Internally, falling oil prices will lower GDP in 2009³¹ and cut government expenditure on investment and private consumption.³² Externally, foreign budgets have declined as a result of the global recession and this, coupled with remaining instability in Iraq, is

22. ID 77,000 per person per month (equivalent of US\$2.2 person per day). (COSIT/KRSO/World Bank, Poverty Assessment (draft June 2009)).

23. The average per capita income of a household with one civil servant is 25 per cent greater than that of a household with no civil servants (data from WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007, cited in IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 (2009)).

24. COSIT, Labour Force Survey 2008

25. IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 (2009)

26. The term 'decent work' is used to emphasize that the jobs created need to provide sufficient income, provide social security coverage for workers, respect labour standards and create a conducive environment for social dialogue between the government and its traditional social partners. This is also the official language used in the UN World Summit (2005) and adopted by ECOSOC Ministerial Declarations, 2006 and 2007.

27. ABC/BBC/NHK, Iraq: Where Things Stand (2009)

28. FAO, IAU, Iraq Food Prices Analysis (2009)

29. WFP/ COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA (2008)

30. Nevertheless, in the medium to long term, Iraqi authorities expect further increases in production and exports.

31. Oil prices averaged US\$69 per barrel in 2007, US\$94 per barrel in 2008 and US\$57 per barrel in 2009 (as of 21 October). Given that between 91 per cent and 92 per cent of the GoI budget comes from oil (IMF Standby Agreement, 2008), it is reasonable to assume that there would be a decline in growth in 2009 compared to 2008.

32. The approved Federal Budget includes a reduction of over a third of investment for 2009.

limiting the flow of foreign direct investment. Iraq's low credit ranking also makes it hard to access international financing mechanisms, perpetuating an oil-dependent economy and a deflating GDP.³³ However, the recent recovery in oil prices and announcement of new major international investments in the oil sector could positively impact GDP growth.

6. Lack of participation in wider social, political and economic processes, particularly among women, youth and children

State accountability in Iraq depends on the degree of actual and perceived participation of citizens in decision-making and shaping governance. Iraq's citizens (regardless of age, sex, disability, religious or ethnic background) have traditionally been unable to participate adequately in decision-making. Civil society is weak, with limited awareness among citizens about rights and duties. Ensuring that citizens participate in the state rebuilding process is critical for stability, peace and long-term development. It is also necessary to stem the growing sense of exclusion, particularly among women and youth, which in some instances can lead to tensions and violence.

While Iraq has fulfilled its constitutional mandate requiring 25 per cent of parliamentary seats to be filled by women, women still remain under-represented at higher levels in the public sector and government.³⁴ Women also have higher illiteracy levels, participate in smaller numbers in the labour force, are paid less and are segregated in certain occupations.³⁵ Women-headed households disproportionately live in poverty: seven in 10 female-headed households are poor.³⁶

Overall, the lack of mechanisms for effective participation hinders the ability of citizens to claim their rights and goes against the principles underpinning the MDGs. Women and youth face specific challenges to participating in and benefiting from wider social, political and economic life. There is a lack of information on the prevalence of disability in Iraq and how it impacts participation in social, political and economic life. Poverty and inadequate social protection systems have left children particularly vulnerable. Economic constraints on families, exacerbated by conflict, have made prospects for child labour more attractive than school attendance, particularly in camps for displaced persons. By 2006, one in nine children aged five to 14 were working.³⁷ The situation remains dire in rural areas, where three times more children work compared to urban areas. However, child labour tends to decrease as a mother's education increases, reflecting the ripple effects of empowering women.³⁸

Youth face particular constraints to securing employment. Youth unemployment is rising: 450,000 youngsters join the labour market each year.³⁹ Youth-targeted health, education and employment services and opportunities are essential for empowering youth to claim their rights. With 43 per cent of the Iraqi population under the age of 15,⁴⁰ this segment represents a significant and potentially destabilizing factor if its potential is not properly channelled. However, with strategic investment in their capacities, the youth of Iraq could constitute the foundation for future sustainable development.

Opportunities that are scarce to all citizens tend to be even less accessible to women. Violence, social traditions, insecurity and weak state performance affect women differently from men. The link between the wider conflict and violence directed towards women is poorly documented. More systematic reporting of violent incidents is needed, as are incentives to encourage women to report. However, domestic violence is known to be widespread, with about one in five married Iraqi women being a victim of physical domestic violence and one in three subjected to emotional violence.⁴¹

33. The Iraqi budget may expand in 2010 as a result of recovering oil prices and IMF growth predictions. Nevertheless, problems remain in the high proportion of operational expenditures and limited GoI capacity to expend funds.

34. GoI Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008 (2008); COSIT, Labour Force Survey 2008

35. COSIT, Labour Force Survey 2008; World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007

36. WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007. However, IHSES provides contradictory data showing that women-headed households are not disproportionately among the poor (World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007).

37. (data from UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/Government of Iraq Ministry of Health, Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2006, cited in UNICEF, COSIT, KRSO, Ministry of Health, Iraq: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women – Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006 Final Report: Volume 1 (2007); unless otherwise stated, all statistics from MICS 2006 are from this source).

38. WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007

39. IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 (2009)

40. UN Population Division (2008)

41. WHO/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, IFHS 2006-2007

Few differences are discernible by age, education or rural/urban residence, although marked differences exist between low incidence in the Kurdistan Region and higher incidence in the centre/south. Part of the problem lies in a culture of tolerance of household violence against women: for instance, almost three in five women believe a husband is justified in beating his wife.⁴² Other examples of violence against women, although not well documented at the national level, include the under-reported practice of female genital mutilation and so-called “honour killings”.

7. Reintegration of IDPs and refugees

Since February 2006, over 1.6 million Iraqis have been displaced within their country, while hundreds of thousands have taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Some 293,000 Iraqi refugees are registered with UNHCR as active cases in the region.⁴³

Displacement increases vulnerability and strains the resources of host communities. It has also depleted human capital, with the exodus of many educated and professional people, thereby creating a key challenge for sustainable and inclusive national reconciliation.

Most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees regard a return to their homes as the main solution to their plight, while a smaller number of IDPs would consider local integration as an ultimate solution.⁴⁴ Returns have slowly increased, but fewer than 25 per cent of the total displaced have returned.⁴⁵ Addressing the displacement problem and fostering the conditions that will allow displaced persons to return home will depend not only on security but also greatly on conditions affecting the communities to which they seek to return – including economic factors, better governance, the justice system and human rights situation, and access to basic services and housing. As displaced families tend to feel well received by host communities and safe in their current residences,⁴⁶ families may delay a decision to return to their areas of origin unless they are assured of their safety and economic viability. Without jobs, services and the restoration of the rule of law and legal protection, many displaced persons may continue to count on external aid or temporary measures.

8. Environment, management of natural resources and climate change risks

The environment in Iraq is defined by declining natural resources and their unsustainable use by an environmentally unaware population. This is manifested by two consecutive years of drought,⁴⁷ desertification and elevated soil salinity, increasing carbon emissions, loss of biodiversity and a rural supply of water increasingly unsuitable for agriculture, livestock or drinking. Poor municipal services, maintenance and management of towns, together with an acute shortage of decent housing, contribute to a deteriorating urban environment with worsening air, noise and water pollution. The lack of industrial waste management and accident response planning leads to pollution from chemicals and other waste products. Every day, 600 million cubic feet of natural gas escapes instead of being harnessed as a source of energy. As the fourth worst offender in the world in this regard,⁴⁸ Iraq contributes to depreciation of its own environment, the environment of West Asia, and to overall climate change.⁴⁹ The diversification of the economy away from oil would assist in mitigating these effects. In addition, policies under the Saddam Hussein regime, including the burning of oil fields when withdrawing from Kuwait and the draining of marshlands to deprive people of traditional livelihoods, have had a lasting negative impact.

42. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006

43. UNHCR data (April 2009)

44. IOM, Emergency Needs Assessments, February 22, 2009: Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq (2009)

45. UNHCR, Monthly Statistical Update on Return (July 2009)

46. According to IOM data, 99 per cent felt well received by their host communities and 98 per cent felt safe in their current place of residence (IOM Emergency Needs and Monitoring Assessments (September 2009)).

47. 39 per cent of all crop land in Iraq (9.7 million hectares) was affected by drought in both 2008 and 2009 (FAO/IAU, Drought Mapping Analysis (July 2009)). Consequently, wheat and barley production in 2008/2009 was expected to be halved, with implications for poverty and food insecurity.

48. Behind Russia, Nigeria and Iran

49. Energy Committee of the Prime Minister's Advisory Board

Currently, Iraq is experiencing severe drought and increasing desertification, due in part to the effects of climate change and to the marked reduction in the volume of water in Iraq's rivers partially as a result of upstream water use and damming. Water insecurity could lead to a shortage of hydropower, pervasive desertification, dust storms, loss of biodiversity and the spread of waterborne diseases – all of which would impact households and farming communities, with particular harm to the poor and marginalized (women, children, elderly, disabled and other vulnerable groups). Lower rainfall will directly affect the “fertile crescent” and might even cause it to disappear altogether.

Pressure on the natural environment strains economic development, particularly in agriculture. It also negatively impacts quality of life, especially for women. For example, in a drought situation, women bear the increased burden of fetching water and facilitating other basic household needs. Moreover, failure to channel resource revenues towards growth and sustainable development has already contributed to resource-related conflict at various levels. Scarcity of water or land, in a context of poor governance, can heighten community and regional tensions.

Iraq recently ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (28 July 2009). As a current Accession Member, with the convention set to come into force, the GoI has agreed to the objective of “stabilizing greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.⁵⁰ As part of the Convention, the GoI will have the opportunity to engage with other ratifying countries to gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies and best practices, launch strategies for addressing emissions and adapting to impacts, and cooperate in preparing adaptation strategies. The GoI will also have the opportunity to access funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) through the Special Climate Change Fund, which can provide support to the country in areas such as adaptation, technology transfer, energy access, capacity development and economic diversification.

9. Soaring youth population and increasing urbanization

Iraq's population tripled between 1970 and 2007, from 10 million to 30 million. By 2030, it will have multiplied to almost 50 million.⁵¹ Two thirds (67 per cent) live in urban areas,⁵² although regions vary greatly, with Baghdad governorate having the highest urban population (87 per cent) and Diyala the highest rural population (59 per cent). While fertility rates have decreased in the past decade, Iraq remains among high-fertility countries, with a 4.3 total fertility rate, compared with a global average of 2.6. As a consequence of chronic conflict, Iraqis lost over four years of average life expectancy in a decade: life expectancy at birth in Iraq dropped from 62.5 years in 1995 to 58 years in 2005. The high growth and demographic momentum embedded in the age structure of the population will have a medium and long term impact on economic and social policies.

This unprecedented population growth with its attendant youth/adolescent bulge becomes a particular concern in the context of state fragility, scarce economic opportunities and poor service delivery. To harness this development, plans need to consider demographic change, population growth, and forced migration, with a particular focus on children and youth. High quality education, an adequate number of quality health facilities, gender equality in employment and adequate security will contribute to inclusive economic growth and help reduce poverty.

Low rural and agricultural development is driving migration to urban areas, generating pressure on service delivery and increasing urban poverty. The major cities are a destination both for people seeking economic opportunities and for displaced families. These factors, combined with the high fertility rate, increase pressure on urban services. Overcrowding is prevalent (13 per cent of houses in urban Iraq have more than ten occupants)⁵³ and services such as water supply, sanita-

50. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2 (http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php)

51. UN Population Division (2008)

52. COSIT data (2007)

53. GoI Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MoMPW), UN-HABITAT, The State of Iraq Cities Report 2006/2007: Cities in Transition (2007)

tion, waste management and electricity, already underfunded and overstretched, are unable to keep pace with demand. Consequently, 57 per cent of the urban population lives in slum-like conditions.⁵⁴ Incentives to stimulate the rural economy should be part of a comprehensive strategy to diversify revenue generation production away from oil.

10. Iraq's ability to predict and address man-made and natural disasters

Conflict and climate change are frequent drivers of emergencies in Iraq, yet response measures to such identifiable risks as desertification, flood, declining natural resources, land mines, and civil strife remain inadequate. Historically, Iraq has adopted a response-based, militarized approach to natural and human-induced disaster episodes. The lack of a central civil protection structure able to analyze and prevent threats, as well as manage an emergency response, remains a major concern. Local structures (such as Governorate Emergency Cells) are neither institutionalized nor adequately resourced. Implementation of international frameworks on disaster risk reduction – primarily the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and the Bali Action Plan 2008 – are particularly critical in the Iraqi context to build confidence in the state and integrate emergency preparedness into longer-term development planning at both the national and community levels.

11. Statistics systems and data collection

Over the past three decades, Iraq's national statistical system has degraded due to conflict, sanctions, lack of skilled cadres in certain areas, and disengagement from its regional and international peers. Although a strong central statistical organization exists (COSIT), it lacks visibility due to poor system-wide coordination and an inability to provide coherent, integrated and up-to-date information systems for monitoring and evaluation. Additional problems facing Iraq's national statistical system are the politicization of some statistical activities such as the population census, wide regional gaps, outdated technical tools and poor administrative records and central registries.

Iraq's national statistical system does not reflect international best practices and its activities, including not only those of the COSIT but also of all line ministries and public agencies involved in statistical production and dissemination, are not planned holistically. A coherent, efficient and well-integrated national statistical system is needed for monitoring progress and performance in a number of vital areas, including the implementation of the upcoming NDP, Poverty Reduction Strategy, UN and joint programmes within the framework of the UNDAF, and national public policies.

54. Ibid.

Box 2: Iraq's International Obligations

International Conventions and Treaties

(Signed, Ratified or Acceded to by Iraq)

Treaty/Convention:

- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva, 1925, acceded 1931)
- Procès-verbal relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930 (London, 1936)
- Constitution of the World Health Organization (New York, 1946, accepted 1947); Amendments to articles 24 and 25 (accepted 1970); Amendment to article 74 of the Constitution of the World Health Organisation (accepted 1984)
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UN General Assembly, 1948) (acceded 1959)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948)
- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (UN General Assembly 1961, superseding the previous "Lake Success Protocol" of 1946, which superseded previous Protocols on Narcotic Drugs dated 1912, 1925, 1931 and 1936 (signed 1946 and accepted 1950)
- Slavery Convention (Geneva, 1926 and amended by Protocol, 1955) (accepted 1955)
- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (UN General Assembly, 1949) (acceded 1955)
- United Nations 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (Geneva, 1956, ratified 1963)
- Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (State Party, 14 February 1956)
- Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954, ratified 1967) and First Protocol (1954, ratified 1967); Second protocol (1999) not ratified
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna, 1961, ratified 1963)
- Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality (Vienna, 1961, ratified 1963)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1969, ratified 1971)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1969, ratified 1971; Iraq did not sign the First and Second Protocols)
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN General Assembly, 1969, ratified 1970)
- Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, 1970, accepted 1973)
- Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Paris, 1972, accepted 1974)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (London, Moscow, Washington, 1972, ratified 1991)
- Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1971, acceded 1976)
- Protocol to the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials (Nairobi, 1976, acceded 1978)
- International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (UN General Assembly 1973, acceded 1976)
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (UN General Assembly, 1981, acceded 1986)

- International Convention against Apartheid in Sports (UN General Assembly, 1985, acceded 1989)
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989, acceded 1994); Amendment to article 43(2) (1985, accepted 2001)
- Food Aid Convention (London, 1999)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Paris and New York, 1993, acceded 2009)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Oslo, 1997)
- United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 1998, acceded 1998)
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000, acceded 2008)
- Agreement on International Roads in the Arab Mashreq (Beirut, 2001; signed 2002, ratified 2008)
- International Health Regulations (2005)
- United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN General Assembly, 2003, acceded 2008)
- Core Conventions of the ILO: C29 (Forced Labour) (ratified 1962), C98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining) (ratified 1962), C100 (Equal Remuneration) (ratified 1963), C111 (Discrimination, Employment and Occupation) (ratified 1959), C138 (Minimum Age Convention) (ratified 1985), C182 (Elimination of the Worst forms of Child Labour) (ratified 2001)
- WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Geneva, 2003, acceded 2008)
- Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna, 1995, acceded 2008)
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (acceded 2008)
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Rio de Janeiro, 1992, acceded 2009) and Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (2009)
- Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 1992, acceded 2009)
- Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo, 2000, acceded 2009)
- Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, plus Supplement (Palermo, 2000, acceded 2009)

International Conventions and Treaties (Signed but not ratified or acceded to)

- Protocol amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, signed at Paris on 18 May 1904, amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, 4 May 1949, signed 1949, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, signed at Paris on 4 May 1910. Definitive signature 1949.
- Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954)
- Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977)
- Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1974-1977 (1977)
- Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (1990)
- International Conference on Population and Development – Programme of Action (1994)
- Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008)
- Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2008)

2.2 Thematic Analysis

Governance

Introduction

DESPITE the efforts of the GoI and the achievements of the last two years, Iraq's governance context continues to be challenging. Failures of governance have historically contributed to a volatile atmosphere and, since the 2003 U.S.-led military offensive, to a high level of violence and insecurity. The consequences of this have had a profound impact on the Iraqi state and society and on the relationship between the Iraqi state and its citizens. Weak governance capacities make the process of state building and peace building difficult and reduce the prospects of achieving the MDGs.

Key challenges facing Iraq today include: establishing state legitimacy and accountability through an inclusive and participatory political process; increasing the state's capacity to exert its authority, rule by law, ensure security, and protect citizens' rights; and strengthening state capacity to perform other core functions and to deliver services in a manner that is efficient, inclusive and responsive to the needs and expectations of citizens, including the most vulnerable groups.

Specific challenges, which contribute to violence and insecurity and strain the capacities of the Iraqi state, include the need to address political and social divisions within and among communities, to rebuild physical, human, and social capital, to reintegrate displaced populations, and to protect the environment. Providing women with equal opportunities and ensuring the protection of their rights is a critical challenge.

While building the state is a critical objective, consolidating peace is a priority, as is ensuring that the process of state and peace building is based on an increasingly positive relationship between state and citizens. Peace will not be sustainable without a strong state and a sound system of governance.

Governance and the MDGs

Governance, as a process, applies to all of the MDGs, but has particular direct relevance in the Iraqi context in terms of MDGs 1, 3 and 8.⁵⁵ (Iraq's progress measured against a nationalized set of MDG indicators can be found in Annex C.) The Millennium Declaration recognizes good governance as the means for achieving global goals. Failures of governance and their consequences for state and society impact on the prospects of achieving critical MDGs. Strengthening the legitimacy, authority and capacity of the state will contribute to achieving the MDGs in several ways: effective governance reforms and stronger political commitment will generate more resources to pursue goals; increased accountability in the political process and of state institutions is key to achieving the MDGs. The responsiveness of the state to the needs of citizens, especially women and marginalized people, can ensure the sustainability of the achievements the MDGs.

(This analysis is based on the pre-CCA analysis report,⁵⁶ on expert papers on the key governance topics identified by the UN and the GoI, and on consultations with Iraqi and international experts.⁵⁷)

55. MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development (www.un.org/millenniumgoals)

56. IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

57. Amman and Baghdad workshops, August 2009. The analysis is informed by the existing body of literature and practice on state and peace building. The conceptual framework utilized in this CCA is informed by the existing body of literature on state and peace building, including recent publications by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Co-operation Directorate and other UN and international partners.

Key issues facing governance in Iraq

1. Issues with the legitimacy of the state

The legitimacy of the Iraqi state and the relationship between citizens and the state remain weak. Despite progress evidenced by the governorate elections of 2009 and subsequent political negotiations, a key problem has been the historical incapacity of the political process to mediate among and represent citizens' interests through an inclusive and transparent political system. This has contributed to threats to the state by non-state armed and insurgent groups (which still persist), and to divisions along sectarian and ethnic lines. Weak capacities of civil society and an unfavourable environment for participation have kept people from engaging effectively in the political arena. Women, youth, the less educated and the poor lack the power and capacity to ensure that their interests are represented through political participation and communication with decision makers. The general lack of security, the lack of decision-making accountability and the absence of public debate on national priorities affect development prospects and relegate national interests such as environmental protection to a lower priority among competing political priorities. The slow progress in improving core resource management and the weak commitment to strengthening disaster risk management capacities weaken state legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi citizens.

An inclusive and participatory process of political reconciliation is necessary to strengthen peace and to rebuild the state. This must go together with stronger mechanisms for representation (i.e., the Council of Representatives, elections), an agreement on pending constitutional issues, and effective participation of citizens, both women and men, and civil society.

a. Political reconciliation

Recent developments show that Iraq is moving towards a new political phase in which sectarian political polarization, which has characterized the political climate in the past few years, is progressively being superseded by coalitions based on pragmatism and secular nationalist parties favouring a strong national government.⁵⁸ Data show that citizens still have little trust in political parties, but nevertheless are progressively engaging in political activities – a sign of increased confidence in the political process.⁵⁹ The development of professional political parties⁶⁰ capable of both effective governance and representation of their constituencies is critical for Iraq's efforts to establish a democratic system and to ensure that the process of political reconciliation is sustainable. Women, although represented in Parliament in compliance with agreed quotas, still have limited access to political life, and are thus excluded from truly participating in the process of political reconciliation. The legacy of political exclusion inherited from the previous regime, the severe impact of the conflict on political and social cohesion, the presence of an underdeveloped political system, and the interference of political, traditional, and religious groups all challenge political reconciliation.

b. Disputed internal boundaries

Since 2003, the continuing dispute between Kurds and Arabs over territories in northern Iraq has undermined the internal cohesion of the Iraqi state and negatively impacted the development of these areas. On a national level, the dispute features competing Arab and Kurdish visions of the nature of the Iraqi state and undermines its credibility by leaving fundamental foundational questions unresolved. Internal relations between ethno-sectarian components that populate each district are strained. With

58. Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq monthly reports (March-August 2009)

59. GoI Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008 (2008)

60. More than 200 political entities contested in the 2009 governorate council elections.

regard to development, competing administrative claims have directly complicated service delivery in districts and sub-districts where local administrators are put in the awkward position of having to translate competing policies into development plans. In some cases, technical directorates are staffed from different governorates with entirely separate reporting structures. This impedes effective administration and management and further undermines the credibility of the state to fulfil its responsibilities.

c. Representative democracy

Representative governance has made significant progress in Iraq since 2005, as a pluralist-democratic system of government has emerged, and a transitional National Assembly was elected to draft the permanent Constitution. Although imperfect, this was Iraq's first experience with representative democracy for decades. Iraq's first Council of Representatives was elected at the end of 2005.⁶¹ Despite flaws with electoral laws, links have been created between some MPs and their constituencies, allowing civil society to have its voice heard at the national level; this was further facilitated by the establishment of Council offices in 18 provinces. The Council also strengthened its overall capacity and is starting to contribute to such critical processes as the national budget debate. However, a number of continuing weaknesses have impaired the Council's ability to satisfy its constitutional obligations, including nepotism, flaws in the Council's bylaws, weak capacity amongst MPs and parliamentary staff, a breakdown in political discourse, heightened vulnerability to high-level political disputes, and a weak electoral framework that encourages voting along sectarian lines with little responsiveness to citizens' concerns. The result has been a sluggish legislative process and an absence of effective oversight.

d. Participatory governance

A weak culture of direct participation, the impact of insecurity and conflict since 2003 on the cohesiveness of communities, and the weak capacities of CSOs, trade unions, and employers' organizations partly explain the limited involvement of Iraq's citizens in political and other spheres of public life. The media have a mixed record and are not considered completely independent from partisan interferences. Research institutes ("think tanks") are not fully developed as sources of independent and competent political and policy analysis. Socioeconomic and cultural barriers, low literacy and educational status also prevent citizens, particularly women and, to an extent, the less educated and young people, from active participation. Iraq's constitution calls for a new role for civil society institutions, and for the creation of an enabling legal and political environment to facilitate citizens' participation in the process of political and social reconciliation and in strengthening democratic governance.⁶²

e. Pending constitutional issues

Iraq has a weak constitutional tradition, however. Before 2003, the country was administered by the 1970 Temporary Constitution. In 2004, the CPA drafted and enforced the Temporary Administrative Law, which served as a transitional constitution. The new Constitution, approved in 2005, was a positive achievement. However, it left a number of fundamental issues unresolved, including: the vertical distribution of powers; the preferred type of electoral system;⁶³ a political parties law; agreement on the exploitation of natural resources (in particular management of water and hydrocarbon resources); and contentious issues of political minorities, particularly in disputed areas in Northern Iraq.⁶⁴ In addition, a number of specific provisions have been either ignored or systematically violated (or left ambiguous), including the important oversight role of the Council of Representatives over the executive branch, and issues relating to women's rights.

61. As per provisions of the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law and of the country's permanent Constitution of 15 October 2005, the Council ended its first term in January 2010.

62. Iraqi Constitution, Art. 45.

63. Election laws agreed by the Council have so far emphasized political compromise between the ruling elite's different groups, to the detriment of real representation for ordinary citizens. The effect is a partial system of government that encourages incumbents' re-election, to the detriment of participatory governance.

64. The term 'minorities' is sensitive, as groups described by others as 'minorities' in particular regions or cities of Iraq may not see themselves as such (e.g., the Turkmen in Kirkuk). It is also important to distinguish between ethnic or religious minorities and political minorities. With respect to the interests of political minorities, it is the role of a constitutional system to offer protection on a counter-majoritarian basis. UNAMI, OPCA Constitutional Support Unit (2009)

1.1 Immediate, underlying and root causes relating to governance

Immediate causes of constraints to good governance include:

1. the undermining of trust and cohesion within and among communities as a result of years of abuse, conflict, and insecurity;
2. the capture of political space by members of political and religious groups, including those that were supported by the multinational occupation, whose ties with Iraqi society remain tenuous as a result of long periods of exile;
3. a lack of confidence in the ability of the state to perform its minimal functions of security and service delivery;
4. political division and competition along sectarian, ethnic and religious lines;
5. low public trust in political parties;
6. socioeconomic and cultural barriers and categories, including literacy and educational status, and;
7. weakened mechanisms for conflict resolution and the subsequent impact of invasion, occupation and war.

Underlying causes include:

1. unresolved constitutional issues, including the lack of clarity in the electoral law and the weak empowerment of citizens through the political process;
2. disparities in educational status;
3. insufficient use of good practices for inclusive governance;
4. non-observance or inadequacy of existing legal and regulatory frameworks;
5. weak capacities of and poor environment for CSOs, trade unions and employers' organizations, and;
6. weak media and lack of a "public voice".

Root causes include:

1. democratic governance structures in early stages of development in a political environment defined by response to external influences (sanctions, occupation) and not to national interests;
2. weak civil society participation and capacities, with poorly articulated concepts of rights and duties;
3. corruption and a lack of accountability, transparency and information sharing – mechanisms and practices needed for inclusive governance;
4. a legacy of centralization and non-representation of people in the power structure, with poor institutional capacities, inadequate investments, and a shortage of qualified human resources and weak capacity development;
5. the political economy of oil that separated the state from its citizens (with oil income accruing to the state directly, supporting the state-controlled economy without resort to tax revenues), and;
6. illiteracy and marginalization of minorities and women.

1.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Political entities in Iraq primarily tend to reflect demographic constituencies rather than the political and ideological preferences of citizens. Political parties, sectarian groups, and traditional and religious leaders, all of whom are critical to political and social reconciliation, have in some instances played a divisive role, and in others have contributed to peaceful cooperation.⁶⁵ These actors engage with local and national level players and institutions, and with citizens. They have the primary responsibility to strengthen the legitimacy of the state by enabling representation. The difficulties that political parties are experiencing are caused by a number of weaknesses, seen in the level of civil-society participation; in the lack of mechanisms for representation and underdeveloped oversight capacities; in the fractured legal environment, including the absence of a political party law; in poor capacities of MPs to formulate and enact legislation, and, above all, in inadequate skills development.

Iraqi citizens are the primary rights-holders in the process of strengthening the legitimacy of the state. Overall their capacities for inclusion and participation in the political process, in particular those of groups such as women (the most vulnerable) and youth, who are often marginalized from public life, are weak. Because of their ability to reach out to communities at the local level and across the country, traditional and religious leaders can play an important role in defending marginalized people in promoting their rights, including those of women. CSOs, including the media and think tanks, can mediate between citizens, political actors, and the state, and can shape the governance environment and a development vision for Iraq. CSOs, in particular, lack a knowledge of participatory approaches, as well as management, advocacy, and technical capacities. Also, many CSOs, community-based organizations, and the media have political or religious affiliations, which undermine their independence and watchdog role.⁶⁶

2. Issues with the rule of law, security and human rights protection

The capacity of the Iraqi state to exert legitimate authority, and to rule by law, is weakened by the cumulative effect of years of violence and the general degradation of state institutions since 1991. Insecurity, particularly since 2003, human rights violations, and reduced access to justice have had a severe impact on communities, especially on women and the most vulnerable. It has also led to political and sectarian-driven violence against male youth. The authority vacuum has created space for opportunistic actors, who in some instances have occupied the legitimate space of the state and taken upon themselves the tasks of the police and judiciary.⁶⁷ Weak implementation of the rule of law, combined with an uncertain security situation, has also created a poor environment for peace consolidation and socioeconomic development, and undermines the state's ability to perform its functions.⁶⁸ The lifting of structural blockages to gender equality (e.g., discriminatory legal provisions), and a gender-sensitive justice system and police force equally accessible to and protective of women and girls, are required to ensure better protection of rights.

The GoI has made progress in recent years in regaining control over the territory and gradually improving security in most parts of the country. However, the capacities of formal justice institutions remain constrained, and access to justice for the poor and women, amongst others, continues to be limited. Limits on the capacity and governance of the security sector also compromise institutions

65. IAU, Iraq Community-Based Conflict Assessments: A synthesis (2009)

66. This paragraph applies to the other issues explored in this paper, and will not be repeated under each issue.

67. IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009); IAU, Iraq Community-Based Conflict Assessments: A synthesis (2009)

68. Key sectors like the economy, management of natural resources, protection of the environment, and the private sector are directly affected as a consequence of the weak enforcement of legal and regulatory provisions and of insecurity. The delivery of services is undermined by the high levels of insecurity and by the incapacity of citizens to claim their rights through a variety of legal and non-legal systems.

like the police and the army in their law enforcement role. Inadequate and poorly implemented legal and security frameworks and the vulnerability of relevant institutions to political and criminal interference are key factors affecting both the state's capacity to exert its authority, rule by law and protect human rights, on the one hand, and citizens' opportunities to access justice, on the other.

a. The judiciary and formal institutions

The formal Iraqi justice system is considered fundamentally capable. It was more or less ignored under the previous regime, and in some respects has been less affected than other sectors by the violence of the past few years. The burden of conflict and insecurity, however, is felt also across the judicial institutions and has affected the rule of law in general. Significant levels of violence continue to challenge the system, including through the intimidation of judicial personnel. Poor infrastructure, a "brain drain" of skilled jurists, and a large number of conflict-related disputes (e.g., over land and property issues and human rights abuses) have further strained system capacities. The judicial system needs to be modernized and upgraded, including through the hiring and empowering of an adequate professional cadre.

b. Access to justice by vulnerable groups

Although access to justice does not feature as a critical problem for many, economically disadvantaged groups, women, children, young people and the disabled have limited access to the formal justice system, have little confidence in its workings, and often rely on traditional justice mechanisms. There is a lack of information about whether women's access to the formal justice system is restricted by women's own choices – informed by cultural beliefs – or imposed by male and family counterparts. The fact that the majority of Iraqi women accept that a husband is justified in beating his wife⁶⁹ would suggest that women's access to justice is constrained not by a lack of confidence on the part of women, but by unequal power relations within the family structure. Lack of access may also be related to the poor legislative enforcement of gender equality. The absence of a domestic violence bill and the failure to revise property laws to facilitate women's inheritance, especially in the context of widow-headed households,⁷⁰ further illustrate the shortcomings of the justice sector in empowering women.

Unsurprisingly, rural communities report an overwhelming use of, and confidence in, informal dispute resolution systems.⁷¹ Various formal and informal dispute settlement mechanisms exist in Iraq, ranging from formal to religious courts and family, religious and political structures. These mechanisms, which play an important role in promoting social reconciliation and in addressing community tensions, often do not meet national and international human rights standards. Iraqi women tend to be unaware that they can seek redress through formal justice mechanisms. Restrictions on women's movement without a male relative and the limited number of female case and police officers limit women's reporting of abuse to authorities. Lack of awareness about women's rights and of official reporting mechanisms, combined with limited outreach of law enforcement and the perceived shame associated with sexual and gender-based abuse, also hamper women's ability and willingness to redress human rights violations against them.⁷²

69. 59 per cent of women in Iraq aged 15-49 believed that a husband is justified in beating his wife. Acceptance was highest in the southern governorates of Thiqr and Wassit (at 85 per cent and 83 per cent respectively) (UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006).

70. One in ten Iraqi households is headed by women; of these, 90 per cent are headed by widows (WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007; World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007).

71. IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

72. UNDP, Gender Equality Strategy 2009 (2009)

c. The security sector

For the state to recover fully its capacity to exert authority and protect citizens' rights, the governance of the security sector needs attention.⁷³ Re-establishing the authority and capacity of the police and the army, which have been significantly reduced since 2003, and articulating a clear policy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, are necessary steps towards consolidating the legitimate authority of the state. The Iraq National Security Strategy 2009-2011 articulates some of these objectives.⁷⁴ Recent improvements in the capacities and oversight of the police and the army are showing results. The police, in particular, made significant progress in recruiting and training, winning public confidence, and reducing sectarian division.⁷⁵ This is reflected by improved public perceptions of security.⁷⁶ However, within certain sectors, such as mine action, an institutional deadlock has prevailed since December 2008. Overall, increased resources and political commitment, including commitment to reduce corruption in the system, and strengthened oversight mechanisms are required for the security sector to become more effective and accountable.

d. Compliance with human rights standards

Human rights abuses and gender discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of some communities and the insufficient level of protection of the most vulnerable groups (e.g., children) have proliferated under the cumulative effect of years of violence, neglect, and weak state capacities. Iraq has acceded to and ratified several international human rights instruments and conventions. These, however, have not been consistently translated into domestic law. The law establishing an independent high commission for human rights entered into force in 2008. However, as of September 2009, the commission had not yet been established partly due to the lack of consensus among Iraqi stakeholders.⁷⁷ Weak implementation of legal and human rights frameworks and, in some areas, cultural and social structures are constraining women's capacities to participate effectively in public life, to access services and economic opportunities, and to claim their rights.

The poor, displaced populations, children and young people are also vulnerable to rights violations and must be protected and empowered to access services and opportunities in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner. The handling of detainees also remains an issue of concern. Each and every MDG is directly affected by the lack of fulfilment of human rights obligations in Iraq, marked by the inability of the state to dispense its obligations for the fulfilment of the rights of all people within Iraq's territory, and the weak capacity of citizens to claim their rights.

2.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to legal, security and rights issues

Immediate causes of constraints to the rule of law, security and human rights include:

1. the damage caused by decades of international sanctions, conflict and armed violence which contributed to a lack of institutional trust;
2. political interference, which undermines the independence of the judiciary;
3. the presence of illegal, sectarian and private armed groups within law enforcement bodies or that seek to replace law enforcement;
4. the unilateral disbandment of the Ba'ath party and its constituent security components;

73. Although the current environment and the state of knowledge do not allow an appropriate analysis at this stage, this is an area that will require increasing attention and partnership between the GoI and international partners.

74. The Strategy defines four strategic components: Security - sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the use of security forces; Political - national reconciliation, good governance, regional cooperation, and international agreements, including promoting human rights, compensating victims, attacking unemployment and poverty, and providing for amnesty; Economic - reformed societal institutions, combating corruption, and promoting economic growth, and Informational - providing legal sanctions for free and responsible journalism and confronting incitements to violence and terrorism.

75. Embassy of the United States of America, Iraq, Rule of Law Strategic Action Plan (2009)

76. ABC/BBC/NHK, Iraq: Where Things Stand (2009)

77. UNAMI Human Rights Office (September 2009)

5. insecurity and threats to judicial institutions;
6. the additional burden to the justice system due to the great number of cases linked to the conflict;
7. shortage of qualified and trained judicial professionals due to “brain drain” and the degradation of the training institutions, and;
8. traditional systems not compliant with human rights standards.

Underlying causes include:

1. under-developed systems of oversight and weak checks and balances, which undermine public trust in institutions and their accountability;
2. unequal access to justice for the poor, marginalized and vulnerable;
3. competition and interference among traditional, religious, community rules and judiciary;
4. weak drafting and legislative capacity and non-observance of legal frameworks;
5. lack of resources and planning capacity;
6. lack of coordination and cooperation among security sector institutions;
7. insufficient skills and capacities among the professional cadre, and;
8. lack of civilian oversight of security institutions.

Root causes include:

1. the fragility of the relationship between citizens and the state, and low public trust in state authority;
2. inadequate alternative dispute resolution measures that fail to ensure the protection of rights;
3. marginalization, exclusion and lack of gender sensitivity, which lower access to justice;
4. poor governance of the security sector;
5. incomplete and outdated legislation, inadequate regulatory framework, and poor legal institutionalization;
6. outdated education system and lack of human capital development;
7. lack of integrity among law enforcement agencies, and institutionalization and acceptance of corruption, and;
8. weakness of oversight functions.

2.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

The judiciary,⁷⁸ the Ministry of Justice,⁷⁹ and security sector institutions are critical actors in enforcing the rule of law, reducing insecurity and protecting citizens’ rights. Their capacity and authority have been affected by years of neglect and conflict. In spite of this, the judiciary continues to be widely respected across the country, and can help strengthen state authority and legitimacy and increase public trust in institutions.

Key capacity gaps of the judiciary include insufficient staff (especially in areas of the judicial process dealing with juvenile offenders and women), poor training in performing critical tasks such as investigations, and overall weaknesses in the administrative capacities of judicial personnel.

In the past, the police force has suffered from a “legitimacy deficit” and a dramatic decrease in capacity and authority. That trend is reversing, and the police are increasingly assuming traditional law and order functions. People across communities report increasing trust in the police, and sectarian

78. The primary institutions of the judiciary are the Higher Judicial Council (HJC), the Federal Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) and other civil and criminal courts, as well as the Public Prosecution Department and the Judiciary oversight Board.

79. Primary components of the Ministry of Justice include the Prison Service, Judicial Training Institute (JTI), and the Land Administration Department.

division in the composition of the National Police is diminishing.⁸⁰ The police should play an ever stronger and more positive role in improving security, enforcing the rule of law, and ensuring the protection of the population, especially women.

Critical capacity gaps of the police force concern the number of police officers, a lack of education and training of most new recruits, and insufficient base locations and equipment for current and planned units.⁸¹

3. Inadequate capacities of state performance

The capacity of the state to perform its core functions and to deliver quality services in a way that responds to citizens' needs and expectations⁸² has been affected first by the former regime and sanctions, then by the war, occupation, and subsequent conflict, and finally by the political and social tensions, massive population displacement, and brain drain that followed. The lack of people-centred social policies has compromised the focus of national development plans and programmes. The real or perceived lack of equity in access to economic opportunities and services, poor management of public goods and resources (in particular oil), the limited capacity to take into consideration environmental protection, and a weak disaster-management capacity have all undermines citizens' trust in the state and ongoing efforts to consolidate state legitimacy and authority. Weak performance of state functions affects both current and long-term infrastructure development and service delivery, particularly in the key sectors of health and education.

a. Public sector modernization

The current structure of government is central, with some federal features for the region of Kurdistan. All financial and administrative functions are provided by central ministries and delivered through line departments.⁸³ Key constraints to improved public sector performance include the over-centralization of the system; outdated, fragmented government structures with overlapping functions; lack of data collection and analysis systems; weak policy, planning, implementation and monitoring capacities, and weak financial management. An inflated civil service on the one hand, and lack of adequate skills and human capital on the other (the latter reflecting a lack of investment in and provision of opportunities for the younger generation), make reform difficult. Gender imbalances in senior positions and the lack of mechanisms for citizens' participation in decision making also preclude a more effective and accountable public administration. Modernization of the functional structure of state institutions, their fiscal relations, and staffing composition must be speeded up and must reflect the new power-sharing arrangements and economic policy. This will be critical to facilitate the success of the political transition.

Lack of reform, in the context of declining oil revenues, will severely impact service delivery and political legitimacy. Public sector reform and decentralization (see following section) also need to generate increased capacities to improve the management of the environment, respond to crisis, and cope with the reintegration of displaced populations. It is also necessary to generate private sector employment. Population issues must further be factored into development plans to generate and provide economic livelihoods. While the right-sizing of the civil service will create challenges due to the loss of state jobs, the modernization and creation of more efficient systems of governance and administration, and the positive "knock-on" effect on the economy will create new employment opportunities for all sectors of the population.

80. The National Police is currently 12 per cent Sunni overall (although about 95 per cent Sunni in Mosul). Already, 40 per cent of the officers are Sunni, and there has been no indication of problems with integration.

81. Rule of Law Strategic Action Plan, Embassy of the United States, Iraq, February 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress (March 2009)

82. Including expectations of: access economic opportunities and quality services; rights to be protected; the environment to be preserved, and disaster risks to be managed.

83. Neither fiscal nor administrative deconcentration has so far taken place to allow governorates actually to govern, with some minor exceptions related to part of the capital budget.

b. Decentralization and local governance

Since 2004, Iraq has had a decentralized political system comprising 18 governorates, with a federal structure applying to the Kurdistan Region and any future regions similarly organized.⁸⁴ Among responsibilities of the Governorate Councils is the formulation of local development plans, for which they have received some budget transfers from the national government.⁸⁵ However, most services are still delivered through ministries and their departments at the governorate level, with both planning and resource allocation still based on the centralized model. The move towards greater decentralization represents – at both the political and administrative levels – a profound transformation from the method of government decision-making under the previous regime. Decentralization can improve accountability and service delivery. It can enhance citizens' capacity to participate in decision making and to claim their rights, although the lack of a systematic and institutionalized local participatory planning process often still prevents this from happening.

Additional obstacles to effective local governance in Iraq include the lack of alternative forms of service delivery and the devolution of decision-making functions to lower levels of administration; the interference of political, religious and tribal powers in the work of local authorities; continued centralization of budgetary allocations, and inadequate skills to operate in the context of decentralization. Planning at the local level (e.g., provincial development strategies) is often seen as a “shopping list” rather than a contribution to a nationally owned vision predicated on measurable results. Other challenges for local governments as part of the planning and development processes are the reintegration of returnees, addressing gender inequality and the management of tensions arising from local conflicts.⁸⁶

c. Corruption

Corruption is a significant obstacle to Iraq's development and profoundly affects the trust within and among communities. Provisions in Iraqi law cover most requirements of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, including the establishment of anti-corruption agencies and the development of a national strategy to combat corruption (2009). So far, results have been modest: both the transitional nature of government and the lack of national baseline data and surveys on the extent of corruption have made action difficult. Key enablers of corruption include the centralized and bureaucratic government system, the structure of the economy and dependency on oil revenues. The lack of a clear political commitment, the weakened rule of law, and the poor performance of anti-corruption bodies hamper efforts to fight corruption.⁸⁷ These are further weakened by the lack of a strong societal pact to combat corruption at the state and individual levels, weak political will to tackle corruption, the weak watchdog role of civil society, and the abundant availability of international aid, which serves to defer the need for the state to address the systemic issues related to resource management, accountability and transparency.

84. These comprise Baghdad and 14 governorates constituting 251 municipalities. Municipal structures are present at all levels of local government, i.e., at the governorate level (Muhafaza), district level (Qada'a) and sub-district level (Nahiya) outside of the capital Baghdad. However, the term 'municipality' refers to the government unit below the governorate. 'Local government' refers to governorate, district and sub-district levels.

85. Provincial Powers Law (March 2008), as stipulated in Article 121 (Third) of the Constitution (USAID Iraq Local Governance program, Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region: An Annotated Text, version 1 (2008)). Budget transfers are intended as an equitable share of federal revenues based on the population, resources, and needs of the Governorate. Governorate Councils have also a monitoring and oversight role over the service delivery performance of line departments.

86. For example, conflicts and tensions concerning issues such as land and access to resources (including employment)

87. This is a major concern, especially for the anti-corruption body, the Commission on Public Integrity, and other actors, e.g. Commission on Integrity, Board of Supreme Audit and Inspectors General, Joint Anticorruption Council (JACC), Council of Representatives (CoR), and the Central Bank.

d. Management of cultural resources

Iraq's cultural heritage is rich and diverse. The country currently possesses three UNESCO World Heritage sites (Hatra, Ashura and Samarra, the latter two of which are on the List of World Heritage in Danger). A further nine sites are on the World Heritage Tentative List. In addition Iraq boasts a rich cultural heritage, tangible and intangible, including oral and musical traditions such as the Iraqi *maqam*, which was proclaimed as a UNESCO Masterpiece of Oral and Intangible Heritage in 2003, and a wide range of cultural institutions and cultural industries. As shown in the UNDP Human Development Report 2004,⁸⁸ recognition and celebration of these diverse cultural traditions are central aspects of human development.

Decades of institutional isolation from international best practices and standards have resulted in a widening of the digital divide and technological stagnation. As a result, Iraq's cultural institutions are using manual and outdated administrative systems with poor record keeping. The government currently lacks the human resources, expertise and equipment to manage the country's wealth of cultural resources and institutions. There is no comprehensive record of cultural resources in the country, and the government lacks the resources and infrastructure to compile the necessary information. There is no cultural policy in Iraq that determines the future protection, management and enhancement of Iraq's rich cultural resources. A clear framework for development is needed to protect Iraq's cultural heritage.

3.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to state performance

Immediate causes of constraints to state performance include:

1. the impact of conflict, sanctions, invasion, occupation, war and insecurity on service-delivery mechanisms and on social cohesion and trust in the state;
2. the high dependence on the centre, the weak demand for services from civil society and weak action in filling gaps;
3. poor enforcement of rules, oversight, and political interference;
4. underdeveloped skill set and brain drain;
5. increasing needs of reintegration and employment creation;
6. corruption and nepotism, and;
7. outdated administrative systems and record keeping, and lack of human resources, expertise and equipment for cultural management and enhancement.

Underlying causes include:

1. lack of punitive measures against corruption and weak performance of enforcement bodies;
2. unclear centre-periphery roles and responsibilities;
3. ambiguous provincial law/local governance;
4. poor planning and delivery capacity at the central and local levels;
5. lack of investment in skills creation;
6. inadequate legal, regulatory and policy frameworks;
7. insufficient budget allocation and expenditure;
8. lack of expertise, outdated approaches, inadequate information and analysis;
9. absence of an effective protection system;
10. lack of cultural policy providing a clear framework for maintenance and development of Iraq's cultural heritage, and;
11. years of isolation from international best practices and standards.

88. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/>

Root causes include:

1. centralized system of planning and delivery;
2. lack of modernization and of capital investment;
3. non-responsive civil service, used more as a means of patronage rather than a tool to deliver services;
4. inflated and inefficient civil service and professional cadre;
5. weak public financial management;
6. underdeveloped and marginalized private sector;
7. undefined links between elected politicians and service-delivery departments/government administration;
8. corruption and nepotism;
9. politicized and traditional society, weakness of civil society organizations, and poorly developed concept of citizens' rights and duties;
10. lack of population-related and social policies, and;
11. inadequate statistical system for monitoring and evaluation.

3.2 Stakeholders and capacity gaps

The civil service is a critical element if the state is to improve its capacity, accountability, and responsiveness, and to maintain its commitment to the MDGs. The 36 ministries, in particular those providing services, are key actors. Citizens expect the state to provide them with opportunities and services. Commitment to reform at the top is essential to effect change throughout the administration.⁸⁹

Local-level bodies, as the first interface between the state and citizens, are increasingly important and critical to improve local governance and strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens. Citizens expect local institutions to respond to their immediate needs and want to play a role in shaping local governance structures.

The public sector continues to face capacity constraints in data collection and analysis, policy, planning, budgeting, execution, and monitoring. Weak coordination and outdated management techniques slow down processes. Depleted infrastructure and low human capacities at the central and local levels impact the state at all levels. Iraq's civil service has not been exposed to modern advances in governance, municipal service provision and decentralized decision-making, and local staff are ill-equipped to manage a decentralized service delivery system. The limited administrative and financial powers of branches of the central ministries with regard to service delivery also severely affect performance.

Anti-corruption institutions and bodies such as the Commission of Integrity, the Inspectorate General, and the Board of Supreme Audit are critical actors in the fight against corruption. They can help make the public administration more effective by reducing waste, improving resource management and prosecuting corruption together with the judicial institutions, and they can increase people's trust in the state, thus contributing to stronger governance in Iraq.

Structural and institutional capacity gaps of anti-corruption bodies include: the lack of baseline and surveys; the inadequacy of legal provisions to prosecute corruption; weak human capital (in particular for the newly created Commission on Integrity); political interferences and weak political commitment to fight corruption, which weakens the capacity of anti-corruption institutions to act confidently. Another important factor is the lack of a strong societal pact to combat corruption at the state and individual levels.

89. IAU, Iraq Community-Based Conflict Assessments: A synthesis (2009)

Inclusive economic growth

Introduction

IRAQ'S economic growth, although constantly positive over the last years, remains volatile, unsustainable and non-inclusive. There is prevailing poverty, food insecurity, high unemployment, a low rate of women's participation in the labour market, a shortage of opportunities for youth and limited access to basic services. Heavy reliance on oil, in the context of major global market distortions and price volatility, combined with high demographic growth and an increasing number of young people in need of jobs, makes the prospect of sustainable development highly uncertain and contributes to growing risks of social exclusion and instability. Low capacity, mismanagement of resources and corruption serve further to compromise economic inclusiveness.

The shortage of resources for investment has impeded the diversification of economic output and left sectors that have traditionally contributed to growth, such as agriculture and industry, as underperformers, losing comparative advantage in regional and global markets. Caught between increasing social pressures and critical development challenges, the GoI has used the country's growth to expand state employment and to invest in security at the expense of resources needed to rehabilitate infrastructure, provide basic services, and create an enabling economic environment for private sector development and durable growth. The social safety net provided by the government has not been sufficiently complemented by elements capable of generating dynamic and sustainable employment, such as the creation of an environment conducive to the development of micro-enterprises. In the absence of a growth-oriented and regulated private sector that can sustain such generous social policies through fiscal transfers, continued oil and food price volatility in the international markets puts social programmes at great risk.

Uneven redistribution of growth, low investment in human capital, over-reliance on oil revenues, and inadequate taxation and internal revenue generation have crippled investment in education and health, causing Iraq's health and educational standards to lag considerably behind and deepening mistrust in state capacity to improve quality of life.

Inclusive growth and the MDGs

In order to achieve inclusive growth, MDGs 1, 3, 7, 8 should form the basis for any strategy in this area.⁹⁰ These goals encompass both the impact (poverty reduction) and essential elements (gender equality and empowering women, environment and partnerships) of inclusive economic growth. These goals are also interrelated: climate change, for example, can slow progress in poverty alleviation by inducing conditions of drought and food shortages, and thus impede the achievement of the MDGs. (*Iraq's progress towards the MDGs can be viewed in Annex C.*)

Key challenges facing inclusive economic growth in Iraq

1. Volatile and unsustainable growth

With growth rates fluctuating from 6.7 per cent in 2006 to 1.5 per cent in 2007 to around 9.5 per cent in 2008, mainly reflecting the dynamics of the oil sector, Iraq's economy shows clear signs of instability and of vulnerability to adverse international market conditions, inflation and declining resources for investment.⁹¹ The contribution of the public sector has continued to grow over the last years in GDP formation, with the oil sector making up around 70 per cent of GDP and providing 85 per cent of budget revenues.⁹² The decline in international oil prices has led to an estimated budget deficit in 2009 amounting to 27 per cent of GDP; production capacity is unable to offset the price drop from US\$113

90. MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development (www.un.org/millenniumgoals)

91. IMF, Iraq Standby Agreement Quarterly Reviews; Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Iraq, Joint Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies; COSIT, National Accounts Report

92. Ibid.

per barrel in July 2008 to US\$34.7 per barrel at the beginning of 2009.⁹³ The 2009 export target of 2 million barrels a day was not met by midyear,⁹⁴ mainly because of the critical decline of output in Kirkuk and Basra and to major technological challenges facing the extractive industry as a whole.

To overcome this critical fiscal imbalance, the GoI was negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new Stand-By Arrangement – the initial request was for a facility of US\$5.53 billion (three times the Iraqi quota) in three instalments over five years. The performance criteria for this arrangement would reportedly include containing inflation through strict monetary policy, continuing reform of the banking sector, and improved public-finance management. The criteria did not mention subsidies, or the PDS, explicitly, but rather referred only to continuing structural reforms.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the Letter of Intent from GoI to the IMF prior to the negotiations did mention targeting of the PDS. Therefore, a full-fledged assessment should be done on the impact that targeting the PDS would have on poverty and malnutrition.

Strict monetary policies imposed by previous Stand-By Arrangements, concluded in support of the debt relief programme, have proven instrumental in containing inflation in the absence of other tools to stabilize prices, but the aggressive appreciation of the Iraqi dinar and the still-high interest rates have slowed growth, provided incentives to increase imports, and limited private investment.

The optimistic assumptions made to accelerate growth, which set oil export targets at 2.5 million barrels a day by 2012 and at 4 million barrels a day by 2014, may not be realistic without sufficient foreign direct investment. However, massive investment in oilfield development is uncertain in the absence of needed resource management reforms. A legislative package, including the hydrocarbon law and the revenue sharing system, was still awaiting political consensus and public support.

1.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to inclusive economic growth

Immediate causes of constraints to inclusive economic growth include:

1. high dependence on oil, volatility of oil prices, production and export capacity constraints, which limit ability to increase exports to generate revenues to buffer the impact of international price fluctuations;
2. poor infrastructure and management of oil, gas, water and land resources due to insecurity and contamination by landmines and explosive remnants of war, and;
3. inadequate legislation and outdated technologies, owing to long-term international comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq.

Underlying causes include:

1. political instability;
2. lack of vision for radical reforms to reduce state control and transform budget policies into effective tools for development;
3. low investment in service delivery and private sector expansion, and;
4. inadequate data collection to monitor growth and measure economic progress according to internationally recognized best practices.

Root causes include:

1. adverse environmental and climate conditions, lowering agricultural output; misuse of gas resources, leading to high pollution and climate deterioration;
2. reduced opportunities for energy production and alternative sources of growth;

93. OPEC prices for Iraq (Ministry of Oil)

94. Ministry of Finance, Budget Execution Report

95. The final performance indicators will not be known until the end of the negotiations. However, those mentioned here have been confirmed by the Iraqi delegation.

3. lack of an enabling agricultural policy;
4. large subsidies to non-competitive state economic activities and dependence on oil, limiting funds available for development of non-oil sectors;
5. an overvalued exchange rate and low customs duties, which have increased imports, and;
6. lack of public-private partnerships.

1.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Confronted with fluctuating financial resources to address social and economic needs, the GoI has been unable to prioritize spending and to restore comparative advantages in oil and non-oil sectors. Contrary to common perception, revenues from oil do not currently provide adequate funds for the budget, which is in deficit. Resource management and government expenditure are oriented toward consumption rather than development. Unpopular structural reforms, such as the overall restructuring and partial privatization of state-owned enterprises, review of PDS subsidies, liberalization of prices and radical reorganization of the public sector to optimize operational budgets, have been delayed due to a lack of expertise and weak planning capacity at the local and central levels. The inability to create a funding balance between immediate needs and long-term development goals, together with a limited capacity to channel external support towards strategic interventions, have characterized the fiscal performance of the GoI over recent years.

Besides other factors, the absence of dialogue and interaction among government, employers, unions and other social partners in the policy and decision making processes has limited economic participation and stalled market development, compromised the setting of priorities, limited private investment and reduced employment opportunities in the non-state economy.

Haphazard growth redistribution has preserved poverty and exclusion and, without a major shift in policies and governmental capacity, will fail to improve sustainability in the long run. While inequality in Iraq is modest,⁹⁶ incomes and therefore investment are low. Instead of targeting government revenues to reduce poverty, funds are spent inefficiently. The fact that poverty stands at 23 per cent when social protection spending is so high is testament to this fact.

To create additional budget resources that can further support development programmes, the GoI has tried to develop a multi-source tax system, but low tax withholding and poor enforcement of revenue collection have failed to reduce the reliance on oil funds to cover operational and public investment costs.

2. Non-diversified economic output and suppressed private sector

Although registering a constant growth rate as a share of GDP (ranging on average from 5 per cent to 7 per cent since 2005), the non-oil economy (such as agriculture, the second largest contributor to GDP behind oil) remains limited, recording an almost negligible contribution to budget revenues. At the same time, participation of the private sector in fuel imports since 2007 has not translated into a massive involvement of private companies due to corruption, excessive bureaucracy and lack of capital.⁹⁷

96. According to the COSIT/KRSO/World Bank Poverty Assessment (draft June 2009), inequality in Iraq is low. The poorest decile of the population accounts for 4 per cent of all consumption spending.

97. Private sector participation in fuel imports could generate employment through importing, distribution and transportation, creating an entry point for other related activities.

More importantly, the chronic lack of security, political stability, predictability and transparency,⁹⁸ combined with the absence of governmental support, have caused over 20,000 private companies to close,⁹⁹ as they are unable to survive in the unstable environment or to compete with cheap imports and heavily subsidized state-owned enterprises.¹⁰⁰ The more than US\$1 billion allocated by state banks for lending under the control of two key ministries – Labour and Social Affairs, and Industry and Minerals – has not generated the intended expansion of private enterprise, due to the absence of financial and non-financial support services that inexperienced entrepreneurs need. Consequently, the expected rise in employment opportunities has not occurred.¹⁰¹

Limited public investment in productive sectors, as well as the non-restored or irregular electricity supply, poor infrastructure and inadequate trade policies, have consistently reduced economic opportunities in non-oil sectors and stimulated outflows of capital, with most private owners preferring to relocate their businesses outside Iraq. Approximately 20 per cent of budget expenditure was allocated for public investment. Although high in absolute value, it has not created an environment conducive to private sector expansion in the absence of public-private partnerships and transparent public procurement procedures.

The agriculture sector is a major source of livelihood for the poor and food insecure, and is the largest source of rural employment. The strong linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the economy (especially food processing) can stimulate growth and income generation. The agricultural sector has declined due to sanctions, violence, poor natural resource management, poor infrastructure, lack of access to basic services, drought and insufficient inputs. Necessary basic services include water, irrigation infrastructure, drought-resistant crops and extension services. Water consumption for agriculture and livestock currently represents 78 per cent of Iraq's total water usage.¹⁰² Investment in essential services for rural areas is crucial to restore livelihoods and increase productivity.

Iraq is a country with exceptional potential for cultural tourism, and already has a flourishing internal and international religious tourism sector.¹⁰³ Development of infrastructure and human resources would boost the contribution of this sector to the economy.

2.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to economic output

Immediate causes of constraints to diversified economic output and a robust private sector include:

1. monetary policies intended to control inflation and leading to exchange rate overvaluation;
2. reduced access to financial services, capital and credit for local private businesses,¹⁰⁴ and;
3. drought, poor water management, lack of modern agricultural techniques and poor quality inputs.

Underlying causes include:

1. the continuation of subsidies for food through the non-targeted PDS, hampering the efforts of local entrepreneurs to expand food processing and sales in the Iraqi market and keeping local agricultural production unacceptably low;
2. lack of modern farming techniques and systems;

98. The World Bank ranks Iraq 139th out of 183 in contract enforcement and 119th out of 183 in protecting investors (World Bank/International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times (MacMillan: Washington 2009)).

99. Iraq Businessmen's Association; Iraq Federation of Industries. This estimate is based on the number of companies removed from the Social Security System in 2003 for not paying their contributions.

100. This is the main finding of a private sector needs assessment conducted by the Taskforce for Economic Reform with private sector associations (July 2009). This report identifies three main obstacles to the private sector: the absence of competition due to the presence of 192 state-owned enterprises employing approximately 680,000 workers; low customs duties introduced by the CPA in 2003, which led to a flooding of local markets with cheap imports in all economic sectors with the exception of oil, petro-chemicals and construction materials; and security.

101. Evaluation provided for Ministry of Finance by Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and Ministry of Industry and Minerals.

102. FAO, Irrigation in the Middle East Region in Figures: AQUASTAT survey – 2008, FAO Water Reports, no. 34 (2009)

103. IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

104. According to the World Bank, Iraq is ranked 167th out of 183 in ease of obtaining credit (World Bank/International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times (MacMillan: Washington 2009)).

3. poor government capacity to manage natural resources and mitigate the impact of environmental degradation, and;
4. inadequate investment in agriculture and water resource management, soil conservation, water and flood control mechanisms and supporting infrastructure (rural roads, communications and electricity).

Root causes include:

1. regulatory environment not conducive to private enterprise building;
2. loss of comparative advantage due to insufficient productivity;
3. lack of legislative and institutional coherence and clarity, and of bodies and regulations governing commerce.

2.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Support for private sector expansion has not translated into a strategic plan for private sector development that addresses the needs of private entrepreneurship and market development. For example, there is no strategic direction for the promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises, which are critical to the development of public-private partnerships, with potentially positive impacts on the creation of jobs and an enabling business environment.

The government lacks the institutional capacity for effective public asset management in the restructuring of the over 192 state-owned enterprises. Transfer of these enterprises to the private sector requires an institutional architecture that guarantees transparent privatization and protects employment. An economic and social impact assessment to evaluate effects and develop evidence-based policies for economic revitalization, although recommended by all international partners, has not been conducted to date.

3. Unemployment and low non-state employment

Unemployment remains high in a country facing instability. This is of particular concern as major economic reforms, which are expected to continue to dislocate labour, have yet to be undertaken. The lack of jobs continues to affect young men; the unemployment rate for males aged 15 to 29 is 25 per cent, while the participation of women in the country's labour force has declined from 20 per cent to 18 per cent in the last five years.¹⁰⁵ 29 per cent of the labour force is underemployed.¹⁰⁶ The underemployment of a limited, albeit skilled, labour force contributes to instability and limits economic growth.

The reintegration of ex-combatants and elements of various security forces is a further employment challenge. The unilateral de-Ba'athification policy enacted by the U.S. following its invasion of Iraq underpins the need for reintegration of personnel from the security sector into the civilian sector. The disbandment of the Ba'ath party and its security apparatus created an environment in which highly skilled persons have little opportunity to augment their skill sets integrated into existing and increasingly professionalizing security forces, or otherwise found alternative livelihood opportunities. This dynamic highlighted the development-security nexus in Iraq that requires redress to capitalize on and sustain the peace dividend.

With government employment growing from less than 1 million to over 3 million jobs in the last three years, the operational budgets required to fund the overstaffed public administration have reached 80 per cent of total public spending – diverting funds away from efforts to enhance basic service delivery and accelerate economic recovery. More importantly, considerable adjustments of salaries in the public sector have made the private sector unattractive to job seekers and have hampered the absorption

105. COSIT, Labour Force Survey 2008

106. COSIT, Labour Force Survey 2008

of a skilled labour force into non-state jobs. There is a lack of incentive and competitiveness in the private sector due to secure, highly paid public-sector jobs that attract skilled and educated workers, while micro- and small businesses have difficulty recruiting qualified workers.

The significant surplus labour in the non-restructured state-owned enterprises, amounting to over 30 per cent of the nearly 700,000 employees, is contributing to low competitiveness and has discouraged private investment and production-sharing agreements that could have helped restore production capacity. However, in the absence of training and modernization measures, state-owned enterprises face an uncertain future in the context of globalization, and their vast labour force represents hidden unemployment. Despite commanding significant public funds of up to 87 per cent of total subsidies, public enterprises are not producing profits and are unable to guarantee stable employment.¹⁰⁷

In parallel, a non-regulated labour market, lacking labour standards and social security coverage, is deepening employment vulnerability and remains unable to improve incomes.¹⁰⁸ Despite a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to social security for all, the number of working individuals excluded from all types of social protection is growing. Most people employed in the non-state economy remain uninsured for such risks such as job loss, temporary lack of working capacity due to sickness or work injury, and ageing.¹⁰⁹ Further, younger workers are much less likely to be protected by social security, reflecting the difficulties they face in finding jobs in the formal economy under current economic conditions. Likewise, social security coverage is strongly associated with levels of education: while it is almost universal for workers with postgraduate degrees, only one in four workers with primary education or less are covered by social security.

3.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to employment

Immediate causes of constraints to employment include:

1. insufficient jobs to absorb the 450,000 annual newcomers to the labour force;
2. a dearth of non-state jobs;
3. lack of competition criteria in the absence of a radical civil service reform, and;
4. over-reliance on the non-labour intensive oil sector.

Underlying causes include:

1. high salaries and pension arrangements for public sector employees, discouraging migration to the private sector, absorbing increasing budget funds, contributing to unfundable deficits, and reducing resources for development.

Root causes include:

1. absence of support policies for on-the-job training programmes, career counselling and job mediation;
2. non-market-oriented economic and trade policies;
3. poor administrative support to small and medium private sector participants;
4. absence of private banking and non-banking financial institutions and non-revised legislation for competition, bankruptcy, arbitration, and contract execution;¹¹⁰
5. absence of institutionalized social dialogue between the government and its traditional social partners, and;
6. lack of private sector development.

107. Federal budget laws

108. IAU, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 (2009)

109. IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

110. According to the World Bank, Iraq is ranked 183rd out of 183 in ease of closing a business and 139th out of 183 in contract enforcement (World Bank/International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times (MacMillan: Washington 2009)).

3.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Key laws and social protection systems are needed in order properly to address unemployment, expand access to training and fund wage-subsidy programmes to accelerate the absorption of job seekers in private sector activities. The country still does not have a proper labour code or an adequate unemployment insurance scheme. More importantly, technical education and vocational training programmes are in need of new regulations and institutional adjustments to be able to respond to market demands on a more flexible basis.

Additional challenges include the absence of private offices for labour placement and limited capacity of existing public employment services to assist job seekers to match skills and to access adequate income. The GoI also lacks capacity and budget mechanisms to generate policies to reverse brain drain and entice skilled professionals to return to Iraq.

4. Poverty and social exclusion

Despite the transfer of significant public funds to social protection programmes such as the generalized PDS, social safety nets, state pensions and social security benefits, poverty is still widespread in Iraq. The recently released IHSES shows that around 7 million people, i.e. 23 per cent of the population, live under the national poverty line (the equivalent of US\$2.2 a day).¹¹¹ Poverty is almost twice as prevalent in rural areas as in urban communities, while households without a civil servant wage-earner, and lower educated-headed households, are more vulnerable to poverty. To accommodate other operational costs, the budget for PDS was reduced from US\$5.9 billion in 2008 to US\$3.6 billion in 2009, and substantial reform was being considered to target the neediest for food distribution through the PDS.

Over 97 per cent of the population continues to prefer the food basket over any other alternative – i.e. cash or cash and in-kind combined,¹¹² reflecting a strong sense of entitlement among the population for the food basket and limited confidence that the government can effectively replace the distribution of food with an effective alternative social safety net. Unstructured economic growth patterns have not led to enhanced opportunities for better incomes and improved quality of life for low-income households, mainly because the allocation of scant resources has not been on the basis of need. As a result, deprived areas have not been targeted for sustainable development programmes as local authorities lack the capacity to assess needs and to reorient interventions to enhance social inclusion.

a. Low incomes of specific groups and sectors of society

Women, youth and rural dwellers in Iraq typically have lower incomes. Women tend to earn lower wages than men,¹¹³ especially in non-state sectors of the labour market. Rural lower-educated households have practically no public sector workers, making them most vulnerable to poverty in Iraq.¹¹⁴ These factors, among others, contribute to social discontent and fuel the potential for civil unrest. Targeted investment towards development of women and youth, especially girls, and their civil engagement to become productive members of society would greatly increase their contribution to positive social actions, leading to social stability and inclusive economic growth.

111. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007

112. WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007

113. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007, cited in IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

114. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007, cited in IAU, Pre-CCA Analysis: Background Papers (2009)

Rural areas are characterized by low non-farming investment and sub-optimal support for agricultural production – both serving to drive large populations towards urban areas where income opportunities are insufficient. Infrastructure in urban areas is in need of considerable investment to handle this migration and to provide access to housing, clean drinking water, sanitation, lighting and power, waste management, education, health facilities, and other basic needs. Development policies have not considered direct interventions in deprived areas with packages of incentives to attract investors, nor have they sufficiently recognized the complexity of urban-rural linkages to reverse migration and reduce the number of urban and rural poor.

b. Inadequate social safety nets

The general characteristic of the social protection system in Iraq has been a strong emphasis on passive assistance, in the form of food and cash transfers, whereas social programmes need to be linked to the productive sector to enhance employability and income-generating opportunities. To mitigate the impact of fuel subsidy removal as recommended by the IMF through consecutive Stand-By Arrangements, the GoI has put in place conditional cash transfers and services under the so-called Social Safety Net (SSN) programme.¹¹⁵

To date, the SSN supports around 1,000,000 families across the country with social benefits, for which means-tested eligibility criteria are in place. Statistics show that most of the beneficiaries are widows with underage children or families of unemployed or disabled or injured providers. While the SSN coverage is similar to the proportion of people living poverty in Iraq (23 per cent of the population), the structural analysis made in the IHSES shows that not all the poor are included in the SSN programme, while some of those receiving social benefits do hold jobs or have other sources of income. The required re-eligibility testing that would have removed from the SSN rolls those whose incomes have improved over one year has not been conducted annually as planned, because of insecurity and the limited capacity of SSN offices at the governorate level.

The registration of job seekers as a precondition to enrol in the SSN programme has not been followed by effective job mediation support and, therefore, most of the SSN-registered unemployed have remained jobless and without a source of income. The absence of proxy tools to test the means of applicants has led to the substantial enrolment of non-entitled claimants, while the delay in installing a functioning IT system has hampered cross-country duplication checks and the automatic removal of those not meeting qualifying conditions. In addition to institutional limitations, widespread corruption has affected the integrity and the credibility of the SSN programme as a whole.

Although designed to support a gradual targeting of the PDS programme, the SSN has undergone no further analysis or adjustment to facilitate the reform of the PDS food basket. In anticipation of the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, the SSN programme requires revision and diversification to include specific severance payment components and services in support of labour retrenchment. If sweeping public sector reorganization takes place, the number of beneficiaries is expected to rise, for which additional budget allocations may not be possible under the current social protection system.

c. Inadequate basic service delivery

Satisfying basic services needs in housing, health, education and other sectors (*discussed in the Essential Services section below*) is a prerequisite for growth to which the GoI should grant particular attention, as they are key drivers for proper skills development, knowledge enhancement and work incentives.

115. While the issue of social safety nets is addressed in this CCA in both the inclusive economic growth and essential services thematic analyses, social safety nets are discussed here as a tool to support continued economic reforms and mitigate their social impact and potential vulnerability.

Inadequate basic services are reported as one of the main causes of the sluggish Iraqi private sector. The limited supply of water and electricity for the non-state economy has considerably affected small and medium enterprises, most of them being forced to close down, while for larger businesses, procuring critical inputs from private sources has resulted in high production costs and non-competitive prices.

Shortages of water and electricity supplies, as well as inadequate education and health care services, are still reported by a significant number of communities in Iraq, with grave impact on the economic, development, and security conditions of the country.

The precarious status of service delivery in Iraq is a consequence of a series of factors, among which insecurity, a lack of comprehensive planning and funding, and the absence of public-private partnership are critical. The slow pace of administrative and financial decentralization brings further constraints the improvement of service delivery, with central policies remaining significantly disconnected from local realities.

4.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to poverty alleviation and social inclusion

Immediate causes of constraints to poverty alleviation and social inclusion include:

The preparation of a long-overdue poverty reduction strategy to outline policies and document programmes on a pro-active rather than on a reactive basis was long delayed due to a lack of reliable data on poverty and social exclusion.

Underlying causes include:

1. resources wasted in designing social-protection programmes based on the assumption that a nation facing wars and sanctions is generally poor;
2. social protection programmes designed on a non-targeted basis and proving highly inefficient in addressing vulnerability and basic needs;
3. rapid government response to instability and social unrest up to early 2008 took the form of higher salaries and pensions and more public sector jobs – to the neglect of those living in rural areas and those unable to work.

Root causes include:

1. corruption and mismanagement of funds have led to a dysfunctional distribution of food, inappropriate SSN coverage and low implementation rates of public investment programmes meant to restore access to basic services and to guarantee a decent life for all;
2. inadequate support for massive displacement has put millions of people under major social stress and led to critical resource shortages, deepening vulnerability and instability¹¹⁶;
3. the central and local government inability to partner effectively with the private sector has reduced chances for improved service delivery and limited access to public funds through which private business could grow and employment expand.

116. The more than 1.6 million Iraqis (5.5 per cent of the population) displaced since February 2006 face serious constraints regarding access to employment and basic services. Post-Samarra IDP surveys by IOM indicate that key priorities include access to work (85 per cent of IDPs), shelter (82 per cent) and food (81 per cent) (IOM, Emergency Monitoring and Needs Assessments (September 2009)).

4.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Iraq lacks a comprehensive and targeted social protection policy to optimize the use of resources redistributed to needy populations and to maximize the impact of transfers for poverty reduction and social development. The role of government in market-building and protecting the most vulnerable must be clarified.

The recently finalized poverty reduction strategy that is under preparation needs to be accompanied by a substantial revision of the social protection system to rationalize interventions and reduce risks. Furthermore, government policies in the immediate term should emphasize partnership with the private sector to alleviate social pressure by creating jobs and economic opportunities.

Ensuring quality essential services

Introduction

MANY essential services have deteriorated significantly in Iraq in terms of both quality and delivery. Not only has chronic insecurity constrained efforts to resume delivery of the basics – drinking water, food, sanitation, electricity, transportation, education, and health care – but capacities to revive these services also remain far from sufficient. The availability of quality services is central to national reconciliation and development, and to achieving the MDGs. Issues of equity and inclusion, participation and empowerment, and protection of human security and human rights are particularly critical with regard to Iraq's essential services, given that several key social indicators have plummeted. Many Iraqis lack the information and awareness needed to make informed choices and claim their rights. Significant disparities exist among regions (often between north and centre/south), between rural and urban areas, and between men and women.

Iraq's recent population growth has intensified the burden on essential services, with dire consequences for children and youth particularly. Iraq has committed to the MDGs, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the World Fit for Children document, and the Education for All (EFA) goals.¹¹⁷ However, the potential of many children and young people to contribute to Iraq's sustainable development has been constrained by the extreme challenges of the past quarter-century. Adolescents and youth, while in many ways treated as children with few responsibilities or resources, are also confronted by adult issues including widespread early marriage, early pregnancies and the need for employment, often with inadequate education.

At the same time, deeply rooted gender inequality in essential services remains a barrier to social justice and development, depriving the country of a significant source of human capital. Despite Iraq's commitments under the MDGs and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), persistent cultural and institutional barriers in the family and the workplace prevent women's full participation in society. Although there has been some improvement, most gender-related development gains have occurred among women with pre-existing advantages – in education, for example, or those in urban areas. Most Iraqi women still have a very limited role in personal or public decision-making, which restricts their access to services and undermines sustainable natural resource management (given women's critical role in obtaining household needs, such as water, amidst scarcity). While a broad national legal framework exists to ensure rights for women, implementation continues to lag. Women-headed households, still on the increase from the loss of men to armed conflict, require special consideration.

This analysis, while recognizing areas of progress under extremely difficult circumstances, focuses on qualitative and quantitative gaps. Three interlinked strategic challenges provide unifying themes:

117. Education for All is a global movement led by UNESCO aiming to provide quality basic education for all children, youth and adults. Adopted by 189 countries and the world's leading development institutions during the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000, the EFA goals are six internationally agreed measurable education goals which aim to meet the learning needs of all children, youth and adults by 2015. Progress towards achievement of the goals has been uneven in Iraq, and the country is at risk of not attaining the targets and benchmarks set for 2015 (see UNESCO, Education for All Mid-Term Review for the Arab States (2008)).

Access and availability

Access to social services is crucial for Iraqis, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to achieve equitable social and economic development and claim their rights. Yet such access is circumscribed by several factors. Economic barriers relate primarily to costs and affordability. Many geographical barriers are linked to continuing conflict, landmine contamination or the explosive remnants of war. Administrative barriers include a weak enabling environment in terms of policy, insufficient attention to vulnerable groups and rural areas, and insufficient budget allocations. The role of non-state actors, including civil society organizations, communities and the private sector, in providing services and representing the voices of rights holders remains underdeveloped.

Eroded infrastructure

Infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged in nearly all sectors by years of conflict and economic sanctions. Many Iraqis still lack basic amenities like clean water or reliable electricity supply, and thus see the restoration of infrastructure as a top priority. While millions of dollars have been distributed to reconstruction projects, efforts have been hampered by continuing violence, allegations of corruption, and a failure to budget for necessary clearance of infrastructure facilities such as main power and water supplies prior to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Insufficient skills among service providers

Many precious human, institutional and knowledge resources have been lost or destroyed through years of armed conflict, politicization and inattention. Among skilled and educated Iraqis such as doctors and professors, the “brain drain” has been acute; Iraq is in danger of losing the core of skilled people it needs most, just as it tries to rebuild. Many Iraqi professionals who remain in the country work under constant threat of kidnapping, retribution or death.

Essential services and the MDGs

Of the three thematic areas, essential services is the most all-encompassing for achieving the MDGs. Addressing the root causes impacting essential services will help to lay the necessary foundation for human development. All the MDGs are linked to this theme, requiring a holistic approach to improving essential services.

Key challenges in quality essential services

1. The right to education

Education is a fundamental human right and is particularly crucial to Iraq, given the country’s significant youth population and its history as a people who value learning and culture. It links closely to poverty reduction and economic growth, and can contribute significantly to national reconciliation while providing Iraq with qualified human resources. Primary school net enrolment reached 87 per cent in academic year 2007/2008, encompassing more than 4.3 million pupils.¹¹⁸ Some schools are being rehabilitated, and more timely disaggregated data are becoming available. More alternatives also are on offer for thousands of out-of-school children and adolescents.

Nonetheless, Iraq’s capacity to nurture the skills of the next generation faces significant challenges, given that MDG targets related to education are not on track. Services are dilapidated or have been

118. COSIT data

destroyed by longstanding underinvestment, isolation and loss of capacity. Persistent violence and insecurity make parents unwilling to send their children to school. Mass displacement further strains already weak services and systems. No formal education sector policy has been developed. In the disputed areas in particular, the inadequate access to education for each community (Arab, Kurdish) in their respective languages is a highly sensitive and potentially destabilizing factor. Education governance in particular requires strengthening: involving parents, children and youth themselves, as rights holders, not only encourages effective, efficient decision-making partnerships but also actualizes children's right to informed participation in all matters affecting their lives.

a. Access and availability

In practice, Iraq has a dual education system: that of the central Government and that of the Kurdistan Region. This duality in education planning has produced notable differences in policy and administration, particularly the Kurdistan Regional Government's requirement of nine years of basic education, versus the central government's corresponding requirement of only six years. Despite rising enrolment rates, these remain insufficient to realize MDG 2, MDG 3¹¹⁹ and EFA Goals 2 and 5.¹²⁰ School preparation is virtually nonexistent, with preschool attendance standing at only 3 per cent. National compulsory education urgently needs to be expanded to intermediate level.

More than one in six schools have been vandalized, damaged or destroyed.¹²¹ While more than 23,000 schools are currently operating, school buildings total fewer than 17,000 – a gap of nearly 6,000 facilities.¹²² Lack of infrastructure and overcrowding force one third of schools to deliver lessons in two or even three shifts,¹²³ with acute shortages of essential teaching/learning materials. Most schools lack potable water, toilets or containers for garbage, and this lack of access to sanitary facilities places particular burdens on girls. Thousands of children with disabilities remain without access to schools, and IDP children face a serious dearth of facilities. Worryingly, nearly nine in 10 children under the age of 15 do not attend primary school regularly, mostly because of insecurity or distance to school. Some 14 per cent of children are currently out of school because they have no access to suitable schooling or are obliged to contribute to household income.¹²⁴ Poverty often causes parents to place children – especially boys – in the workforce instead of school. Retention is low¹²⁵ and even among those who attend school, only about 40 per cent¹²⁶ progress from primary to secondary level. The delayed age of enrolment across all educational levels is a further problem.¹²⁷

b. Challenges to girls' education

In large parts of Iraq, boys' education is more highly valued. The lowest rate of primary enrolment is among rural girls, at 68 per cent, with a secondary enrolment rate of just 13.6 per cent.¹²⁸ Prevailing socio-cultural norms such as "family honour" particularly impede girls' access, and links between girls' education and reduced fertility, lower child mortality, higher economic productivity, and increased family well-being are not recognized. Early marriage is often considered a viable alternative to education.

119. GoI Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008 (2008)

120. EFA Goal 2: Provide free and compulsory primary education for all; EFA Goal 5: Achieve gender parity by 2005, gender equality by 2015 (UNESCO, Education for All Mid-Term Review for the Arab States (2008))

121. MoE/UNICEF, Educational Statistics in Iraq 2003-2004

122. Ministry of Education data

123. Extrapolated from Ministry of Education 2007/2008 Education Management Information System figures. This problem is greater in intermediate and secondary schools (MoE).

124. WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007

125. Only 60 per cent of those enrolled in 1st primary continue to 6th grade (MoE 2008). Improved retention in primary school is likely to result in a bottleneck for enrolment in secondary school due to an insufficient number of intermediary and secondary school classrooms.

126. COSIT data

127. Almost 25 per cent of students are beyond the recommended age for enrollment (MoE data (2008)).

128. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006

The above constraints are directly reflected through persistent high rates of women's illiteracy, which are double that of men, at 28 versus 12 percent.¹²⁹ Overall, adult literacy is 80 percent, with wide variations between governorates.¹³⁰ In addition, disparities in illiteracy rates between women and men are as high among younger people as among their elders.¹³¹ All this illustrates the severity of the setback in meeting the relevant MDGs for a country that had been on its way to eradicating illiteracy in the 1980s.

Girls outside the formal education system fare little better than those within. A wide gap exists between enrolment for out-of-school boys and girls in accelerated learning programmes: at the end of academic year 2007/2008, the number of boys enrolled was triple that of girls, indicating the degree of entrenchment of obstacles to girls' education at all levels. Given the importance of mothers' education to the survival, growth, development and education of children, increasing girls' access to education is likely to have repercussions for generations.

c. Poor quality of services

Deterioration in education quality is partially reflected in low pass rates in national school exams and high dropout rates. Teaching methods prioritize memorization over analysis and creativity. The curriculum has been weakened in many schools by the absence of lessons in art, music, sports or civic values, as well as by a dearth of adequate libraries. Inappropriate organizational frameworks and inadequate education policies and strategies have compromised coherence and planning, with dubious results and wasted resources.

Higher education and Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) still suffer the consequences of past underinvestment and damage caused by conflict. There is a shortage of laboratory, scientific and engineering equipment and a lack of up-to-date reference books in university libraries. Conflict and sanctions also isolated Iraqi academics from contact with researchers outside Iraq, as well as causing many to leave the country. Lack of coordination and institutional frameworks have led to the fragmentation and deterioration of TVE programmes in many sub-systems. Archaic teaching methodologies and outdated curricula and technology have compromised service delivery and quality. Years of isolation and neglect have delinked education from the needs of the labour market and from development objectives. The limitations of the private sector are therefore compounded by a lack of skills and employment opportunities for youth, especially in technical or technological occupations.

Decentralization of power to governorates as stipulated in the 2005 Constitution continues to be frustrated by limited management capacity at the national and sub-national levels. Women appear under-represented at senior management levels, further circumscribing planning and management to promote girls' education. In addition, the education system lacks a well-established administrative structure with clear rules and regulations. Obtaining reliable data is an ongoing systemic challenge. Building on the established Education Management Information System, more information and reliable data are needed to inform sound education policies and plans. At district and sub-district levels, the paucity of data seriously constrains the articulation of plans and programmes to cover underserved areas and vulnerable communities. Lastly, education has not received enough financing to meet the requirements of comprehensive reform. Nearly all allocations are spent on salaries, and key areas such as school maintenance face serious shortfalls.

129. For males and females aged 15 years and over, estimated according to WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007.

130. Adult literacy for the total population aged 15 years and over, estimated according to WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007.

131. OCHA/IAU, Iraqi Women: Facts & Figures (2009)

1.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes

Immediate causes of constraints to the right to education include:

1. weak coordination between the north and centre/south;
2. poor physical infrastructure;
3. high actual and opportunity costs;
4. a curriculum that does not keep pace with global developments;
5. a weak technical vocational and education training system that fails to match skills to labour market needs;
6. shortages of supplies and ineffective teaching methods, and;
7. rapid turnover and poor motivation among teachers.

Underlying causes include:

1. poor institutional capacity to plan, execute and manage education programmes;
2. weak teacher qualifications;
3. destruction or overutilization of infrastructure;
4. consequences of diminished livelihoods, of socio-cultural traditions and limited community involvement;
5. low incentives and long hours for educators (especially in rural areas);
6. unavailability of data, and;
7. the consequences of economic sanctions and isolation, brain drain, and large disparities in the distribution of supplies and facilities such as libraries or laboratories.

Root causes include:

1. prolonged economic sanctions, long-term violence, armed conflict and neglect;
2. challenges to national reconciliation;
3. inconsistent compulsory education policies, nascent democratic governance structures, underdeveloped national capacities and human rights culture;
4. socio-cultural traditions that result in marginalization based on gender, and;
5. insufficient jobs, a lack of traditions of civil society participation, and inadequate national investments.

1.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

A national vision for the role of education in nation-building remains critical. Among the numerous policies to be developed, in addition to an overall education policy, are those for teacher recruitment, engagement and development. Adequate policy attention must be devoted to the rights of vulnerable and special population groups such as girls, children with disabilities and IDPs. To improve coordination, interactions must be strengthened with other key systems, such as health, water and sanitation and other basic services, and between regions. The inadequate capacity of parents, especially mothers, to participate effectively in their children's education must be addressed to strengthen community participation in school governance.

Yet Iraq also needs effective systems and a better understanding with regard to the evolving process of decentralization, including roles at and below governorate levels. Weak information management lies at the core of many challenges; serious efforts are needed to address this, particularly including availability and use of data at sub-governorate level, which may allow meaningful budget allocations. Insufficient human and institutional capacity in terms of education planning, policy, management, monitoring and evaluation has hindered the ability of the education sector to deliver quality edu-

cational and training services to all levels and across all geographical areas. There is a special need to ensure effective psychosocial support systems for children affected by conflict. A clear strategic framework for adjusting physical infrastructure to demand requires development, along with participatory activities on maintaining new facilities. Clarity is required on how to deal with responsibility for emerging areas such as early childhood development.

Far stronger linkages with the private sector will be critical to ensure optimal relevance of education to employment needs. Closer relations are required among educational establishments, employers and business organizations. There is also a need to review higher education policies to better cope with market needs for graduate and post-graduate education. Lastly, it will be critical to diversify research into strategic needs and standardize methodologies to ensure quality, ensuring access to international studies and knowledge-sharing.

2. The right to health

Promoting and protecting health and respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights are inextricably linked. Every country, including Iraq, is now party to at least one human rights treaty that addresses health-related rights. At the same time, assuring a strong focus on overall quality of life can help Iraq achieve its aspiration of becoming a more economically competitive country. Among other things, healthy citizens tend to be productive and able to take advantage of available opportunities, therefore adding to the economic and social security of a country.

Several health indicators in Iraq have shown improvement since the 1990s, such as antenatal care, the number of births attended by skilled personnel, and prevalence of wasting in children under age 5. Yet until recently, the Iraqi healthcare system has been based on a centralized, hospital-oriented and capital-intensive model that had limited efficiency and could not ensure equitable access. The government, since 2004, has been moving towards a decentralized model based on a primary healthcare approach. However, other health reforms initiated in 2008 have moved at a slower rate because of limited institutional capacity and expertise at the national level to lead the process. In addition, the focus is still on a curative rather than preventive approach with limited integration into the work of Primary Health Centres. Planning and technical capacities at the governorate level remain in their infancy. The emerging private sector provides curative services to only a limited number of people on a fee-for-service basis. Applying principles of good governance in health is key to supporting contemplated health system reforms. Health care in the disputed areas is poor due to lack of qualified staff, clinics, hospitals, equipment and medicines. As with the education sector, policy planning and management is impeded by the lack of coordination and communication in the context of a dual-administration system.

a. Access and availability

As is the case with education, access to health care has been seriously affected by the political and security situation, including damage to infrastructure and a sharp decrease in the number of professionals as a result of “brain drain”. Skilled health staff are significantly more available in urban than rural areas. High staff turnover, population displacement and continuing violence not only have strained capacities to sustain services, but also have sharply affected many of Iraq’s health indicators compared to neighbouring Arab states.

Further exacerbating the effectiveness of the healthcare workforce is the lack of policies, mechanisms and workspace for lower cadres of health workers and auxiliary staff. Currently, there is no defined national community health worker corps, and although data are maintained on nurses and other medi-

cal personnel, there are no data available on community health workers or other volunteers working at the community level. Allowing lower cadres of health professionals to operate within the primary healthcare system would not only alleviate the burden on the health system and address the critical shortage of medical personnel, but would likely also lead to better collection and management of health information at the community level.

While security and safety improvements have allowed more people to access existing health centres, service utilization remains ineffective overall. Cost is at least 10 times more likely to be cited as a reason for not seeking medical treatment than inaccessibility of services, lack of female or male health attendants, or concerns for safety.¹³² Women's roles especially need to be strengthened in health-related decision-making processes, health management and policymaking.

Youth often do not access information and services, especially for sexual and or reproductive health, because of stigma or fear of discrimination. This results in even greater strain at a critical juncture between the country's demographic and epidemiological transformations, on the one hand, and knowledge, attitudes and practices on the other. IDP health also has declined steeply; reproductive health services are almost nonexistent in IDP camps, although pregnant women comprise about one fourth of this population.¹³³

Health facilities continue to experience recurrent shortages of essential medicines. The local pharmaceutical industry has started to re-emerge, but still needs major investment and capacity development to meet international standards; some local drug manufacturers appear not to apply good manufacturing practices, and reflect the need for better monitoring and regulation.

In 2008, Iraq's public health budget accounted for only 3.4 per cent of government expenditures; half went for salaries and staff incentives. While budgetary allocations to the sector are increasing, less than half was actually utilized in recent years because of outdated financial and accounting procedures.

b. Maternal and reproductive health

Improvement of women's health has been a key concern of global conferences. These forums, as well as the MDGs, have enunciated that women have the right to enjoy the highest standard of physical and mental health, including the realization by 2015 of universal access to reproductive health services, and that children have the right to special care and assistance for good health. In spite of a declining trend, fertility remains high in Iraq, with significant urban/rural and inter-governorate disparities. Although first-visit access to antenatal care is relatively high, completion of the recommended number of visits (at least four) is still low (35 per cent).¹³⁴ Maternal and child and reproductive health services are provided at almost all levels of the health system in Iraq. Emergency obstetric care is provided only at secondary level and higher, constraining access for many women in need, especially in rural areas.

Despite a trend toward a lower maternal mortality ratio (MMR), this key MDG indicator remains significantly higher than those for some of the country's neighbours, placing Iraq among the 68 countries that account for 97 per cent of maternal and child deaths.¹³⁵ MMR stands at 84 per 100,000 live births, mainly as a result of poor birth practices, inadequate referral or availability of emergency obstetric care, and a high level of anaemia among pregnant women (35 per cent),¹³⁶ which particularly

132. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007

133. GoI Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008 (2008)

134. Ministry of Health Statistical Report (2008)

135. Countdown 2015 MDG monitoring website: www.countdown2015mnch.org.

136. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006

affects rural women and those in the centre and south. One in four delivering women faces serious complications during pregnancy.¹³⁷ About one in 15 adult female deaths can be attributed to maternal mortality.¹³⁸

A major challenge imposed by the youth bulge is found in increasing numbers of adolescents and youth joining the reproductive pool. Marriages at a young age are prevalent in some parts of Iraq. A challenge of equal significance is found in the increasing gap between the biological maturation of adolescents and delayed socioeconomic maturation. Total unmet need for contraception is high,¹³⁹ and evidence shows that male involvement in fertility control is largely lacking. Family planning services are offered in less than 5 per cent of primary health care centres, and family commodities are rarely available except through private pharmacies at a high cost.¹⁴⁰ While knowledge, attitudes and behaviours with regard to fertility regulation require further strengthening, methods are not always available, culturally acceptable or affordable.

c. Child health

Health trends also reveal lower rates of under-five mortality, in part attributable to a higher proportion of deliveries attended by skilled medical staff and in health institutions, as well as to the reduction in overall fertility rates. The under-five mortality rate is cited as 41 per 1,000 live births, with wide disparities between governorates;¹⁴¹ more disaggregated data are needed on this key MDG 4 indicator. A priority area that requires further intervention is essential and emergency newborn care services. Integrated management of child illnesses is an important strategy to reduce under-five mortality as well as to contribute to children's healthy growth and development, using measures to improve performance of health professionals, the health system, and family and community practices.

Because of unsanitary environmental conditions, an unsafe water supply and poor hygiene practices, diarrhoeal diseases are widespread; diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections, compounded by malnutrition, account for about two thirds of under-five deaths. Despite enhanced community education and social mobilization, routine life-saving immunization services have deteriorated. Measles coverage has dropped sharply, although increasing the proportion of one-year-olds immunized against measles is of crucial importance to achieve MDG 4. Barely one in three Iraqi children will have had all recommended vaccinations by age 12 months.¹⁴²

d. Malnutrition and food insecurity

For the 23 per cent of Iraqis living below the poverty line, food insecurity represents a major concern and a serious constraint to their ability to claim their right to food. Food insecurity persists as a result of many chronic factors and their complicated interactions – among them chronic insecurity, economic sanctions, high unemployment, weak education and health systems, insufficient production of food at national level, and a failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food at household level. Likewise, it is linked to rural/urban location, sex of household head, and poor water and sanitation and transportation services.

A severe drought has resulted in as little as one fourth of normal precipitation in 2008-2009 for agricultural regions, wreaking havoc on Iraq's ecosystem, drying up riverbeds and marshes, turning arable land into desert, and generally transforming what was once the region's most fertile area into

137. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2006-2007

138. WHO/COSIT/KRSO, IFHS 2006-2007

139. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006

140. Ministry of Health data (2008)

141. Ministry of Health data for 2008 cite rates for U5 mortality (U5MR) of 34 deaths per 1,000 live births and for infant mortality of 29 deaths per 1,000 live births. The most recent UNICEF State of the World's Children report (December 2009), gives a 2008 U5MR of 44 deaths per 1,000 live births (cf. 53 in 1990) and a 2008 infant mortality rate of 36 per 1,000 live births (cf. 42 in 1990).

142. Ministry of Health data (2008)

a wasteland. Largely as a result of the drought, more than 20 sandstorms in the first eight months of 2009 caused deaths and widespread respiratory problems. Once a food exporter, Iraq in 2009 had to import the vast majority of its food.

Progress on MDG 1 indicators for nutrition has been slow. Despite improvements, malnutrition among under-five children remains widespread. More than one in five is stunted.¹⁴³ Some 22 per cent of Iraqi households are considered vulnerable to food insecurity without the PDS, and 3.1 per cent are food-insecure.¹⁴⁴ Poor dietary diversity is also prevalent. At the same time, the entire population is eligible for monthly food rations through the PDS, one of the largest public food distribution programmes in the world. However, the food supply chain is not adequately efficient to achieve this task; and not surprisingly, the poor are disproportionately affected. Hunger is higher for female- than for male-headed households and for rural than for urban households. The transfer of food ration cards for IDPs and returnees, a time-consuming process in a volatile security environment, compounds the issue. Although infant and young child feeding practices are improving slowly, they remain poor.¹⁴⁵ Particular shortfalls occur in the Kurdistan Region. Micronutrient deficiencies are also widespread, despite progress on wheat flour fortification with iron and folic acid. As noted above, Iraq also has a high prevalence of anaemia among women of reproductive age.

e. A growing disease burden

Despite the critical overall situation, much progress has been made in communicable disease prevention and control. A comprehensive surveillance system is well established and functioning in almost all governorates, with primary health centres and hospitals providing weekly and monthly reports. This was achieved through improving communication tools and putting in place a network of disease surveillance with skilled and trained focal points in all governorates who are sharing information on trends and alerts on emerging public health threats. With regard to MDG 6, while malaria appears isolated in specific areas, challenges remain in providing quality care for multi-drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis. Although the prevalence of HIV is currently less than 0.1 per cent of the population, associated vulnerability and risk factors have continued to rise. Growth in the youth population could exacerbate the issue, as could liberalized trade relations and the opening of borders which may draw Iraqis into the global drug trade. This calls for improving the awareness of the population about HIV transmission, which is low at present.¹⁴⁶ A major cholera outbreak was reported in 2007-2008, underscoring the close linkage between morbidity and water-borne diseases and indicating the importance of strengthening cross-sectoral coordination.

Iraq is undergoing an epidemiological transition with an increasing prevalence of chronic non-communicable diseases and contributory risk factors such as tobacco use. The health system struggles to cope with both developed- and developing-world diseases: for example, while many children suffer from malnutrition, others are beginning to experience obesity. Smoking, hypertension, diabetes and high LDL cholesterol rates are also prevalent. Transforming attitudes into healthy practices, including among youth, remains a major challenge. Mental health is an issue of large dimensions, particularly for women.¹⁴⁷ Recurrent violence has had profound psychological and social effects on children and youth, many of whom have seen family members killed, and on IDPs, who may have had to flee for their lives.

143. Ibid.

144. WFP/COSIT/KRSO, CFSVA 2007

145. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006.

146. Ibid.

147. WHO/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, Iraq Mental Health Survey 2006-2007, cited in WHO, COSIT, KRSO, MoH, Iraq Mental Health Survey 2006/7 Report (2009)

f. Poor quality of services

Preventive health services are in serious decline, due to falling numbers of health professionals and constraints on access to services that do exist, largely because of the security situation, among other factors. On the positive side, about 1,000 doctors returned to the country in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, many facilities remain overloaded and services are poor, especially for women and vulnerable groups, including youth, children and IDPs. Institutional and managerial capacities are limited, with a strong need to strengthen women's role in health management and policymaking. Much stronger capacity development is needed as a whole, along with upgrading of health curricula; for this, closer collaboration is required between health and education officials. Overall coordination on health issues, both among sectors and at various levels, remains highly challenged. The lack of capacity is greatly exacerbated by staff turnover, which has led to disruptions in institutional memory and changes in decision making. Community-based approaches may be more appropriate than high-tech solutions.

2.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to health

Immediate causes of constraints to the right to health include:

1. high rates of child and maternal mortality;
2. widespread malnutrition;
3. poor access to safe drinking water and sanitation;
4. rising rates of certain illnesses;
5. rapid turnover of health staff;
6. underfunding of projects;
7. inadequate feeding practices, and;
8. limited access to health-related information, particularly for women and youth.

Underlying causes include:

1. the poor condition of health services;
2. inadequate government budgetary prioritization and spending on health services;
3. lack of national capacities, including preparation for and mitigation of natural disasters;
4. limited health planning accountability, particularly at local level;
5. poor management, planning, budgeting and training within the health system;
6. underdeveloped community approaches;
7. lack of dietary diversity;
8. poor water and sanitation conditions and inadequate electricity services;
9. insufficient understanding of the health needs of women and youth, and;
10. inadequate care-seeking behaviour, combined with lack of awareness of good health practices and patterns of transmission, prevention and treatment of disease.

Root causes include:

1. prolonged economic sanctions, armed conflict, chronic insecurity and lack of safety;
2. insufficient jobs and a shortage of qualified human resources;
3. nascent democratic governance structures;
4. inadequate national investment in essential services;
5. poor norms and standards within the health system;

6. declining quality and quantity of natural resources, exacerbated by unsustainable resource use that must be reversed;
7. socio-cultural traditions that may result in marginalization based on gender;
8. an underdeveloped human rights culture, and;
9. an unfocused social protection system.

2.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

There is a need to transform the hospital-oriented system further into a decentralized primary health care model well prepared to respond to public health threats. Little change has occurred in the services mix in primary health care, which requires urgent attention. Infrastructure and equipment must be further modernized, while balancing the proportion of investments in capacity development. In particular, improvements are needed in emergency care/preparedness and in sanitary/epidemiological control, along with public health monitoring.

Health services should be further reoriented to accommodate the needs of chronic disease prevention through strengthening the integration of chronic non-communicable diseases into primary health care services. Psychosocial services – particularly for women, children, youth and IDPs – require strong expansion. In communicable disease surveillance, a need exists for better projections with regard to diseases of public health concerns in line with International Health Regulations 2005,¹⁴⁸ including cholera, measles, pandemic influenza and HIV/AIDS. Environmental risk factors (solid, hazardous and health care wastes) represent about one quarter of the global burden of diseases. Addressing these environment-related challenges will require strengthening capacity of professionals in relevant sectors to apply best practices in the management of environmental wastes.

Meanwhile, expanded agricultural production resulting in increased dietary diversity and rural income can strongly enhance Iraq's efforts to achieve several of the MDGs. Strengthening nutrition education, including at community level, also represents a critical component, and a salt iodization policy is urgently needed. Crucially, continued food assistance must be targeted – and needs-based – for the most vulnerable and food-insecure, particularly children and women. There is a need to link social protection programmes to the productive sector and to invest in human capital in order to reduce the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

These measures will require systematic processes to address barriers to health-seeking behaviours, including those associated with socio-cultural attitudes and practices. It will also be necessary to strengthen regulation of the private sector with regard to medical care and pharmaceuticals. A major need exists for national development blueprints to enshrine reproductive health rights in an explicit, integrated package embedded in global covenants and agreements. Strengthened communication and improvements in sectoral management information systems at all levels can go a long way toward maintaining up-to-date and comprehensive data. Making health protection a joint responsibility of the state, the people and employers is crucial. Health system reform also urgently needs to explore options for sustainable, efficient health system financing; particular attention must be given to ensuring more equitable resource allocation to rural areas. Additional gaps should be examined in the legal framework, given that policies, norms and standards tend not to be fully implemented at the local level because of a lack of understanding of them.

148. These are global rules to enhance national, regional and global public health security, adopted in 2005 with the support of WHO.

3. The challenges of social protection

Iraq continues to face a deep social protection crisis (*see also Inclusive Growth*), and risks remain especially acute for women, children, youth, disabled persons and IDPs. The Iraqi Constitution addresses basic issues of child rights, for example, but does not yet provide adequate protection, including legal coverage for children in need of special protection or in conflict with the law. Yet when implemented effectively, social protection policies and programmes can contribute significantly to the overarching MDG of poverty reduction. This includes initiatives in social assistance for the most vulnerable, social insurance, labour market policies/programmes, addressing vulnerability at community level, and child protection.

a. Access and availability

Social protection programmes in Iraq are comparatively extensive, mainly because of the massive PDS food-ration programme. As a consequence, Iraq allocates, by regional standards, a relatively high proportion of its national income to social protection. However, the suboptimal allocation of these resources due to the lack of pro-poor bias in the programmes minimizes their impact on the neediest segments of the population.

b. Presence of landmines, depleted uranium and explosive remnants of war

Mine contamination impedes delivery of basic services and humanitarian assistance, negatively affects the environment and hampers development programmes. Landmines also curtail access to agricultural land, prevent IDP return and deprive families of income when breadwinners are killed or injured. Further, depleted uranium rounds have been linked to increased rates of leukaemia, congenital malformations, and various cancers, and continue to haunt Iraq long after their use in the first Gulf War.¹⁴⁹ It is estimated that 1,730 square kilometres of land are contaminated by explosive remnants of war, impacting the livelihoods and safety of more than 1.6 million Iraqis.¹⁵⁰ Twenty million landmines and 50 million cluster bombs still pose dangers, making Iraq one of the most contaminated countries in the world. Even so, information regarding many contaminated areas remains limited. People are forced to take risks to earn their livelihoods, and national capacity to tackle the issue is highly circumscribed. The government has committed to clear all anti-personnel mines by 2018.

c. Patterns of gender-based violence

A worrisome pattern of gender-based violence appears to be emerging, although still difficult to document and under-reported because of fear of retaliation and cultural or religious prohibitions. Most forms reported involve beatings, burns, sexual violence, “honour” crimes, mutilations and executions. The risk of forced marriage and sexual exploitation has also increased. In a positive move, the KRG Ministry of Human Rights has established committees on violence against women in the three governorates of the Kurdistan Region.

d. Violence against children and child labour

Children can be subject to severe disciplinary methods. About five in six children aged 2-14 have been subjected to at least one form of psychological or physical punishment by their mothers, caretakers or other household members, with almost one in three receiving severe physical punishment.¹⁵¹ Children in contact with the law are particularly re-victimized, through ill treatment, separation from

149. Souad N. Al-Azzawi, Depleted Uranium Radioactive Contamination in Iraq: An Overview (2006)

150. UNDP/UNICEF, Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq (2009)

151. UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH, MICS 2006

families, incarceration, disruption of education and lack of attention to therapeutic needs. Standards and procedures remain to be developed to enable a consistently protective environment for all children; legal reforms have generally been top-down and have not taken into account the views and experiences of children and service providers. Children with disabilities also represent an increasing concern, discriminated against and institutionalized, with inadequate family- or community-based care practices to mainstream them.

Child labour – estimated at 11 per cent and most prevalent among boys aged 12-14 residing in the centre, south, and rural areas¹⁵² – is another form of violation of human rights and of GoI commitments to relevant international agreements. Children's rights are further constrained with regard to child labour, which is prohibited by the MDGs, the CRC and the World Fit for Children document. Among the 11 per cent who work, boys residents of dwellers in central, south and rural areas are most affected.¹⁵³

e. Low quality of services

Overall, the continuing violence and insecurity have greatly weakened, and in some cases destroyed, institutions and systems for physical, social, emotional and legal protection, including for the displaced. Capacity is weak for social protection programming, particularly for children and youth, and challenges are considerable for coordination among relevant ministries. The protection system needs to become more proactive and rights-based. Too few data on protection issues have been gathered and mainstreamed into national policies and plans, rendering evidence-based planning difficult. This is compounded by inadequate knowledge and skills of professionals working with protection issues, including social workers, teachers, health workers and judicial personnel. Practices are largely out-moded, and service providers lack knowledge of current protection procedures or capacity to introduce innovative services.

3.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to social protection

Immediate causes for challenges to social protection include:

1. loss of a spouse or parent;
2. acute capacity constraints;
3. stresses on family life;
4. lack of data;
5. lack of innovative services, and;
6. extensive landmine and explosive-remnants-of-war contamination.

Underlying causes include:

1. an inadequate legal framework;
2. longstanding neglect of rights for women and vulnerable children;
3. disruption of family life;
4. widespread population displacement;
5. closure of schools;
6. lack of awareness of landmine risks, and;
7. continued risky behaviour.

^{152.} Ibid.

^{153.} Ibid.

Root causes include:

1. chronic violence and insecurity;
2. insufficient jobs;
3. shortage of qualified human resources;
4. an unfocused social protection system;
5. an underdeveloped human rights culture;
6. longstanding traditions favouring charity over empowerment of vulnerable groups;
7. inadequate national investments in essential services, and;
8. socio-cultural traditions that result in marginalization based on gender.

3.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Gaps exist in child-friendly and gender-sensitive protection laws, regulations and recourse mechanisms, and enforcement continues to be poor. The legal framework for children with special needs remains a mixture of old, new and incomplete laws, sometimes incongruent with the Constitution. Ongoing insecurity further exacerbates effective implementation of programmes.

Gender mainstreaming in all policy and programme areas has been slow, and investigation of crimes against women is hampered by a lack of skills, training and awareness. It should be noted that cases of violence and crimes against women are under-reported. The Iraqi Penal Code provides for lenient punishments for crimes regarded as “honour” killings, while medical or judicial authorities do not maintain systematic statistics for sexual violence. Particular attention must be given to referral, recovery and reintegration services for women. Although relevant ministries implement projects targeting adolescents and youth, challenges persist in youth engagement and in inadequate finance, equipment and staff qualifications. A comprehensive system for violence-related mortality surveillance and causes, including use of improvised explosive devices, is necessary, as is more adequate funding for physical and mine-related psycho-social and socioeconomic rehabilitation.

4. Improving availability and quality of key infrastructure and ensuring environmental sustainability in services

Upkeep of infrastructure in Iraq, including water and sanitation, electricity, housing, and transport and communications, has long been neglected, resulting in the near-collapse of many systems of basic services. For example, major water pipe networks installed four decades ago now leak or rupture frequently; crisscrossing and damaged pipelines mix sewage with drinking water, placing large parts of the population at risk. Severe shortages of electricity also directly affect the right to clean water and decent housing, with MDG 7 targets relating to safe water not on track. Children and women are particularly affected by insufficient and erratic service. The health and well-being of people should be protected from environmental health hazards such as air pollution, exposure to toxic chemicals and misuse of pesticides.

At the same time, it is vital to meet human development needs without undermining the capacity of the environment to provide those needs over generations. Sustainable management and protection of Iraq’s natural resources are crucial to offsetting environmental degradation arising from multiple factors: rapid population increase; lack of readily available and affordable alternatives for energy and other basic needs; lack of awareness and education about sustainable resource management, and

shortcomings in the implementation of government policies. In particular, Iraq faces an acute water crisis, resulting from challenges of trans-boundary water sharing, lack of constitutional/legislative frameworks for this key resource, and a need for strengthened integrated capacities to manage conflicting domestic demands.

The delivery of agriculture services is neither cohesive nor cost-effective. Agriculture services cover a gamut of activities such as animal and plant health and disease protection research, water management, commercial lending, crop marketing services, supplies of inputs and equipment. For this sector to be developed sustainably, delivery services need to be reformed and costing models developed.

a. Access and availability

Water supply, stability and safety represent major cross-sectoral issues jeopardizing the status of Iraq's environment and ecological support systems, with links to population growth, agriculture, health, emergency response, institution building and regional stability. Iraq's water system requires immediate intervention to counter the growing scarcity of water, with key ecosystems and habitats in decline largely because of overuse and mismanagement.

In the past 25 years, the level of water in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the country's primary sources, has fallen by more than two-thirds; these flow into Iraq from Turkey and Iran, with whom no effective dialogue for water-sharing exists. A recent international report warned that these vital water lifelines could completely dry up by 2040. Severe desertification is increasing, and the area under cultivation has fallen by half in 2009. Currently a wide range of ministries hold administrative interest in the water sector; however, coordination among them is poor. Low water use efficiency is compounded by unsustainable reliance on groundwater that seriously threatens strategic water reserves.

Nearly half of water users and a quarter of sanitation users surveyed found those services unreliable.¹⁵⁴ High use of contaminated drinking water and unimproved sanitation contributes to community tensions; thus, re-establishing water and sanitation and electricity services, among others, is key to building trust in the government. As little as 17 per cent of sewage is treated, with the rest let out into waterways. In urban areas, 44 per cent of people have access to waste collection services, compared with only 5 per cent in rural areas.¹⁵⁵ The government has set an ambitious target of universal access to safe water and sanitation by 2014.

Meanwhile, a wide gap exists between planned and allocated annual budgets;¹⁵⁶ resources are insufficient to rehabilitate and maintain water and sanitation facilities, and meaningful tariffs are needed to sustain services. Electricity is particularly problematic, given that power generated falls far short of demand; household consumption has doubled. This has caused frequent breakdowns and shutdowns of the poor and overtaxed system. Gas and liquid fuel also have been affected by sabotage, and allegations of corruption have been linked to disparities in power supply.

A severe shortage of decent housing also negatively affects all aspects of life and development and hinders progress toward MDG 7. Environmentally adverse conditions and displacement and damage to housing stock during the conflict have contributed to the high prevalence of overcrowding, particularly in urban areas. The government estimates that there will be a shortfall of 3.5 million housing units Iraq-wide between 2006 and 2015.¹⁵⁷ Environmentally adverse conditions in current housing stock include stagnant water, insects and rodents, excess humidity, open sewage outlets, garbage and dirt, foul odours, dust, noise, and smoke and gas pollution. Lack of a strong housing financing system

154. Ibid.

155. World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, IHSES 2007

156. Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works and Amanat Baghdad

157. GoI National Development Plan (2010-2014) – Sectoral Strategies for Housing, Water and Sanitation and other Municipal Services (2009)

exacerbates these issues by constraining home loans for poor or middle-income families, while the emergence of a set of inexperienced contractors has led to the need for costly, large-scale changes to projects before they can be implemented.

Lastly, the government sees transport and communications as vital to economic activity. These sectors' activities remain complex, involving more than 10 ministries and commanding up to 12 per cent of the 2008 GoI budget. In addition to an acute need to improve maintenance and lower costs, the lack of enabling legal and regulatory environments remains a key issue. Standards of competition and community service need to be set and enforced, with costs reduced to levels of adjacent countries.

b. Poor quality of services

While many physical facilities have been restored, the absence of sustainable management and regulation of resources remains key. For example, access to water and sanitation services alone will not reduce the incidence of diarrhoea unless hygiene practices and awareness are promoted simultaneously; likewise, community participation in water use must be combined with a move toward conservation incentives. Moreover, in the area of environmental health, there is an urgent need to address challenges related to indoor air pollution from solid fuels, climate change, the desertification process affecting Iraq and neighbouring countries, improving water supply sources and sanitation facilities, improving the management of solid waste and health care waste, improving hygiene behaviours, and promoting health housing.

Capital and recurrent expenditure needs are expected to remain significant and likely far exceed GoI central funding capacity. It will be essential to enhance planning, management, implementation and monitoring capacities, including strengthening the representation of women and the private sector. Lastly, data reliability remains a major constraint. An electricity distribution network database and development plans are needed at governorate level. Institutional and regulatory improvements will be needed to make services competitive, while transparency and effective oversight of bidding and other systems must be significantly strengthened.

4.1 Immediate, underlying, and root causes relating to infrastructure and the environment

Immediate causes of constraints to stabilizing key infrastructure and ensuring environmental sustainability in services include:

1. high population growth;
2. insufficient housing supply;
3. inadequate housing finance market;
4. declining rental housing market;
5. scarcity of land and serviced plots;
6. shortage of building materials;
7. high prices;
8. acute water scarcity;
9. overall environmental degradation and desertification;
10. poor infrastructure;
11. vandalism;
12. weak resource planning, management and monitoring skills, and;
13. increased demand; and high costs.

Underlying causes include:

1. lack of an enabling environment;
2. need for institutional and regulatory reform;
3. poor maintenance and wastage;
4. absence of regional water-sharing agreements;
5. absence of institutions that support low-income groups;
6. declining share of government budget allocated to housing;¹⁵⁸
7. poor banking system and investment climate;
8. restrictive land use controls;
9. freezing of government land stock in certain urban areas, and
10. a malfunctioning materials industry.

Root causes include:

1. continuing violence and insecurity;
2. lack of sufficient skilled staff and poor institutional capacities for policymaking, planning and management;
3. unsustainable resource use that must be reversed;
4. inadequate participation of civil society, particularly of women, and;
5. weak coordination that impedes accountability, transparency and information sharing.

4.2 Stakeholder and capacity gaps

Without national policies, central planning for key infrastructure and environmental sustainability is weakened. Among other initiatives, preparation of an electricity/energy master plan based on economic analysis has been delayed. Inaccessibility and obsolescence of power generation plants and difficulty in obtaining funds for clearance and rehabilitation, as well as spare parts for maintenance, have contributed to the decline in infrastructure and underscored the importance of an enabling environment. In particular, absence of integrated water resources management in Iraq will have long-lasting adverse effects, although a water strategy is under development.

Other major challenges include inter-ministerial coordination and strategic regional partnerships. Inefficient, unsustainable domestic policies and demands call for greater access to finance and agricultural extension services as well as improved farming techniques. Weak management capacity is compounded by poor water use practices.

The need for a comprehensive housing policy and strategy likewise is acute, as is a need to boost capacity of the private sector. Training programmes for contractors and construction workers, to develop quality standards and norms for bid quotations and specific construction tasks, should be part of overall capacity development. Technical support to provincial councils and communities to identify means for the safe collection of faecal solids and liquid wastes, along with household garbage, can provide the opportunity for a livelihood industry that is environmentally sounder than current systems.

Both government and civil society organizations should make efforts to educate the population on water rationing and waste management, with avenues for recycling. Currently, land planning strategies are formulated at the central level, which impedes the decision-making power of the local authorities. The local authorities are expected to implement the strategy, but lack the capacity to do so. In order to address the housing shortfall effectively, strategic decision-making should be decentralized to the local authorities, and their ability to implement enhanced. Legal and regulatory provisions governing land development need to be clarified. The housing finance markets need to be revitalized through the reform of state institutions and legal enforcement of loan repayments in order to create an enabling environment for commercial banks to enter the sector.

158. Allocations of the government budget to housing dropped from 5.5 per cent in 2004 to 1 per cent in 2009.

SECTION 3: Conclusion and priority issues for the UNDAF

This section examines the primary development gaps that emerge from the three thematic analyses as potential priorities for development action, and UNDAF foci. The UN cannot tackle these issues on its own. They require the full engagement of Iraq's government and international partners. The UN's specific role in addressing these issues can be delineated – bearing in mind specific comparative advantages for this context, development lessons from the past and the interests and capacity of other partners.

The priority areas for action listed below, while each linked to a thematic section covered in the CCA (governance, inclusive economic growth, ensuring quality essential services), impact to some degree on all the sections.

3.1 Priority development gaps for action

The thematic analysis has identified the key immediate, underlying and root causes behind development obstacles facing Iraq. Many of these obstacles spring from the same or similar causes. This suggests that an integrated approach to Iraq's development needs would best serve the country in many cases. The issues listed below are drawn from across the thematic analyses as the key factors to achieve peace consolidation and stability in Iraq and to meet the MDGs. They should be considered the primary areas of focus for an UNDAF.

These issues, while generally reflecting the Iraqi context, do not describe exact conditions in every governorate and sub-district. In particular, the differing capacities and history of the Iraqi national government and the KRG are not fully captured here. However, while the Kurdistan Region has experienced a smoother recent development trajectory than the other 15 Iraqi governorates, its context cannot be delinked from challenges faced across Iraq as a whole. Thus the elements listed below also apply to the Kurdistan Region, although their manifestations as experienced by local residents will differ from the experiences of those in central and southern Iraq. This highlights once again the importance of context-responsive strategies that are tailored specifically to local realities and the very real disparities among and within Iraq's regions.

Governance

(i) Strengthening legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness of the state

The lack of state accountability and responsiveness is a recognized root cause of vulnerability and conflict affecting governance, growth and service delivery. A weak and fractured legal, regulatory and policy environment underlies unaccountable and inefficient systems – which in turn lowers access to essential services, and hinders inclusive economic growth. Even if Iraq is over the worst effects of the global economic downturn and its budget is set to expand as oil prices rise, the GoI still lacks the capacity to expend investment funds and execute some of its core development functions.

Policy and legislative reforms are needed to improve the basic functioning of the state and support sustainable development. Programmes to develop institutional capacities – by modernizing operational and communication systems within and among core institutions – are essential to set the frame-

work for effective social development. Key areas for action in this regard include reorganization of functional responsibilities to more logical cost centres, core skills training for staff and technical upgrades to budgetary systems, improved data collection and analysis systems within line ministries, promoting more effective sectoral strategic planning, and establishing monitoring/feedback systems to ensure effectiveness and prevent corruption. In particular, the local delivery of quality services in Iraq depends to a great extent upon revisiting both the de facto and de jure relationships between central and local government, to develop a delivery model tailored specifically to each core MDG-related service sector.

The analysis has also identified the need to move away from a de facto political system that has not represented the interests of all citizens. State legitimacy in Iraq depends not just on an accepted constitutional basis for governance, but on an inclusive and participatory “activation process” for the Constitution. Political mechanisms that enable a transparent decision-making process through democratic representation of all citizens, regardless of religion and ethnicity, are essential to increase perceived state legitimacy. This is itself a forerunner to national consensus over peace and development priorities. The backing of a strong civil society is necessary to achieve these goals, requiring a reliable legislative framework through which Iraq’s neglected and often marginalized civil sector can operate and cooperate with government.

(ii) Realization of human rights and participatory justice through rule of law

This analysis highlighted the profound impact that denying human rights – including the most fundamental rights to life, education and health, as well as political and social rights – have had on Iraqi citizens. Vulnerable groups – the long-term poor, women and children, the disabled, minority communities, IDPs and returnees – are identified throughout the thematic analysis as particular victims of human rights violations. Access to justice for these groups through the rule of law is also fragmented and uneven across Iraq.

It is therefore urgent to address human rights abuses both nationally and locally. At the national level, this starts with ensuring a strong constitutional basis for rule of law and protection of rights inside Iraq (there remains much work to do in this area). At local levels, this means promoting application of consensus-based justice standards throughout judicial systems (through legal reforms) and Iraq’s civic-social systems (through two-way community engagement with the peace-building and development process). Access to justice for vulnerable groups is fundamental to reconciliation in Iraq – with priorities including social justice for women (particularly female-headed households), provision of protections for children in conflict with the law and re-absorption of former armed combatants, the status of IDPs and the reintegration of returnees. Women face specific hurdles in seeking redress through the justice system for violations committed against them, and much needs to be done to make the justice system more sensitive to their interests. With regard to IDPs and refugees, proper management of the return process is central to national and indeed local stability. The KRG and the governorate of Baghdad have a particularly high displacement burden. Key interventions are needed nationally and in areas of return to manage disputes emerging from land and property claims and to support the judicial and traditional dispute resolution systems.

Inclusive economic growth

(iii) Linking sustainable economic growth to social justice (jobs, services and social protections)

Analysis shows that the presence of rich natural resources in Iraq has not translated into consistently high growth rates, and revenues are not maximized to create productive and decent work, better services or poverty reduction. Inadequate redistribution of growth, mainly oriented towards supporting a state-controlled economy, lies at the core of Iraq's poor economic output and underfunded social development. Growth is channelled towards consumption in a manner that has enlarged the state apparatus (some 15 per cent of the entire Iraqi population are currently holding public jobs or receiving pensions) while the majority of citizens remain vulnerable and lack economic opportunities. Analysis of the unemployment context also indicates that a lack of access to jobs for an increasing and younger population, for women, and for returnees can affect the consolidation of peace in the short term, and compromise development prospects in the long term.

Key areas for action include a national programme to reorient sustainable growth towards social investment, by assisting GoI to balance development needs and growing operational costs. Such an effort would naturally include revisiting Iraq's revenue structures to diversify the economy from oil dependence and to ensure that public investments are directed towards more job-rich economic sectors. Action is also required to create an enabling national climate for private sector growth, to spur job creation. The Iraqi government has pinpointed the agricultural sector as a source of local job creation through farming, fishing, and linking producers with consumers and agro-industries.

Structural reforms facilitating private sector expansion are needed to support this – but these must be accompanied by effective measures to mitigate the social impact. Such measures would include the creation of more targeted social safety nets to relieve pressure on Iraq's operational budget and to protect the most vulnerable. Strategies for reinvesting revenues in services and for promoting public-private partnerships, with a focus on women and children, are also critical to enhance social justice and advance the MDGs.

(iv) Mitigating environmental pressures from climate change, population growth and inappropriate agricultural practices

This analysis shows the links between a fast growing population, rural poverty and high-speed urbanization – all of which gravely overstretch Iraq's environment. Changes in population size, distribution and movements instigated by conflict and war were identified as immediate and underlying causes of the challenges facing environmental conservation, water management, adequate housing, access to quality services, agricultural capacity and prospects for economic diversification. Climate change in itself is also intensifying the impact of these factors on living conditions for Iraqis. Indeed, a main threat to the country's recovery and development efforts is the risk of future climate change, particularly as regards water availability. Climate change can potentially also slow down progress towards the achievement of the MDGs. Inappropriate agricultural practices such as the misuse of chemicals and pesticides and inefficient use of water have been responsible for environmental damage.

A comprehensive and long-term approach to environmental planning is needed, with particular emphasis on supporting the agriculture sector. Urbanization as a phenomenon in Iraq also needs targeted management strategies to alleviate urban poverty, slums, unemployment and environmental hazards. Iraq's environmental challenges are here to stay, given the rising population demands – but these can

be mitigated by a more structured national approach to such issues as waste management, natural resource management, land degradation, soil erosion, air pollution, water wastage, deforestation, and climate change. Climate change-related disaster management is an essential component of any environmental management strategy in Iraq. Iraq's regional relationships also impact to a large degree its internal environmental challenges and their socioeconomic consequences. Water management, mine clearance and economic integration are key issues that must be addressed by the GoI within a regional context.

In view of the impact of climate change on poverty alleviation and achieving the MDGs, it becomes important to align human development goals with measures for addressing climate change. This calls for a commitment to addressing climate change as a matter of priority by all stakeholders, particularly relevant GoI ministries, and will entail a continuous and flexible process of mainstreaming climate change mitigation, adaptation, finance and capacity development into existing strategies and policies. This process is also an opportunity for climate-resilient development, given the vast amount of resources available to support climate change efforts.

New technologies are urgently needed to capture flaring gas and reduce greenhouse gas emissions resulting from oil production. Having ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Iraq will be eligible to apply for funding from GEF through the Special Climate Change Fund, which finances projects relating to adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building, energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management, as well as economic diversification. Capacity development in the area of climate-change financing will be required to access funding and manage delivery at the national and sub-national levels.

Ensuring quality essential services

(v) Building equity and quality into Iraq's social services, towards local poverty reduction and reconciliation

While lack of access to essential health, education, water, sanitation and nutrition in Iraq does not have the devastating health and other social consequences experienced in less-developed countries, it does perpetuate poverty, exclusion, marginalization (particularly of women and girls) and inter-sectarian or inter-ethnic resentment in many areas. This analysis identified the linkages between stabilization and equitable access to services and economic and civic opportunities.

High levels of poverty and regional inequalities in the distribution of wealth are also destabilizing factors, best tackled through area-based approaches integrated within vulnerable communities – as a partner initiative to higher-level administrative and governance reforms to improve sectoral services. Key actions suggested by the analysis include promoting equity in access to basic services for excluded and marginalized groups, focusing particularly on both extending/restoring services where they are absent (including through small-scale rehabilitation) and improving quality and access to services where they exist.

The equitable extension of services to all groups, particularly in Iraq's most conflict-sensitive areas, can play a major role in strengthening participatory governance and fostering reconciliation. A focus on children and women's access to services, as well as on persons with disabilities, is particularly clear throughout the analysis, which depends (in Iraq as elsewhere) on tailored initiatives to strengthen the relationship between rights holders and duty bearers.

Each local context presents its own immediate, underlying and root causes for lack of uptake or provision of services. The analysis shows that uptake of services such as education in Iraq are linked less to availability of infrastructure than to contextual attitudes and lack of economic opportunity for

families. The return of IDPs must be factored into the overall effort to restore Iraq's once-strong social services: the process of return can strain relationships within communities, the capacities of local authorities, and capacities of the state at the national level (as most services are still delivered through centralized ministries). In order to build trust in the political process and in the state, initiatives to build back social services in areas of return must be targeted equally to host and returning populations through a process of local revival.

(vi) Investing in human capital (including Iraqi women and future human capital through Iraqi youth and children)

Across every sector and all three thematic areas, Iraq's depleted human capital is a major challenge to development and particularly to service provision. The lack of skills enhancement and the loss of professional competencies experienced during the years of violence and insecurity, as well as the brain drain linked to population displacement, has deprived the country of essential capacities and grievously undermined service delivery. Lost capacity cannot be replaced through training alone; it requires significant investment in education and youth.

The analysis suggests the need to invest, as a priority, in primary, secondary and vocational education access and quality, to mitigate trends in low enrolment, low completion and poor exam results. Specific initiatives are needed to train or retrain young people as they seek to enter the labour market, as well as providing on-the-job training for existing professional cadres across a wide range of sectors (with a focus on governance and service delivery).

This analysis also identifies lack of investment in women's capacity as a root and underlying cause of illiteracy, poverty and gender-based violence in Iraq – underlying the lack of uptake of social services at the local level. Iraq's political, legislative and administrative structures, including the various levels of policy and decision making, do not allow equal opportunities and do not ensure sufficient promotion of women's rights. This suggests the need to address women's capacity in Iraq from a comprehensive perspective – not just addressing forms of violence against women and conservative cultural attitudes, but opening the door to more equal power relations within households, greater participation in local societies, governance, labour markets and other critical civic rights. All the evidence suggests that the impact of these measures on broader society, including social growth, participatory governance and the education and health of children, will be profound.

3.2. UN's role and comparative advantages

The UN's comparative advantage in Iraq today is defined by three key contextual facts:

- a. While moving towards stability, Iraq remains a post-conflict, transitional environment where political factors and perceptions still determine how successfully and equitably a development agenda can be implemented.
- b. Iraq is a relatively resource-rich country, falling into the middle-income development bracket. Iraq has the potential capacity to generate the resources necessary to sustain a development agenda and fund large-scale capital investment projects, even though those resources are currently poorly managed.
- c. The aid environment of Iraq is crowded, with substantial investments coming from the international community – more so than many other post-conflict contexts. A U.S. Government Accountability Office report in March 2009 noted that US\$49 billion had been invested by the U.S. alone on Iraq reconstruction and development since 2004. The entire scope of the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), by comparison, is only US\$1.3 billion since 2003.

Within the context of these factors, the UN effort in Iraq has undergone considerable evolution since 2003, offering many lessons regarding comparative advantages for the future. In the immediate post-conflict environment of 2003-2006, the UN focused heavily on large- and small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation – working directly through the government or through private contractors – as well as on institutional development and legal framework setting. From 2007 to 2008, to respond to an emerging humanitarian crisis, the UN stepped up direct delivery of humanitarian assistance, primarily to IDPs and host communities. An independent assessment of UN intervention funded by the IRFFI noted that the majority of assessed UN interventions had had a “significant and meaningful” effect on individual Iraqi lives, particularly in project localities.¹⁵⁹ However, this assessment also challenged the UN to strengthen the longer-term impact of its investments on Iraq’s broader recovery, by increasing inter-agency cohesion and government alignment and by ensuring that initiatives were needs-based, institutionalized, replicable and appropriate for scale-up. A GoI review of aid management in Iraq, commissioned by the MoPDC, supported these conclusions.

Looking forward to the next phase of Iraq’s development, the UN will build on these lessons to implement the wide mandate provided by Security Council resolutions 1770, 1830 and 1883 (which provided one-year extensions of the UNAMI mandate from August 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively). Under this mandate, unique UN strengths and experiences can be most effectively leveraged from the following three perspectives.

Perception advantages: The stamp of international legitimacy offered through the UN has a direct bearing on strengthening state legitimacy in Iraq and providing a high-level platform for development. The UN’s impartial role is widely – although not universally – accepted amongst key stakeholders across Iraq’s governance structures – a critical factor at a time when a lack of political consensus could destabilize Iraq’s development trajectory.

The expiry of Chapter VII restrictions on Iraq in 2009, accompanied by a greater UN international presence inside Iraq, has changed the nature of the GoI-UN relationship into a more normalized, hierarchical partnership, with GoI in the lead, and strengthened Iraqi faith in UN ability to work with Iraq on highly sensitive issues, in comparison with international state actors. This confers on the UN a unique relevance to – and indeed responsibility around – specific efforts led by GoI to: resolve Constitutional disputes and support the electoral process, continuing a strong, multi-faceted UN effort in this regard; set an institutional framework for the administration of rule of law in compliance with international standards; establish national policy frameworks for national services development (including support to the NDP) and inclusive economic growth; ensure humanitarian protection, gender equity and children’s rights and the rights of persons with disabilities, as enshrined in the MDGs and international law and standards; and broker cross-border confidence-building measures for development, economic integration and security.

These initiatives, the foundations for which are already laid, should provide the highest-level legal and policy framework for the implementation of technical initiatives to follow.

1. Technical advantages: Viewing Iraq from the perspective of a post-conflict and middle-income country with large-scale grant and loan-based assistance available from international donors, the UN with its relatively limited resources has no technical or financial value to add for this coming phase in the following areas:

- Direct funding of major, capital-intensive infrastructure construction and/or large-scale rehabilitation projects;
- Disconnected, status-based, direct-assistance projects without replicability or GoI support (although the UN may assist NGOs in implementing projects where humanitarian need exists, including small-scale post-

159. Scan Team Report, 2009

- conflict infrastructure repair); and
- Capital and finance markets reform.

Rather, the UN's comparative technical advantage lies in enabling the GoI to better strategize and then scale up national and local initiatives that directly relate to the priority development challenges identified within this CCA. This implies creating a more "knowledge-centric" UN tailored around Iraq's NDP, scaling down direct supply and service delivery components while building policy expertise, data analysis and emergency response capacities.

To address priority challenges for governance, the UN can build on the expertise and trust gained through work on Iraq's Constitution and elections, and its anti-corruption programmes, to strengthen legitimacy of the state from a technical perspective. Areas where the UN has a clear technical advantage over other actors in Iraq include, inter alia: addressing the capacity gap in participatory governance (beyond electoral participation), to include fostering linkages between Iraq's nascent and still uneven civil society and the state, as well as promoting a free and active press; and introducing, and then scaling up, initiatives to promote reconciliation, legal frameworks for the protection of human rights, and judicial reform. These areas are not being addressed comprehensively by other actors in Iraq.

The UN also has a key role in addressing capacity gaps in Iraqi public-sector institutions, through priority structural reforms across the civil service and within key ministries to implement Iraq's development agenda, alongside the World Bank and Iraq's other partners. Given the range of actors involved, the UN's comparative advantage in this latter area is as a convener of a system-wide approach to institutional reform and a strategic driver of reform, rather than as a reform provider per se.

To address priority challenges for inclusive economic growth, the UN should work together with the World Bank to identify respective comparative advantages based on skills available on the ground. The UN and World Bank can act as force multipliers in Iraq to address development gaps identified for economic diversification and private sector stimulation through structured loans, support to capital markets and Public Financial Management (World Bank); and through legislative change (to restructure Iraq's budget, simplify Iraq's investment climate and reform state-owned enterprises), market needs assessment, corporate social responsibility, and microfinance at the local level with a focus on women in the workforce (UN).

The UN is also essential in this context to balance a focus on capital growth spurred through the World Bank and foreign direct investment with more effective and targeted social support systems, channelling economic growth efforts to the vulnerable for social justice, protection and equity. This should include a joint GoI-World Bank-UN effort to reform Iraq's primary social safety net, the Public Distribution System, and to link investment budgeting to development strategies.

To address the economic opportunity gap underlying weak local reconciliation processes, the UN should take a central role to partner with GoI in area-based employment generation initiatives – particularly in areas experiencing chronic poverty, high return rates and youth at risk of involvement in violence. The UN should be a partner and convener (given much greater financial resources available from other international actors) in promotion of agricultural reform as one means of alleviating rural poverty, and in addressing the challenge of urbanization and environmental degradation. From this perspective, UNDP is one of the managers of the GEF and is rapidly building expertise in climate change-related areas such as carbon trading. Finally, as an international broker, the UN is a natural

partner for GoI in addressing the negotiation, policy and legal gaps identified in the regional context (i.e., to support adoption of international and regional treaties to manage natural and cultural resources, including, oil, natural gas and water).

To address priority challenges in delivery of essential social services, the UN is the only organization with the comprehensive normative background and experience (if not the financial resources) to address the development gaps in operations and services for the poor and vulnerable, the youth component of the human capital crisis, linkages between economic growth and social justice, marginalization of women, and the services/livelihood and human rights components of local reconciliation. This could be best managed through:

- 1) upstream policy support to GoI for sectoral strategies tagged to the MDGs, CRC and CEDAW, based on a rational assessment of the optimal relationship between central and local government per sector, with a strong focus on water and municipal services, education, health and agriculture;
- 2) introduction of tailored, replicable, integrated and GoI co-funded services and livelihood programmes in particularly vulnerable localities;
- 3) reliable, disaggregated data collection, analysis and dissemination, and;
- 4) fostering social protections including housing and property rights, mine action and food security. The support provided should be appropriate for a middle-income country, designed to enhance knowledge and skills across state and society, targeting particularly vulnerable groups (e.g., women, youth, infants, persons with disabilities, returnees, former combatants and IDPs).

With the many large-budgeted actors involved in service provision in Iraq, the UN comparative advantage is more a question of approach and focus than of financing. In this light, the UN has a responsibility, as well as the capacity, not just to ensure that services from the Iraqi state reach rights holders, but to foster social dialogue toward formulation of gender-sensitive and child-friendly social policies and budgets which Iraq has not yet been in a position to develop.


2. Coordination and leverage: The measure of success for the UN system in Iraq will not be the dollar value of resources channelled through UN agencies, nor even the immediate impact of directly-funded UN projects. It will be how the UN manages to mobilize international and Iraqi resources around Iraq's development priorities, and the degree to which UN-GoI initiatives are effectively scaled up.

The UN is therefore essential in Iraq as a harmonizing fulcrum between the government's development agenda and the agenda of the international community for Iraq. The UN is also mandated by implication through UN Security Council resolution 1770 and subsequent resolutions to ensure that the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness are realized in Iraq: No other agency can more effectively assist the GoI to achieve this.

In addition, the UN, bringing low resources but high capacity to Iraq's development agenda, is better placed than other international partners to set a standard for co-financing from GoI at the national and local levels of programme implementation. This is critical to ensure that GoI's leadership is maintained and that Iraq – as it can and should – moves gradually but inevitably towards self-sufficiency.


SECTION 4: Annexes

ANNEX A: Maps



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IRAQ - Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
IOM Assessed IDP families from 2003 until November 2009





ANNEX B: Indicator Framework

Essential Services

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--|-------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net enrolment | | | | | | | | | | |
| KG, age 4-5 | EMIS | per cent | 2008 | 6.2 | -- | -- | 6.2 | 6.2 | -- | -- |
| Primary, age 6-11 | MICS | per cent | 2008 | 85.5 | 93.8 | 86.7 | 90.9 | 80.4 | -- | -- |
| Primary schools | COSIT | per cent | 2007-2008 | 87 | -- | -- | 91 | 82 | -- | -- |
| Primary schools | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 85.8 | 93.8 | 86.7 | 90.9 | 80.4 | x | |
| Secondary schools | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 40.1 | 52.8 | 34.3 | 45.9 | 34.3 | x | |
| Intermediate schools | Ministry of Education | per cent | 2007-2008 | 40.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Intermediate, age 12-14 | EMIS | per cent | 2008 | 40.5 | -- | -- | 43.5 | 37.3 | -- | -- |
| Upper secondary, age 15-17 | EMIS | per cent | 2008 | 27 | -- | -- | 28.9 | 25.1 | -- | -- |
| Preparatory/ upper secondary schools | MICS | per cent | 28-Jun | 27 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Pre-school attendance (36 -59 months) | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 0.9 | 2.2 | 2.7 | x | |
| Children under the age of 15 who do not attend school regularly | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 86 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Illiteracy aged 10 or more | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 17.5 | 13.5 | 25.3 | 10.5 | 24.4 | -- | -- |
| Schools damaged either by war or lack of maintenance | Ministry of Education | per cent | -- | 70 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Health & Nutrition | | | | | | | | | | |
| Households using adequately iodized salt | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 28 | 34.4 | 16.1 | -- | -- | x | |
| Average household spending on health | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 14 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Mortality from diarrhoea | Ministry of Health statistical report | per 100.000 target pop. | 2008 | 11.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Mortality from other infections | Ministry of Health statistical report | per 100.000 target pop. | 2008 | 68.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Cholera incidence | National Report on the status of human development in Iraq | number | 2008 | 5,000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Anaemia in women aged 15-49 (not pregnant nor breastfeeding) | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 35.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Anaemia rate among women aged 15-49 | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 37.9 | 36 | 40.8 | -- | -- | x | |
| Anaemia in women aged 15-49 (not pregnant nor breastfeeding) in the south and centre | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 38 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Anaemia in women aged 15-49 (not pregnant nor breastfeeding) in the Kurdistan Region | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 21.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Low birthweight | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 14.8 | 14.9 | 14.6 | -- | -- | x | |
| Children under 6 months exclusively breastfed | Ministry of Health statistical report | per cent | 2008 | 25 | 23.7 | 27.4 | 23.5 | 26.7 | -- | -- |
| Iraqi infants aged 6-11 months who are properly breastfed | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 38 | 35.9 | 41.4 | 38.7 | 37.3 | x | |
| Children aged 6-59 months who receive a high dose of Vitamin A (during 6 months prior) | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 11.3 | 13.3 | 8.6 | 11.6 | 11.1 | x | |
| People who experienced significant emotional distress | IMHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 35.5 | -- | -- | 30.4 | 40.4 | x | |
| People who suffered from (life time) any disorder | IMHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 16.5 | 17.74 | 14.5 | 13.7 | 19.46 | x | |
| Maternal mortality rate | ILCS | per 100.000 live births | 2002-2003 | 193 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Maternal mortality rate | IFHS | per 100.000 live births | 2006-2007 | 84 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Deliveries | | | | | | | | | | |
| by traditional birth attendants | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 18.4 | 12.9 | 26.9 | -- | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|--------|----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| taking place in health institutions | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 64.1 | 70 | 55.1 | -- | -- | x | |
| taking place at home | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 24.7 | 20.4 | 31.2 | -- | -- | x | |
| Mothers received antenatal care | MICS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 84 | 89.6 | 75 | -- | -- | x | |
| Non-receipt of health checks after childbirth | ILCS | per cent | 2004 | 58 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Mothers received at least 2 doses of tetanus vaccination during the last pregnancy | MICS | per cent | 2006-2007 | 37.9 | 44 | 28.1 | -- | -- | x | |
| Use of contraception among currently married women aged 15-49 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Use of any contraceptive method | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 50 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Use of modern contraceptive method(s) | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 33 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Use of traditional method(s) | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 17 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Children aged 18-29 months vaccination | | | | | | | | | | |
| BCG vaccination | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 92.3 | 94.6 | 88.9 | 93.4 | 91.2 | x | |
| Polio 0 immunization | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 81.8 | 87.2 | 74 | 82.8 | 80.8 | x | |
| Polio 1 immunization | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 90.8 | 93.1 | 87.6 | 92.3 | 89.3 | x | |
| Polio 2 immunization | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 81.8 | 84.3 | 78.2 | 83.1 | 80.4 | x | |
| Polio 3 immunization | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 65.6 | 70 | 59.3 | 67.9 | 63.1 | x | |
| Coverage of measles vaccine | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 68 | 74.7 | 58.1 | 70.2 | 65.7 | x | |
| Persons suffering from poor housing conditions | | | | | | | | | | |
| stagnant water | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 56.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| insects and rodents | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 49.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---|----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| excess humidity conditions | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 39 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| open sewage outlets | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 36.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| garbage and dirt conditions | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 36.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| foul odours conditions | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 28.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| dust conditions | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 28.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| noise | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 22 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| smoke and gases | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 13.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| more than 16 hours a day of power cuts | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 31 | 36 | 22 | -- | -- | x | |
| more than 16 hours a day of power cuts | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 31 | 36 | 22 | -- | -- | x | |
| more than 11-15 hours a day of power cuts | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 21 | 21 | 22 | -- | -- | x | |
| more than 6-10 hours a day of power cuts | CFSVA | per cent | 2007 | 28 | 26 | 33 | -- | -- | x | |
| Physical domestic violence in kurdistan region | IFHS | per cent | 2007 | 10.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Physical domestic violence in south and centre | IFHS | per cent | 2007 | 22.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Demographics | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fertility | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 4.3 | 4 | 5.1 | -- | -- | x | |
| Fertility | MICS | per cent | 1990 | -- | -- | 5.8 | -- | -- | x | |
| Urban population | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 71 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| governorate centre population | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 41.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| other urban areas | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 29.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Estimated yearly growth of population in urban areas | Iraq Housing Construction Sector Study, Final Report January 2007 prepared by PADCO AECOM | per cent | 2000-2010 | 2.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| females married first time by the age of 12+ | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | -- | -- | 9.8 | -- | -- | x | |
| females married first time by the age of 18 | IFHS | per cent | 2006-2007 | -- | -- | 26.8 | -- | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--|-----------------------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Environment & Natural Resource Management | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sources of water for IDPs | | | | | | | | | | |
| water pipes | IOM | per cent | 2008 | 90 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| lakes, rivers and streams | IOM | per cent | 2008 | 53 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| open or broken pipes | IOM | per cent | 2008 | 52 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households using an improved drinking water source | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 79.2 | 91.9 | 57 | -- | -- | x | |
| IDP families living with families or host communities | IOM | per cent | 2009 | 12 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Percentage of dried Mesopotamian marshlands | UNEP | per cent | 2000 | 90 | | | | | | |
| Increase in carbon dioxide level | EIA, International Energy Annual | per cent | 2002-2006 | 25 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Landmines & UXOs | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rain-fed crops blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 32% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Water used for other purposes blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 11% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Roads & trails blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 10% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Drinking water blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 6% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Housing blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 1% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Other infrastructure blocked by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent | 2004 - 2006 | 1% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Communities affected by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of communities | 2004 - 2006 | 1622 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|--|------------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Square kilometres contaminated by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | square kilometers | 2004 - 2006 | 1730 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Population at risk (saftey & livelihoods) by ERW | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of persons | 2004 - 2006 | 1,616,127 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| ERW victims in the past two years | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of victims | 2004 - 2006 | 577 | -- | -- | 519 | 58 | | x |
| Communities with ERW (high impact category) | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of communities | 2004 - 2006 | 70 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Communities with ERW (medium impact category) | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of communities | 2004 - 2006 | 568 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Communities with ERW (low impact category) | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | number of communities | 2004 - 2006 | 984 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Cluster bombs used between 1991-2006 | Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities | number of cluster bombs used | 2007 | 50,000,000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| ERW victims in the past two years aged 15 - 19 | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent by age | 2004 - 2006 | 45% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| ERW victims in the past two years aged 30 - 44 | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent by age | 2004 - 2006 | 19% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| ERW victims in the past two years aged 5 - 14 | Landmine Impact Survey, the Republic of Iraq | per cent by age | 2004 - 2006 | 24% | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Anti-personnel land mines destroyed | Article 7 Transparency Report | per cent | 2008 | 0.02% | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|---|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Social Protection | | | | | | | | | | |
| Contribution rates in the private sector in non-oil enterprises (workers) | Jobs for Iraq: An Employment and Decent Work Strategy | per cent | 2007 | 17 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Contribution rate of enterprises in the oil sector (workers) | Jobs for Iraq: An Employment and Decent Work Strategy | per cent | 2007 | 5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Contribution rates in the private sector in non-oil enterprises (employers) | Jobs for Iraq: An Employment and Decent Work Strategy | per cent | 2007 | 12 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Contribution rate of enterprises in the oil sector (employers) | Jobs for Iraq: An Employment and Decent Work Strategy | per cent | 2007 | 20 | | | | | .. | |
| Jobs covered by social security | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 45.2 | 44.6 | 42.1 | -- | -- | x | |
| Jobs covered by social security, by education | | | | | | | | | | |
| Illiterate | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 24.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Intermediate | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 35.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Secondary or vocational | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 62 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Bachelor | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 82.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Beyond bachelors | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 96.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Jobs covered by social security, by per capita nominal expenditure (IQD '000 per month) | | | | | | | | | | |
| per capita nominal expenditure <60 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 23.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| per capita nominal expenditure 61-79 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 28.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| per capita nominal expenditure 80-99 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 30.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--------|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| per capita nominal expenditure 100-119 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 38.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| per capita nominal expenditure 160-179 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 49.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| per capita nominal expenditure 180-199 | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 54.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| per capita nominal expenditure 400+ | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 73.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Transfers for individuals aged 60+ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transfers from civil retirement | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 7.30% | 6.10% | x | |
| Transfers from military retirement | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 3.50% | 3.10% | x | |
| Transfers from inherited retirement | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 4.80% | 0.10% | x | |
| Transfers from Social Security retirement | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 0.60% | 0.10% | x | |
| Proportion of individuals aged 60+ receiving selected types of transfers from cash assistance from government | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 3.20% | 1.00% | x | |
| Proportion of individuals aged 60+ receiving selected types of transfers from in-kind assistance from government | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 0.50% | 0.40% | x | |
| Proportion of individuals aged 60+ receiving selected types of transfers from gifts, donations and compensation from other families inside Iraq | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 1.10% | 3.40% | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|--------|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Proportion of individuals aged 60+ receiving selected types of transfers from gifts, donations and compensation from other families outside Iraq | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | -- | -- | -- | 7.30% | 6.10% | x | |
| Water & Sanitation | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children with diarrhoea who received ORT or increased fluids and continued feeding | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 63.8 | 62 | 66.8 | 66 | 61.4 | -- | -- |
| Households with water and sanitation infrastructure | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 80 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households with constant interruptions in water supply because of power outages | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 37 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households with use of improved sanitation | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 92 | 98.2 | 81.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households with solid waste collected | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 45 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households with collected waste dumped into open land or rivers | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 60 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Households with wasted children who had experienced diarrhoea | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 18 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Energy - Electricity & Fuel | | | | | | | | | | |
| Primary source of electricity (households) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Public network | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 67 | 81.9 | 84.4 | -- | -- | x | |
| Community generator | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 41.2 | 39 | 12.6 | | | x | |
| Private generator | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 7.6 | 1.7 | 6.4 | -- | -- | x | |
| Secondary source of electricity (households) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Public network | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 25.5 | 10.4 | 9.6 | -- | -- | x | |
| Community generator | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 41.2 | 39 | 12.6 | -- | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---|----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Private generator | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 20.1 | 31.5 | 32.6 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households that can solely rely on the public network for electricity | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 22.4 | 12.1 | 40.9 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households that resort to gas as the primary source of fuel used for cooking | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 82.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Housing | | | | | | | | | | |
| Households living under any slum condition (UN-HABITAT definition) | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 57 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Population living in non-durable structure | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 11 | 3 | 25 | -- | -- | x | |
| Population living in less than 50 sq m/person | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 4.1 | 6.7 | 2.6 | -- | -- | x | |
| Population living in a house with 3 or more persons/room | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 18 | 17 | 25 | -- | -- | x | |
| Population suffering from insufficient light | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 28 | 31 | 31 | -- | -- | x | |
| Population suffering from insufficient ventilation | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 15 | 21 | 12 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households residing in owned property | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 79 | 72 | 89 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households having access to public network | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 81 | 97 | 46 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households having access to septic tank | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 50 | 40 | 55 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households served with waste disposal services | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 29 | 43 | 3 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households accessed by all-weather road | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 57 | 77 | 21 | -- | -- | x | |
| Households reported experiencing stagnant water in their housing environment | IHSES | per cent | 2007 | 56 | 51 | 63 | -- | -- | x | |
| HIV prevalence among adults (15-49 years) | 2008 report on the global AIDS epidemic, UNAIDS | per cent | 2008 | 0.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| HIV/AIDS cases registered | 2008 report on the global AIDS epidemic, UNAIDS | number | 1986-2007 | 269 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--|----------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| HIV cases reported post-2003 | National AIDS Program, Annual report 2008 | number | 2003-2008 | 53 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) | Prevention of HIV / AIDS among young people in Iraq , National Communication Strategy, MOH – Iraq / UNICEF | number | 2002 | 75,405 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) | Prevention of HIV / AIDS among young people in Iraq , National Communication Strategy, MOH – Iraq / UNICEF | number | 2003 | 64,428 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Knowledge on HIV/AIDS among women aged 15-49 | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 41 | 52 | 21 | -- | -- | x | |
| Comprehensive knowledge on HIV prevention methods and transmission among women aged 15-49 | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Knowledge of mother-to-child transmission of HIV among women aged 15-49 | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 33 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Awareness of location of HIV services among women aged 15-49 | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x |
| Utilization of HIV services among women aged 15-49 | MICS | per cent | 2006 | 3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x |

Inclusive Growth

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--------------------------|---------|--------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| Poverty | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| People living under the poverty line | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 23 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Employment | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Labour Force participation | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 47.4 | 45.1 | -- | 52.9 | -- | 75.6 | 18.4 | -- | x | |
| Labour Force participation by education | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Illiterate | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 27.7 | 20.7 | -- | 36.2 | -- | 65.8 | 11.7 | -- | x | |
| Intermediate | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 41.4 | 37.5 | -- | 52.3 | -- | 62 | 10.1 | -- | x | |
| Secondary | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 51.8 | 46.1 | -- | 63.3 | -- | 68 | 23 | -- | x | |
| University | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 89.2 | 86.5 | -- | 94 | -- | 93 | 80.7 | -- | x | |
| Labour Force participation by age | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| aged 15-19 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 28.9 | 21.5 | -- | 40.5 | -- | 44.3 | 11.5 | -- | x | |
| aged 20-24 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 49.5 | 43.9 | -- | 58.1 | -- | 76.6 | 19.3 | -- | x | |
| aged 25-29 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 60.1 | 59.4 | -- | 63.6 | -- | 94.8 | 24.6 | -- | x | |
| aged 30-34 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 59.4 | 59.6 | -- | 61.3 | -- | 96.8 | 22.3 | -- | x | |
| aged 35-39 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 60.6 | 60.6 | -- | 63.3 | -- | 97.1 | 24.1 | -- | x | |
| aged 40-44 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 58.4 | 58.7 | -- | 61 | -- | 95.8 | 22.2 | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------|--------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| aged 45-49 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 56.2 | 58.2 | | 57.4 | | 93.6 | 23.8 | | x | |
| aged 50-54 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 50.9 | 50.2 | -- | 54.4 | -- | 83.9 | 20.8 | -- | x | |
| aged 55-59 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 42.7 | 42.9 | -- | 47.2 | -- | 72.3 | 12.2 | -- | x | |
| aged 60-64 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 28.7 | 23.6 | -- | 35.3 | -- | 50.6 | 8.3 | -- | x | |
| Unemployment rate | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 14.7 | 14.7 | -- | 12.9 | -- | 13.8 | 18.5 | -- | x | |
| Unemployment rate by education | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Illiterate | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 13.6 | 15.6 | -- | 11.6 | -- | 14.9 | 10.3 | -- | x | |
| Intermediate | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 14.1 | 14.7 | -- | 9.2 | -- | 11.9 | 34.5 | -- | x | |
| Secondary | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 15.3 | 13.3 | -- | 13.2 | -- | 12.3 | 31.1 | -- | x | |
| University | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 13.4 | 12 | -- | 16.9 | -- | 10.3 | 21.4 | -- | x | |
| Unemployment rate by age | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| aged 15-19 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 32.8 | 37.2 | -- | 25.7 | -- | 36.3 | 18 | -- | x | |
| aged 20-24 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 26 | 28 | -- | 21.5 | -- | 24.4 | 32.8 | -- | x | |
| aged 25-29 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 16.5 | 17.8 | -- | 13.7 | -- | 14.8 | 23.3 | -- | x | |
| aged 30-34 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 10.1 | 10.4 | -- | 7.8 | -- | 8.5 | 17.3 | -- | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|---|---------|--------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| aged 35-39 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 7.2 | 7.5 | -- | 6 | -- | 4.4 | 18.6 | -- | x | |
| aged 40-44 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 6.3 | 7.2 | -- | 5.7 | -- | 4.3 | 14.6 | -- | x | |
| aged 45-49 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 5.3 | 5.6 | -- | 4.9 | -- | 4.5 | 8 | -- | x | |
| aged 50-54 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 4.8 | 4.3 | -- | 4.7 | -- | 4.7 | 4.9 | -- | x | |
| aged 55-59 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 3.8 | 3.9 | -- | 2.9 | -- | 3.9 | 2.6 | -- | x | |
| aged 60-64 | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 Jul-Aug | 2.3 | 1.9 | -- | 2.2 | -- | 2.4 | 2.2 | -- | x | |
| Public sector workers as a percentage of all employed | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 35.3 | | -- | -- | -- | 27.3 | 8 | -- | x | |
| Private sector workers as a percentage of all employed | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 63.9 | | -- | -- | -- | 53.2 | 10.7 | -- | x | |
| Jobs provided by government as a percentage of all jobs | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 | 35 | | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | x | |
| Full-time jobs provided by government as a percentage of all full-time jobs | COSIT Labor Force Survey | percent | 2008 | 44 | | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | x | |
| Private Sector Development | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Growth by sectors | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry, hunting & fishery | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 31 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Mining and quarrying | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 45 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Crude oil | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 44 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Other kinds of mining | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 530 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governor-ate level | |
|--|---|---------|-----------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|--------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| Manufacturing industry | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Electricity and water | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 255 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Building and construction | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 499 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Transport, communication and storage | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Wholesale, retail ,trade and hotels and others | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 143 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Finance,insurance, real estate and business services | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 512 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Banking and insurance | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 322 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Ownership of dwellings | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 528 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Social and personal services | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 115 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Social services | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 119 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Personal services | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 66 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |
| Growth in total activities | COSIT Annual Abstract of Statistics 2006 - 2007 | percent | 2003-2007 | 1,582 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | | x |

| Indicator | Source | UNIT | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------------------------------------|-----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| Gross Domestic Product | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP growth rate | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2004 | IMF SBA review | percent | 2004 | 46.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2005 | IMF SBA review | percent | 2005 | -0.7 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2006 | IMF SBA review | percent | 2006 | 6.2 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF SBA review | percent | 2007 | 1.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2008 | IMF SBA review | percent | 2008 | 9.8 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| GDP | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2006 | 49.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2007 | 62.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| GDP per capita | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | US\$ | 2006 | 1,720 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | US\$ | 2007 | 2,109 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| GDP share by sectors | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 6 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Retail | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 6.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Transportation | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 7 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Electricity | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 0.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Manufacturing | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 1 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Oil and mining | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 65 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Construction | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 1 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Social and Private services | COSIT GDP and National Income report | percent | 2006 | 13.5 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|-------------------------------------|-----|
| | | | | Total | Gov. Center | Urban | Rural | Total | Male | Female | Total | Yes | No |
| Oil indicators | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oil revenues as a percentage of GDP | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2004 | IMF Country Report | percent of GDP | 2004 | 65 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | percent of GDP | 2006 | 60.3 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | percent of GDP | 2007 | 60.2 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Oil exports | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | million barrels per day | 2006 | 1.4 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | million barrels per day | 2007 | 1.59 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Other economic indicators | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | percent of GDP | 2006 | 13.6 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | percent of GDP | 2007 | 17.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | - |
| Exchange rate | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | IQD per US\$ | 2006 | 1467 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | IQD per US\$ | 2007 | 1255 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Assets held abroad | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2006 | 8.6 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2007 | 12.6 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| Consumer prices | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | Percentage change | 2006 | 64.8 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | Percentage change | 2007 | 4.7 | N/A | -- | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | N/A | N/A |

GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|-----------|---------|-------------------|---------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Violence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Experienced Physical Domestic Violence | IFHS | percent | 2006-2007 | 21.2 | 23.3 | 23 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Experienced Emotional Domestic Violence | IFHS | percent | 2006-2007 | 33.4 | 31.9 | 36.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Controlling Behaviour by Husband | IFHS | percent | 2006-2007 | 83.1 | 82.6 | 84 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Number of Security incidents | UNAMI SSI | number | Aug 2007-Sep 2009 | 45372 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Number of Killed in Iraq | UNAMI SSI | number | Aug 2007-Sep 2009 | 22,240 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Displacement, Return and Integration | | | | | | | | | | |
| Refugees inside Iraq - Total | UNHCR | number | 2009 | 39,606 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Iranian | UNHCR | Percent | 2009 | 27 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Palestinian | UNHCR | Percent | 2009 | 32 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Turkish | UNHCR | Percent | 2009 | 40 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Registered Iraqi Refugees - Total | UNHCR | number | 2009 | 292,998 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Jordan | UNHCR | Percent | 2009 | 18 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Syria | UNHCR | Percent | 2009 | 71 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Number of Refugee Returns- Families | | | | 3,030 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| July - Dec 2008 | UNHCR | Unit | Jul-Dec 2008 | 3,030 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 3,390 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Number of Refugee Returns- Individuals | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| July - Dec 2008 | UNHCR | Unit | Jul-Dec 2008 | 16,370 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 13,840 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 13,840 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Number of IDP Returns- Families | | | | 21,870 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| July - Dec 2008 | UNHCR | Unit | Jul-Dec 2008 | 21,870 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 9,100 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Number of IDP Returns- Individuals | | | | 129,550 | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| July - Dec 2008 | UNHCR | Unit | Jul-Dec 2008 | 129,550 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 2009 | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 53,910 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| IDP Returns to Baghdad- Individuals | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 32,450 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|--------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Refugee returns by country of asylum (individuals) | | | | 6,220 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Syria | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 6,220 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Iran | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 1,610 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Jordan | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 1,110 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Sweden | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 690 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Egypt | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 650 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| USA | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 250 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Germany | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 230 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Australia | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 170 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| UK | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 170 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| UAE | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 160 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Netherlands | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 150 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Turkey | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 150 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Denmark | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 140 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Yemen | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 140 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Lybia | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 120 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Lebanon | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 100 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Oman | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 90 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Canada | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 60 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Finland | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 40 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Norway | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 40 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| France | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 30 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Greece | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Malaysia | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Romania | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Saudi Arabia | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Switzerland | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 20 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Bahrain | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Belgium | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| N.Zealand | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Poland | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| South Africa | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Spain | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Uzbekistan | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Others | UNHCR | Unit | 2009 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|--|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Elections | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average provincial election turnout | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2005 | IHEC | percent | 2005 | 55.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| 2009 | IHEC | percent | 2009 | 51 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Political activity and perceptions on governance | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| People engaged in political activity | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 3.1 | -- | 3.5 | 3 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1.5 | x | |
| Trust in political parties shaken | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 70 | 72.9 | -- | -- | 64.1 | -- | -- | | x |
| Trust in political parties shaken among unemployed | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 83.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Leading underlying cause of violence: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Occupation and loss of national independence | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 59.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Unrest stemming from marginalization and exclusion | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 13.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Low standards of living and wide unemployment | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 11.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Provocation by the media | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 7.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Imposition of alien values | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Threats to national identity | GoI Status of Human Development Report | percent | 2008 | 4.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Government institutional composition | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of MPs | GoI Status of Human Development Report | Number | 2008 | 275 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 188 | 87 | | x |
| Seats won in local elections | IHEC | Number | 2009 | 444 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 334 | 110 | x | |
| Ministers | US State Department | Number | 2009 | 25 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 22 | 3 | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|---------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|--------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Political candidates in local elections | IHEC | Number | 2009 | 14,400 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10,400 | 4,000 | | x |
| Head of household gender | IFHS | percent | 2006/2007 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 89.8 | 10.2 | | x |
| GoI ministries | US State Department | Number | 2009 | 36 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| SOEs | US State Department | Number | 2009 | 195 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Government budget and expenditure | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Budget projection | Iraq National Budget 2009 | US\$ billion | 2009 | 59.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Government salaries expenditure budget (projected) | Iraq National Budget 2009 | US\$ billion | 2009 | 17.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government expenditure on wages (projected) | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 37.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government pension expenditure budget (projected) | Ministry of Finance | US\$ billion | 2009 | 3.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government SOE expenditure budget (projected) | Ministry of Finance | US\$ billion | 2009 | 3.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Percentage of GoI budget allocated to operational costs | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 78.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Public expenditure | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2006 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2006 | 34.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2007 | 38.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |
| External Government debt | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2007 | 101.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |
| 2009 | IMF Country Report | US\$ billion | 2009 | 31.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---|--------------|-----------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| GoI expenditure spent on operational costs 2005-2007 | US Government Accountability Office, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight | percent | 2005-2007 | 90 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| GoI expenditure spent on investment 2005-2007 | US Government Accountability Office, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight | percent | 2005-2007 | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Government expenditure in Public Activity | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PDS | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 6.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Grants | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| War reparations | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 6.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| SOEs | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 2.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Pensions | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 2.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Local council and provincial management | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 2.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Other ministry expenditure | Iraq National Budget 2008 | US\$ billion | 2008 | 3.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government operational spending (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2007 | 79 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 72 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 78 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Expenditure on health (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 2.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Expenditure on education (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 7.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 9.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Expenditure on security (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 33.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 17.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Expenditure on other ministries (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 29.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 38.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Expenditure on KRG transfers (% of GoI expenditure) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 15.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 12 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Operational costs (% of overall GoI operational costs) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KRG | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 12.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Education | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 9.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Electricity | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Interior | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 8.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Oil | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Defence | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 6.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Health | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 3.8 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Agriculture | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|---------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Justice | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Investment costs (% of overall GoI operational costs) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KRG | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 21.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Education | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Electricity | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 21.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Interior | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Oil | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 17.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Defence | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Health | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | x |
| Agriculture | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Justice | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government revenues 2008-2009 by sector | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oil revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 83.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|---------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 85.4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Customs revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.8 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | -- | -- |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Income Tax revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 0.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Corporate Tax revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 0.8 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Staff income tax revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 0.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---------------------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Interest income tax revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.8 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 5.7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Revenues from assets transferred from SOEs (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 3.1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 1.8 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Pay services revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 0.2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Tax revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 10.4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Other revenues (% of total GoI revenues) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2008 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2008 | 0.1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| 2009 | Ministry of Finance | percent | 2009 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Government data collection activities | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Surveys conducted by COSIT | IAU Stocktaking | Number | 2006-2007 | 19 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Surveys conducted by KRSO | IAU Stocktaking | Number | 2006-2007 | 12 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | x |
| Culture, technology access and time usage | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of mobile phones in Iraq | IHSES | Millions of mobile phones | 2007 | 24 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Radio stations operating in Iraq | CIA World Fact-book | Number | 2008 | 52 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | x | |
| Household expenditure on visits to historical sites, public parks and zoos | IHSES | IQD per capita per month | 2007 | 8 | -- | 17 | -- | 2 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| Persons whose households possesses durable goods | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| radio/cassete recorder | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 43 | -- | 51.5 | -- | 30.8 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| color TV | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 95.2 | -- | 95.2 | -- | 91.3 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| B&W TV | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 3.9 | -- | 2.8 | -- | 5.5 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| video recorders | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 2 | -- | 2.9 | -- | 1.2 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| personal computers | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 7.4 | -- | 12.2 | -- | 1.8 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| Play Stations | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 4.6 | -- | 8 | -- | 1 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| satellites dishes | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 88.3 | -- | 91 | -- | 82 | N/A | N/A | x | |
| Reading daily newspapers: never | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 80.1 | -- | 76.1 | -- | 89.2 | .. | .. | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Primary access location among internet users: at home | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 39.3 | -- | 41.2 | -- | 33.5 | .. | .. | x | |
| Internet usage (7 day week) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Overall average (average among whole population) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 14 | -- | 2 | -- | 1 | 2 | 1 | x | |
| Actual average (average among actual users) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 528 | -- | 46 | -- | 28 | 54 | 31 | x | |
| Persons using | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 2.7 | -- | 3.7 | -- | 2.3 | 3.4 | 2.6 | x | |
| Watching television (7 day week) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Overall average (average among whole population) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 179 | -- | 186 | -- | 155 | 188 | 170 | x | |
| Persons using | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 87.9 | -- | 88.6 | -- | 82 | 89 | 86.6 | x | |
| Reading (7 day week) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Overall average (average among whole population) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 7 | -- | 8 | -- | 5 | 8 | 7 | x | |
| Actual average (average among actual users) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 106 | -- | 107 | -- | 101 | 102 | 110 | x | |
| Persons using | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 6.9 | -- | 7.8 | -- | 5.2 | 7.7 | 6 | x | |
| Sports & hobbies (7 day week) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Overall average (average among whole population) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 13 | -- | 12 | -- | 15 | 22 | 5 | x | |

| Indicator | Source | Unit | Year | Value | | | | | | | Available for the Governorate level | |
|---|--------|---------|------|-------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------|--------|-------------------------------------|----|
| | | | | Total | Total Urban | Governorate Centre | Other Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Yes | No |
| Actual average (average among actual users) | IHSES | minutes | 2007 | 127 | -- | 127 | -- | 125 | 139 | 95 | x | |
| Persons using | IHSES | percent | 2007 | 10.6 | -- | 9.5 | -- | 11.6 | 15.7 | 5.6 | x | |

The symbol -- In a cell indicates that data are not available.

The symbol N/A in a cell indicates that data are not applicable.



Total number of Indicators in the tables

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|-------------------|----|---------------|------------|
| Essential Services: | 159 | Inclusive Growth: | 81 | Governance: | 164 |
| | | | | Total: | 304 |



Unless otherwise stated:

- All data from the World Bank/COSIT/KRSO Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) 2007 is taken from World Bank, COSIT, KRSO, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey: IHSES-2007 Tabulation Report (2008)
- All data from the WHO/COSIT/KRSO/MoH Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) 2006-2007 is taken from WHO, COSIT, KRSO, Government of Iraq Ministry of Health, Republic of Iraq: Iraq Family Health Survey – Final Report (2007)
- All data from the WFP/COSIT/KRSO Vulnerability Mapping and Analysis (CFSVA) survey 2007 is taken from WFP, COSIT, KRSO Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis: Iraq (2008)
- All data from the UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/MoH Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2006 is taken from UNICEF, COSIT, KRSO, MoH, Iraq: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women – Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006 Final Report: Volume 1 (2007)
- All data from the WHO/COSIT/KRSO/MoH Iraq Mental Health Survey (IMHS) 2006-2007 is taken from WHO, COSIT, KRSO, MoH Iraq Mental Health Survey 2006/7 Report (2009)
- All data from the UNDP/COSIT Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) 2004 is taken from UNDP, COSIT, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004: Final Report (2005)

ANNEX C: MDG Indicators by Governorate

| IRAQ MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----|--|-------------------|------|---|-------------------------------|-------|-------|------|--------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| | Target | # | Indicator | Baseline Total | Year | Source | Current National ₁ | | | | | Current Sub-National | | |
| | | | | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Bagh- dad | Dohuk | Erbil |
|  1 | Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day | 1 | Proportion of population below National Poverty Line (\$2.2 per day) (%) | .. | .. | .. | 22.9 | 16.1 | 39.3 | 23.1 | 20.3 | 12.8 | 9.3 | 3.4 |
| | | 2 | Poverty gap ratio at National Poverty Line (%) | 86.9 | 1993 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 4.5 | 2.7 | 9.0 | -- | -- | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 |
| | Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people | 3 | Rate of unemployment for the age segment of 15 – 24 years (%) | 7.1 | 1990 | Employment & Unemploy- ment Survey | 30.0 | 34.5 | 24.3 | 30.1 | 29.7 | 23.2 | 32.5 | 23.4 |
| | Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger | 4 | Prevalence of underweight children U-5 years (%) (weight for age) | 9.0 | 1991 | MDGR 2005 COSIT | 7.6 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 8.7 | 10.4 |
| | | 5 | Prop. of pop. below min. level of dietary energy consumption (%) | 20.0 | 1991 | MDGR 2005 COSIT | 22.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| | | 6 | Proportion of the population with an insecure source of nutrition (%) | 11.0 | 2003 | Evaluation of Nutritional Status of Iraqi Families Survey | 3.1 | 2.1 | 5.3 | -- | -- | 0.8 | 4.1 | 3.6 |
|  2 | Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling | 7 | Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%) | 90.8 | 1990 | Directorate of social and Educational Statistics | 84.8 | 88.8 | 76.9 | 87.2 | 82.1 | 89.9 | 89.8 | 89.6 |
| | | 8 | Net enrolment ratio in intermedi- ate education (%) | -- | 1990 | N/A | 36.7 | 43.5 | 22.8 | 40.1 | 33.3 | 41.9 | 36.6 | 48.0 |
| | | 9 | Net enrolment ratio in secondary education (%) | -- | 1990 | N/A | 21.2 | 25.5 | 10.9 | 22.5 | 19.9 | 25.5 | 12.0 | 26.7 |
| | | 10 | Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach 5th grade (%) | 75.6 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 95.2 | 95.0 | 95.5 | 96.2 | 94.0 | 95.5 | 93.3 | 94.1 |
| | | 11 | Literacy rate of segment of pop. aged 15 – 24 years (%) | 78.6 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 83.9 | 88.3 | 73.3 | 87.7 | 80.4 | 91.1 | 74.9 | 77.4 |
| | | 12 | Female-male literacy rate, seg- ment of pop. aged 15 – 24 years (%) | 75.6 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 91.4 | 96.2 | 78.2 | -- | -- | 99.5 | 78.9 | 82.1 |

| Current Sub-National | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Year | Source | 2015 |
|----------------------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|------------|------|--|-------|
| Sulaimaniya | Muthana | Qadissiya | Thi Qar | Basrah | Missan | Wassit | Babel | Kerbala | Najaf | Diyala | Kirkuk | Ninewah | Anbar | Salahaddin | | | |
| 3.3 | 48.8 | 35.0 | 32.0 | 32.1 | 25.3 | 34.8 | 41.2 | 36.9 | 24.4 | 33.1 | 9.8 | 23.0 | 20.9 | 39.9 | 2007 | IHSES | 16.0 |
| 1.0 | 14.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 19.0 | 9.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 2007 | IHSES | 0.0 |
| 20.4 | 38.4 | 26.6 | 59.1 | 40.0 | 37.7 | 22.1 | 20.3 | 27.9 | 27.0 | 33.1 | 29.6 | 41.9 | 25.7 | 28.7 | 2008 | COSIT Labour Force Survey (3rd) | 3.6 |
| 4.6 | 10.8 | 8.5 | 6.5 | 13.9 | 11.1 | 12.0 | 6.2 | 4.1 | 8.1 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 6.2 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 4.5 |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2007 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 10.0 |
| 5.6 | 8.6 | 5.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 10.1 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 2007 | Food Security and Vulnerable Groups Analysis | 5.5 |
| 91.4 | 75.3 | 78.1 | 77.9 | 86.6 | 65.6 | 79.5 | 78.2 | 88.9 | 78.2 | 92.2 | 90.7 | 81.7 | 90.1 | 78.3 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 22.8 | 23.5 | 17.9 | 15.8 | 34.3 | 21.2 | 31.9 | 33.5 | 25.7 | 35.2 | 47.8 | 39.4 | 24.1 | 54.9 | 14.7 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 22.8 | 9.8 | 17.9 | 15.8 | 24.9 | 7.2 | 13.8 | 24.1 | 10.6 | 22.1 | 35.8 | 17.7 | 13.5 | 34.6 | 14.7 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 90.4 | 98.7 | 93.2 | 97.6 | 97.5 | 89.4 | 95.4 | 95.8 | 96.3 | 94.3 | 99.2 | 98.4 | 95.2 | 93.2 | 94.2 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 100.0 |
| 87.0 | 71.3 | 73.8 | 81.0 | 87.0 | 69.2 | 81.8 | 82.8 | 86.5 | 80.4 | 93.0 | 87.3 | 74.4 | 93.5 | 84.6 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 90.5 | 79.2 | 88.1 | 84.3 | 98.6 | 76.1 | 84.7 | 94.8 | 93.9 | 96.9 | 96.9 | 91.4 | 83.3 | 97.2 | 90.6 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |

| | IRAQ MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|-------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|-------|-------|------|--------|----------------------|-------|------|
| | Target | # | Indicator | Baseline Total | Year | Source | Current National ₁ | | | | | Current Sub-National | | |
| | | | | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Bagh- dad | Dohuk | Erbi |
|  | Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 | 13 | Enrolment ratio of females to males in primary education (%) | 79.5 | 1990 | Directorate of social and Educational Statistics | 94.2 | 99.2 | 84.2 | -- | -- | 99.8 | 96.8 | 99.4 |
| 14 | | Enrolment ratio of females to males in Secondary education (%) | 64.1 | 1990 | Directorate of social and Educational Statistics | 76.9 | 97.3 | 49.7 | -- | -- | 84.1 | 154.7 | 107.0 | |
| 15 | | Enrolment ratio of females to males in University education (%) | 50.9 | 1990 | Directorate of social and Educational Statistics | 86.6 | 92.1 | 50.9 | -- | -- | 98.9 | 97.1 | 147.2 | |
| 16 | | Enrolment ratio of females to males in Higher education (%) | 25.3 | 1990 | Directorate of social and Educational Statistics | 61.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| 17 | | Share of women in wage emp. in non-agricultural sector (%) | 10.6 | 1990 | Employment & Unemployment Survey | 7.4 | 9.8 | 2.3 | -- | -- | 9.1 | 5.0 | 9.5 | |
| 18 | | Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%) | 13.2 | 1990 | Documentary Records | 27.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 32.5 | 37.5 | 33.3 | |
|  | Target 4.A: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate | 19 | Under-five mortality rate (for every 1,000 live births) | 62.0 | 1990 | Maternal & Child Mortality Survey | 41.0 | 41.0 | 41.0 | 44.0 | 37.0 | 35.0 | 45.0 | 46.0 |
| 20 | | Infant mortality rate (for every 1,000 live births) | 50.0 | 1990 | Maternal & Child Mortality Survey | 35.0 | 35.0 | 35.0 | 37.0 | 32.0 | 29.0 | 33.0 | 42.0 | |
| 21 | | Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles (%) | 80.0 | 1990 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics | 81.0 | 82.5 | 78.6 | 81.4 | 80.5 | 83.2 | 92.2 | 74.1 | |
|  | Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio | 22 | Maternal mortality ratio (for every 100,000 live births) | 117.0 | 1990 | Harvard University Study | 84.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 23 | | Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (%) | 50.0 | 1990 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics | 88.5 | 95.0 | 78.1 | -- | -- | 93.9 | 84.0 | 87.5 | |

| Current Sub-National | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Year | Source | 2015 |
|----------------------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|------------|------|---------------------------------|-------|
| Sulaimaniya | Muthana | Qadissiya | Thi Qar | Basrah | Missan | Wassit | Babel | Kerbala | Najaf | Diyala | Kirkuk | Ninewah | Anbar | Salahaddin | | | |
| 100.0 | 83.0 | 82.1 | 81.7 | 99.8 | 79.1 | 91.5 | 83.2 | 95.7 | 109.7 | 96.5 | 96.2 | 93.4 | 91.2 | 87.2 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 124.1 | 109.7 | 106.9 | 136.4 | 122.4 | 75.0 | 71.9 | 79.2 | 112.0 | 126.2 | 103.7 | 90.3 | 53.9 | 72.7 | 55.2 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 123.7 | 213.6 | 121.5 | 47.1 | 61.6 | 102.6 | 44.9 | 127.9 | 75.7 | 58.2 | 108.6 | 77.9 | 51.1 | 62.3 | 59.6 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| 9.0 | 4.3 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 8.9 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 6.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 12.5 | 7.3 | 4.0 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 2008 | COSIT Labour Force Survey (3rd) | 50.0 |
| 16.7 | 40.0 | 25.0 | 30.8 | 35.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 27.3 | 16.7 | 22.2 | 16.7 | 15.4 | 25.0 | 21.4 | 9.1 | 2006 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 50.0 |
| 31.0 | 43.0 | 38.0 | 35.0 | 34.0 | 35.0 | 45.0 | 58.0 | 53.0 | 42.0 | 39.0 | 21.0 | 43.0 | 30.0 | 70.0 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 21.0 |
| 26.0 | 34.0 | 33.0 | 31.0 | 27.0 | 32.0 | 35.0 | 55.0 | 47.0 | 38.0 | 34.0 | 15.0 | 35.0 | 28.0 | 57.0 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 17.0 |
| 76.4 | 80.7 | 82.0 | 84.9 | 83.9 | 90.7 | 88.0 | 85.2 | 87.0 | 72.9 | 84.9 | 84.8 | 69.5 | 85.0 | 57.8 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2006 | IFHS | 29.0 |
| 91.9 | 84.7 | 95.4 | 86.9 | 96.9 | 84.6 | 77.5 | 90.6 | 97.1 | 97.9 | 90.5 | 75.5 | 74.1 | 94.0 | 82.5 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 100.0 |

| | IRAQ MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|--|-------------------|------|--|-------------------------------|-------|-------|------|--------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| | Target | # | Indicator | Baseline Total | Year | Source | Current National ₁ | | | | | Current Sub-National | | |
| | | | | | | | Total | Urban | Rural | Male | Female | Bagh- dad | Dohuk | Erbil |
|  6 | Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases | 24 | Rate of condom use from prevalence of birth control (%) | 0.7 | 2000 | MICS - 2 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.4 | -- | -- | 0.8 | 2.1 | 1.0 |
| | | 25 | Proportion of malaria incidence for every 100,000 of the population | 26.8 | 1995 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/MoH | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 |
| | | 26 | Proportion of TB incidence for every 100,000 of the population | 2.0 | 2000 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/MoH | 12.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | | 27 | Prop. TB cases detec. + cured direct. obs. treatm. short course (%) | 86.0 | 2000 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/MoH | 86.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 78.0 | 92.0 | 91.0 |
|  7 | Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources | 28 | Proportion of land area covered by forest (%) | 4.0 | 1990 | Agricultural Research & Studies | 4.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| | | 29 | Proportion of the population using solid fuels for cooking (%) | 35.0 | 2003 | Evaluation of Nutritional Status of Iraqi Families Survey | 4.6 | 0.6 | 12.9 | -- | -- | 0.7 | 5.5 | 5.9 |
| | Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation | 30 | Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source (%) | 81.3 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 79.0 | 92.0 | 57.0 | -- | -- | 95.6 | 98.6 | 97.2 |
| | | 31 | Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility (%) | 71.5 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 92.0 | 98.0 | 82.0 | -- | -- | 99.5 | 98.1 | 98.2 |
| | Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers | 32 | Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (%): Owned | 60.8 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 78.6 | 72.4 | 89.2 | -- | -- | 62.6 | 80.1 | 77.8 |
| | | 33 | Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (%): Rented | 23.7 | 1990 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 11.5 | 18.7 | 1.9 | -- | -- | 22.0 | 8.5 | 13.3 |
|  8 | Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications | 34 | Telephone lines per 100 population (%) | 5.6 | 1990 | Directorate of Transport and Communications Statistics (COSIT) | 20.2 | 27.0 | 3.4 | -- | -- | 16.7 | 18.4 | 20.3 |
| | | 35 | Cellular subscribers per 100 population (%) | 0.0 | 1990 | idem | 78.0 | 82.4 | 67.3 | -- | -- | 78.5 | 93.1 | 97.2 |
| | | 36 | Proportion of families owning a personal computer (%) | 3.6 | 2004 | idem | 11.8 | 16.0 | 2.1 | N/A | N/A | 21.1 | 17.5 | 18.2 |
| | | 37 | Proportion of families using satellite (%) | 32.0 | 2004 | idem | 88.3 | 90.9 | 82.0 | N/A | N/A | 93.8 | 74.6 | 74.6 |

Notes:

* Other/Missing sources of drinking water in Basrah equals 91.7% reported to be safe

| Current Sub-National | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Year | Source | 2015 |
|----------------------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|------------|------|--|-------|
| Suleimaniya | Muthana | Qadissiya | Thi Qar | Basrah | Missan | Wassit | Babel | Kerbala | Najaf | Diyala | Kirkuk | Ninewah | Anbar | Salahaddin | | | |
| 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 2.9 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 10.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2006 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/ MoH | 0.0 |
| 0.0 | 53.0 | 69.0 | 47.0 | 32.0 | 43.0 | 42.0 | 45.0 | 40.0 | 36.0 | 19.0 | 27.0 | 18.0 | 15.0 | 17.0 | 2006 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/ MoH | 0.0 |
| 97.0 | 91.0 | 93.0 | 96.0 | 88.0 | 95.0 | 90.0 | 77.0 | 77.0 | 88.0 | 91.0 | 90.0 | 97.0 | 87.0 | 89.0 | 2006 | Department of Health and Vital Statistics/ MoH | 100.0 |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 2003 | MDGR 2007 COSIT | 10.0 |
| 6.1 | 8.0 | 27.2 | 6.8 | 0.1 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 6.8 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 11.1 | 0.2 | 3.2 | 1.4 | 3.6 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 0.0 |
| 95.5 | 53.1 | 74.5 | 69.9 | 1.5* | 75.1 | 71.0 | 63.9 | 90.3 | 88.1 | 72.5 | 97.7 | 83.7 | 94.2 | 72.5 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 90.6 |
| 97.1 | 81.0 | 63.5 | 80.8 | 87.6 | 83.1 | 94.1 | 83.4 | 91.8 | 93.2 | 95.8 | 93.6 | 93.3 | 99.4 | 92.8 | 2006 | MICS - 3 | 96.3 |
| 78.1 | 93.6 | 81.8 | 91.4 | 82.1 | 84.1 | 78.4 | 84.7 | 84.5 | 78.6 | 74.3 | 83.9 | 87.6 | 86.9 | 89.1 | 2007 | IHSES | 80.4 |
| 12.1 | 3.9 | 7.9 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 5.7 | 7.1 | 13.0 | 10.8 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 5.3 | 2007 | IHSES | 11.6 |
| 33.4 | 33.1 | 32.0 | 18.7 | 22.6 | 16.0 | 26.4 | 23.4 | 16.3 | 26.3 | 8.8 | 22.1 | 19.3 | 15.3 | 13.3 | 2007 | IHSES | 11.2 |
| 96.7 | 73.1 | 80.2 | 73.2 | 84.1 | 76.0 | 78.5 | 78.2 | 82.3 | 80.2 | 51.2 | 95.8 | 80.5 | 32.8 | 68.7 | 2007 | IHSES | 40.0 |
| 12.6 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 5.7 | 13.2 | 5.1 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 6.2 | 10.2 | 5.2 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 2007 | Food Security and Vulnerable Groups Analysis | 10.0 |
| 62.8 | 87.4 | 90.9 | 89.1 | 91.3 | 89.0 | 91.1 | 88.0 | 92.8 | 88.8 | 94.2 | 88.2 | 85.5 | 96.6 | 92.1 | 2007 | IHSES | 100.0 |

ANNEX D: UNCT Plan of Engagement for CCA/UNDAF process in Iraq (May 2009)

I - Motivation for the CCA/UNDAF

Iraq is undergoing transition from the political, social and economic upheaval resulting from the invasion in 2003 to a more politically stable, socially-responsive and economically-promising country. The country still faces a range of challenges including security, ethnic conflicts and socio-economic vulnerabilities that pose major development challenges for the Government and the people of Iraq. The humanitarian situation has improved but remains a concern in parts of the country that continue to be affected by violence. The recently-established poverty line and proportion of population that fall on or under it requires a renewed focus on addressing development in a comprehensive manner. These challenges suggest an active engagement of the international community and the UN in the fulfilment of human rights alongside the Government's commitment to institutionalize a democratic and well-governed state machinery.

To realize its own development vision, the Government of Iraq (GoI) is leading the formulation of the Five-Year National Development Plan (NDP) (2010-14) that replaces the National Development Strategy 2007-2010. A number of sectoral committees have been established to facilitate the NDP process under the leadership of Ministry of Planning & Development Cooperation (MoPDC). The GoI is also reviewing the International Compact for Iraq (ICI) to better reflect the rapidly changing internal and external situation.

The UN system's humanitarian, reconstruction and development efforts enter a new phase to provide a coordinated, coherent and harmonized response to development challenges faced by the Government and the people of Iraq. The Sector Outcome Teams (SOTs) and UNCT Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) were established at the beginning of 2008 as part of this effort. The UNCT signed the UN Assistance Strategy (2008-10) with the GoI that is fully aligned with the national priorities set out in the National Development Strategy, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the ICI benchmarks. The planned phase-out of the Iraq Trust Fund and the situational transition in Iraq warrants a more strategic, coherent and cohesive response to Iraq's development priorities and challenges based on renewed partnership and engagement with GoI, international community, civil society and the UN system as a whole.

To this effect, the UNCT has decided to move to a more strategic partnership with the GoI following a comprehensive and coherent approach based on the UN Common Country Programming process. The Common Country Assessment (CCA) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Iraq will ensure strategic alignment with and effective contribution of the UN System to the NDP. This will also allow the ExCom UN agencies of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, as well as UN-HABITAT and WHO, to formulate and align their respective country programmes with the NDP and UNDAF. This will in turn lead to greater harmonization within the UNCT and between UNCT and GoI.

II - Overview of national planning processes

The GoI is currently involved in the formulation of a comprehensive development vision for Iraq. The GoI is working to harmonize the NDP with the concurrent Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process. Both the PRS and NDP are led by the GoI, under the leadership of MoPDC and with the technical assistance of World Bank and USAID respectively. Both strategic planning frameworks are expected to be finalized in 2009. The NDP will be submitted to the Council of Representatives by October 2009.

with an understanding that the document would be binding for the next, post-election government in Iraq. The GoI has prepared a series of 14 sectoral analytical papers to provide the basis for the NDP. These were subjected to a broad national level review and consultation at the Baghdad NDP workshop held on 20-21 May 2009 to reach consensus and understanding on needs, priorities and vision for development in Iraq. The workshop recommended that the UN agencies, funds and programmes should support the GoI in the finalization of the NDP and welcomed the inclusion of UN agencies as part of the GoI's technical and sectoral committees which are providing the necessary inputs for the finalization of the plan. The inclusion of the line ministries in the formulation of the NDP was also emphasized so that the plan could be fully integrated into a national vision of development. The sectoral papers will be submitted to the Technical Committee by 1 August in preparation for the NDP workshop proposed for 15-20 August in Amman. The discussion of the sectoral papers at that workshop will provide an opportunity for the GoI, UNCT, and the World Bank to provide their feedback on the papers. These processes will feed into the discussion of the methodological unification of the papers in order to ensure a cohesive, comparable set of outputs in preparation for the formulation of the NDP.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy is being led by the MoPDC and Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) with support from the World Bank. A technical committee to draft the PRS has been constituted with two expected deliverables – the poverty assessment study based on the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) data and the drafting of the PRS. Both these documents were to be produced in draft form by June 2009. The High-Level PRS Committee led by COSIT under the MoPDC received the Cabinet's approval for the recently calculated poverty line for Iraq. The World Bank under the leadership of the PRS Committee organized a two-day workshop to review the draft PRS with the involvement of sector and technical specialists from all government ministries and departments. The UN participated in this event, providing technical contributions via its Sector Outcome Team (SOT) members and the IAU analysts. The PRS will eventually feed into the NDP. The GoI, the UN and the World Bank were continuing to work in partnership to ensure the alignment of the NDP, PRS and CCA/UNDAF.

The GoI and international community have been working in partnership to review progress on the ICI and identify future priorities and benchmarks. Following the ICI Baghdad Coordination Group Meeting in May 2009, a working group was established by the GoI with representatives of line ministries, office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and representatives of the Cabinet. The working group was preparing priorities for the remaining two years of the ICI which were being finalized by the end of July for submission to the Annual ICI Ministerial Conference to be held in Baghdad in October 2009. The ICI Secretariat was also finalizing the progress report on achievements for the period May 2008-May 2009 to be ready by the end of June.

III - Proposed options for the CCA process

Given that the GoI is in the process of formulating the NDP 2010-14 and the PRS based on sectoral review and analysis as well as evidence provided by IHSES, the best option for the UNCT is to join hands with the GoI. This involves the UN's full engagement with the ongoing planning processes by utilizing its comparative advantages to support national analytical capacities and ensuring that both PRS and NDP are aligned to Millennium Declaration/MDGs and fulfil its international commitments and obligations. For these reasons, the UNCT has expressed its support for the undertaking a combination of participation in government-led analytical work (Option 1) and complementary UNCT-supported analytical work (Option 2). The UN CCA/UNDAF Task Force has contributed to the draft and endorsed the Plan of Engagement which was to be shared with the UNCT and revalidated during of the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop in Amman. A CCA document, in line with the above direction and in close cooperation between the UN and the GoI would be drafted during August 2009.

i) Participation in government-led analytical work

The UNCT was invited by the GoI to attend the national conference on the NDP that took place on 20-21 May in Baghdad and to provide feedback on 14 sectoral papers¹⁶⁰ which will form the analytical basis for the GoI's new development plan. The Baghdad workshop affirmed the UN's commitment to supporting the technical committees and the Ministry of Planning on integrating essential cross-cutting areas, including human rights, gender, environment and employment. This conference provided an opportunity for the UN to provide substantive inputs to the sectoral analysis and advocate for MD/MDG based development planning.

The sectoral papers also informed the CCA Pre-Analysis and subsequent gaps analysis as part of the CCA process. The Resident Co-ordinator's Office recruited a consultant to work with the IAU in order to provide feedback to the GoI on the papers and assess the ways in which they could be integrated into the CCA. The UN was to provide feedback to GoI by end of June to be taken into consideration in the preparation of the second draft of the papers. These updated sectoral papers were to be discussed at the NDP workshop proposed to be held in Amman on 15-20 August. This set of processes assisted in ensuring that the CCA is fully aligned with the NDP.

The GoI-led PRS process has identified six outcomes: a higher income for the poor; improved health level of the poor; improved educational level for the poor; better housing environment for the poor; increasing the rate of the poor people that benefit from social protection; and less difference between poor women and poor men. In addition, the participation of UNCT via the SOTs in the PRS workshop (8-9 June in Amman) enabled the UNCT to share its technical expertise while advocating for the inclusion of UN values and the MD/MDG principles.

ii) Complementary UNCT-supported analytical work

The National Millennium Development Goals Committee, in close partnership with the UNDP, was drawing up a National MDG framework comprising a set of nationalized goals, targets and indicators as well as a set of sectoral analyses to identify what should be done to achieve them. Reports published by COSIT on the global MDG targets (2005 and 2007) showed that, due to three decades of conflicts and sanctions, Iraq was not likely to achieve individual targets in gender equality, health, water and sanitation and housing by 2015. In this context, the ongoing MDG localization process provided a basis for advocating the inclusion of MD/MDGs at the helm of the national development plan.

During May and June, the UN conducted preparatory analysis to inform the CCA process. MoPDC lent three of its COSIT and Kurdistan Regional Statistical Office (KRSO) staff to review, provide feedback and technical support for the preparatory analysis conducted for the CCA by the UNCT Analysts. These analysts spent two weeks in the IAU in Amman, working with analysts to review their preparatory work and identify future areas of collaboration between the IAU and COSIT/KRSO. This will build consensus around a common analysis of the situation, promote the identification of linkages between datasets, enhance the UNCT's analytical capacity on Iraq and help in receiving official endorsement for the UN's own analytical base and its possible use in the national planning process.

To ensure that national planning entails the elements of results-based management (RBM) and human rights-based approaches (HRBA) to development strategies, training was being offered to GoI for them to incorporate some of these elements into their development frameworks while contributing to the CCA/ UNDAF process.

160. The 14 papers are entitled: Agriculture & Water Resources; Building & Housing; Education; Employment & Unemployment; Government Investment; Health; Industry; Private Sector Development; The Paper of the Committee on Economic Policy; Transport & Communication; Vision & Economic Policies; Youth in Iraq; Five Year Plan - Economic and Social Development Strategies in Kurdistan Region; and Living Conditions in Iraq.

IV - Extent of national and UN analytical capacity¹⁶¹

A stock-taking of humanitarian and development data for Iraq conducted in mid-2008¹⁶² concluded that there was a wealth of data available, and pointed to the vital role of COSIT and KRISO in providing data and capacity for data collection. However, the report identified key information gaps and questioned the reliability of some of the data. It also concluded that, until that point, the UN's information and analysis lacked strategic vision and purpose, and did not always inform policy, programming, advocacy or coordination. Since that time, the UNCT IAU has succeeded in producing concrete outputs through the UNCT Analysts and technical staff, who combine the comparative advantages of the UNCT. The IAU has distributed several publications using the latest data to a wide audience, including the GoI, UN agencies, NGOs, the media and academia. The UNCT IAU has supported evidence-based planning and policy-making through its analysis for the 2009 Consolidated Humanitarian Appeals Process and through the coordination of the CCA pre-analysis process. The 3W database, website and maps provide regularly updated coordination mechanisms for project information and data on Iraq.

Since the publication of that stock-taking, a number of published surveys have meant that COSIT/KRISO and the UN are now able to conduct a more comprehensive, reliable data consolidation and analysis. WFP/COSIT/KRISO Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Survey 2007, the World Bank/COSIT/KRISO Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) 2007, the as well as continuous IOM and UNHCR IDP, refugee and returnee monitoring are available. The IHSES 2007 in particular has received widespread recognition for its high level of technical quality and consistency.

The COSIT IraqInfo database functions as a central repository of all major surveys conducted with GoI, providing detailed access to thousands of indicators. The central UN repository for information, IAU Info, complements this GoI initiative by consolidating over 200 key indicators that are updated monthly with new information and which are disaggregated by area (including district-level data) and gender. However, in spite of the improvements in availability of information during the past year, gaps still remain. For example, casualty data are not disaggregated by gender, and there is an absence of baseline data on gender-based violence.

Analyses conducted by the UNCT over the past year have identified key challenges to Iraq's development prospects using the latest data. WFP/COSIT/KRISO (CFSVA) used the WFP/COSIT/KRISO CFSVA surveys from 2005 and 2007 to identify the most vulnerable districts in Iraq according to key indicators. The UNCT IAU's Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008 analyzed data from the COSIT Labour Force Survey 2008 and WFP/COSIT/KRISO CFSVA 2007 to identify the weaknesses in Iraq's labour market and their root causes. Such analyses indicate some of Iraq's humanitarian and developmental priorities.

However, outstanding work includes the identification of key responsibilities and remaining gaps in capacity through HRBA. The HRBA to development will ensure the timely, impartial delivery of aid and the incorporation of the MDGs, justice and democracy into development planning. An HRBA workshop was held with the UNCT in March 2009 to initiate this process and a follow-up session on HRBA was being held at the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop to bring national partners on board at the same level of understanding. A detailed capacity and gaps analysis with national partners would be conducted in July as part of the CCA process to identify needs that must be addressed for sustainable national development.

161. The analysis is based on the Checklist to assess the quality of country analysis as outlined in Annex 2 of the CCA/UNDAF Guidelines.

162. Available at: <http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Stocktaking%20of%20existing%20indicators%20and%20information%2013%20March%202008.pdf>

Non-governmental stakeholders have been actively involved in a number of processes. The UNCT IAU includes participating analysts from several international NGOs, and the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey 2008 was conducted in partnership with MercyCorps and IMC. COSIT and KRISO performed a lead role in the sample design and methodology, as well as supervision of all data collection of the IKN. A second round of the IKN survey is planned in partnership with COSIT and MercyCorps for the end of 2009. The pre-analysis has benefited from the Iraq Community-based Conflict Mitigation assessments, which were produced in consultation with local government officials, academics and NGOs and implemented by Relief International, to report on the causes and consequences of conflict at the micro level.

The UN has the means to assess the risk of future conflict and natural disaster and accordingly prepares its response to such emergencies. The UNCT Contingency Planning led by OCHA is an ongoing, inter-agency effort to identify and respond swiftly and effectively to potential emergencies. In addition, further expertise and support to strengthen this process, and ensure the highest standards for conflict analysis will be harnessed through the UN's global network. UNAMI HRD and the IAU have been monitoring progress in the implementation of the GoI's National Operations Centre (NOC), specifically in liaison with the Crisis Action Cell (CAC), the GoI's crisis and natural disaster response unit. The EmergencyInfo online database has been developed as a coordination tool for identifying the needs arising from emergencies and responses to those needs. FAO is also monitoring the effects of drought on a continuous basis. In addition, the RCO has recruited a conflict advisor for the CCA/UNDAF process. She will ensure that a conflict perspective runs through the pre-analysis, review the NDP sectoral papers from a conflict perspective and synthesize existing literature on the conflict in Iraq.

V - UN's comparative advantage in support of the CCA

The UN in Iraq has demonstrated comparative advantages through the leadership of the Sector Outcome Teams carrying forward its mandate, as well as innovative contracting arrangements which have enabled it to remain present on the ground. The UN is uniquely positioned to facilitate legal and institutional reforms, capacity building, advocacy, and to pilot initiatives linking NGOs, CBOs, and the private sector with GoI.

Through its ongoing project to support MDG-based planning, UNDP will hold training sessions and workshops for national ministries and facilitate the integration of national MDGs into national planning. One such training has already taken place in April 2009. The use of the MDGs in both the NDP and the CCA/UNDAF will enhance the strategic harmonization of the GoI and the UNCT through identification of common goals, and assist the GoI in fulfilling all ratified international obligations and commitments.

The UN has long-standing experience and technical expertise on human rights-based approaches to programming and results-based programming, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools. This experience and expertise can be contributed via the RC M&E Unit to support and build the capacity of key government actors responsible for taking the NDP 2010-2014 to fruition. A request has already been made by MoPDC to help develop national M&E capacity and a formal assessment of national planning, monitoring and evaluation processes and capacities will be undertaken as part of the CCA process.

The UNCT has a high level of expertise in information and analysis. The establishment of the UNCT IAU in 2008 has harnessed agencies' combined capacity to improve the humanitarian and development response in Iraq through the strategic use of information. This integrated approach to information and analysis promotes the standardization of methodologies and cross-sectoral analyses. It has enhanced sharing of information while bringing onboard a strategic cross-sectoral overview. It has also strengthened the UN's relationship with the government and NGOs through various cooperation initiatives including IraqInfo. The UNCT is therefore in a strong position to provide training and support to the informational capacity of the GoI.

The UNCT has the analytical capacity to ensure that environmental sustainability and gender are issues which run through its analyses. In addition to the specific sections of the UNCT's pre-analysis (discussed in more detail below) devoted to gender (under demographics, security and violence, health, economy and governance), the UNCT Analysts are fully aware of the importance of gender mainstreaming throughout all sections of the pre-analysis. IAU technical staff have ensured that recent gender-disaggregated data are available to them for this purpose. A GenCap Gender Advisor was employed in order to ensure that all UNCT members and SOTs were aware of the importance of gender mainstreaming. The HRBA analysis will incorporate a gender lens into the identification of capacity gaps during the CCA process. The pre-analysis also includes a section devoted to the environment under economic development and inclusive growth, and it was being ensured that environmental sustainability would be incorporated as a cross-cutting issue within the work of the Thematic Groups to be formed during the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop.

Through its support to the 2009 Iraq Census, UNFPA was supporting capacity building at two levels. COSIT staff and university researchers were being trained in statistical and thematic analysis for in-depth evaluation of Census data, in addition to data from other sources and national surveys conducted during the last four years. Second, government staff responsible for sectoral planning processes at national and governorate level were being trained on utilization of Census data for annual and medium-term planning.

The ongoing review of the UN Assistance Strategy 2008-10 will also provide a basis for the CCA/UNDAF in terms of highlighting and identifying emerging priorities, gaps and challenges that could be addressed either within the remaining period of the current programme cycle or, more strategically, through the UNDAF 2011-14. In addition, the engagement of the GoI in the review process reinforces the national ownership of the UN's development work and paves the way for a pronounced UN-GoI partnership through the CCA/UNDAF process.

The UN already has structures in place that will support the development of the CCA and formulation of the UNDAF. These include the Gender Task Force, the UN joint coordination on AIDS, eight Sector Outcome Teams, the Advocacy Group and the UNCT IAU.

The CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop in June would provide a forum to discuss when and where it was necessary to ensure that goals and expected results are realistic, given past performance and current capacity in terms of availability of staff, financial resources, systems and instruments, partners and M&E capacity. The Workshop would identify opportunities for collaboration and complementarities to enhance collective comparative advantage. Some due process on reflection, feedback and dialogue on UN capacity with relevant partners would also take place.

VI - Mechanisms for CCA/UNDAF formulation (as of May 2009)

The CCA/UNDAF process is led by the UNCT which has the ultimate responsibility and authority on the process. The Inter-agency CCA/UNDAF Task Force, comprising agency representatives and led by the RC Office, will guide the CCA/UNDAF process, ensuring that the work plan and the processes are synchronized. With the support of the Task Force, UNCT has assigned the UNCT IAU to lead the CCA portion of the process. On the GoI side, the Iraq Strategic Review Board (ISRB) represents the highest-level coordinating committee while the NDP Technical Committee will provide the relevant inputs at the technical level.

In preparation for the CCA, the UNCT Analysts will conduct a pre-analysis, with formulation support from a UNICEF consultant and informational support from COSIT/KRSO staff, in order to ensure that the UN engages with the GoI in an informed and effective manner. This pre-analysis phase will also enable the UN to identify any gaps in available data sets. UNCT analysts will conduct the pre-analysis using data that has been validated by the GoI with technical and informational support from IAU staff. The pre-analysis will be used as a basis for the discussions of the Thematic Working Groups at the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop in June and will serve as a resource for the thematic analyses developed thereafter.

The GoI's series of sectoral analytical papers are being reviewed by an analytical consultant in cooperation with the UNCT Analysts and SOTs to identify areas where the UN could provide support to the GoI, and to inform the CCA. The consultant will provide recommendations on the most effective way in which the UNCT can provide support to the GoI, based on UN's comparative advantages, and on the ways in which the UN can improve and broaden the scope of its analysis as part of CCA/UNDAF process. The review process will also facilitate UN engagement with the GoI and increase the UN's role in the formulation of the NDP.

A conflict advisor is working with the analysts and also reviewing other relevant documents to ensure that a conflict perspective runs throughout the pre-analysis. The consultant will be reviewing the Assessment Reports produced by the USAID/Relief International/Columbia University Community-based Conflict Mitigation Program and pre-existing capacities within OCHA Iraq for emergency response related to conflicts and disasters. The consultant will also review the sectoral papers in order to assess the extent to which the context of conflict is accounted for in the government analysis. It will be ensured that this conflict perspective and OCHA Iraq's pre-existing capacities for emergency response will be carried forward and incorporated into the CCA process.

To carry out the CCA, Thematic Working Groups will build on the pre-analysis to develop a deeper understanding of priority issues identified at the CCA/UNDAF Design Workshop. Each group, which will encompass Government, donors, civil society, academia and UNCT representatives, is expected to be chaired jointly by a representative of UNCT and a Government representative.

The next stage of CCA/UNDAF preparation entails an in-depth causal analysis to understand the immediate, underlying and root causes of key issues within the prioritized thematic areas. This analysis will be conducted by the four Thematic Working Groups. Based upon the themes prioritized at the CCA/UNDAF Workshop, the Thematic Working Groups will undertake causality analysis and identify capacity gaps as part of the HRBA specified in the work plan to understand issues within each theme. The Working Groups will meet in the first two weeks of July in Baghdad. This critical exercise will culminate with the drafting of four thematic analyses by the end of July, which will inform the CCA. The thematic analyses will summarize the overall situation, key issues and causes, taking into account all elements of UN principles, the MD/MDGs and different cross-cutting issues in the context of Iraq. Considering that Iraq is in transition from a conflict situation, the thematic analysis will incorporate a proper assessment of relevant factors that contribute to natural and man-made disasters, conflict and unrest.

The CCA will be drafted in consultation with the UNCT, UN Task Force, with active engagement of ExCom agencies (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP) during the first two weeks of August based on the thematic analyses. The CCA document will be presented in draft form at the NDP workshop proposed for 15-20 August in Amman.

The formulation of the UNDAF will begin in early October 2009 with the Strategic Prioritization Workshop, ensuring that the UNDAF is fully aligned with the development priorities set out in the NDP, and that the GoI has full ownership of the process. The CCA will provide the basis for the prioritization of the UN's strategic focus for the UNDAF, following the principles of human rights-based programming and results-based management. The identification of strategic UNDAF outcomes for Iraq will serve as a guiding framework for the development of the UNDAF Results Matrix, the UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the UNDAF M&E Calendar by respective UNDAF groups.

The entire CCA/UNDAF process will benefit from the continuous feedback and guidance of the CCA/UNDAF Task Force, UNCT, the regional Peer Support Group, the Regional Directors Team, GoI, Civil Society and other key partners.

The success of ExCom country programmes is contingent upon the quality of the CCA/UNDAF and all efforts will be made to ensure that the entire process is undertaken in line with UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) guidelines and standards. The deadline for the Country Programme Document submission is by March 2010 for approval by respective agency Boards in June 2010. The WHO Joint Programme Review Mission 2010-2011 will be signed by December 2009-January 2010. The preparation of the Country Cooperation Strategy will begin in June-July 2009 and is set to be launched in December 2010-January 2011. To this effect, the CCA/UNDAF Task Force will ensure that the timely inputs are sought from stakeholders, especially the UN PSG, and that all relevant comments and feedback are factored into the process to ensure a high-quality product.

VII - Resource requirements

Both UNFPA and UNIFEM have taken on consultants to provide additional analytical capacity for the pre-Analysis and the CCA. UNICEF has also taken on a consultant specifically to contribute to the procedural and formulation discussions surrounding the CCA/UNDAF process.

The UNCT IAU is working with a conflict advisor in order to provide capacity for analysis with a conflict lens and additional training and statistical capacity

The RCO has recruited a consultant for Sectoral Papers Review to provide additional inputs for the evaluation of the GoI's forthcoming sectoral papers.

An HRBA consultant will also be recruited in order to assist with the gaps analysis for the CCA.

The visits of the COSIT and KRSO staff has been funded and organized through UNFPA, and hosted by the UNCT IAU.

The experts are yet to be recruited to facilitate the Thematic Working Group meetings in the first two weeks of August as part of the CCA.

VIII - Next steps for the CCA/UNDAF

It should be noted that the timeline for the CCA/UNDAF is live and will be revised according to progress and the situation on the ground. The first draft of the UNDAF is expected by January 2010 and a final product, endorsed by GoI, by March 2010.

| Pre-Analysis | | |
|--|---|--|
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| Meeting to discuss Pre-Analysis and CCA time frame | IAU | 12 May |
| Pre-Analysis undertaken | IAU | 12-17 May |
| Submission of draft Pre-Analysis v.0 | IAU | 18 May |
| Pre-Analysis v.1 drafted in response to feedback | IAU | 19-26 May |
| Submission of draft Pre-Analysis v.1 | IAU | 26 May |
| IAU meeting to present Pre-Analysis v.1 | IAU | 27 May |
| Pre-Analysis v.2 drafted in response to feedback | IAU | 28 May-9 June |
| Submission of draft Pre-Analysis v.2 | IAU, with conflict advisor, RCO and UNICEF consultant | 9 June |
| Analysis of GoI's Ministerial sectoral papers | IAU with consultant and SOTs | 16 June |
| Consultation with COSIT and KRSO staff Pre-Analysis feedback and support | IAU, GoI | 7-16 June |
| Finalization of Plan of Engagement | IAU, RCO, PSG, Task Force | 17 June |
| Presentation produced summarizing Pre-Analysis | IAU, GoI, UNICEF consultant, conflict advisor | 17 June |
| Translation of Pre-Analysis, Plan of Engagement and Pre-Analysis Presentation | RCO | 21 June |
| Formatting of Pre-Analysis and presentation | IAU | 21 June |
| Consultation on Pre-Analysis v.3 with CCA/UN-DAF Task Force and PSG | IAU, PSG, TF | 18-24 June |
| Finalization of Pre-Analysis | IAU | 2 July |
| UNDAF Design Workshop | | |
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| Orientation/training of UNCT, GoI and other partners on CCA/UNDAF processes, RBM, HRBA | DOCO/RCO/IAU | 23-24 June (Baghdad) 27-30 June (Amman) |
| Thematic and Cross-Cutting Analysis | | |
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| Causality Analysis (HRBA Gap Analysis) and Thematic Analysis | CCA Thematic Groups, IAU + Facilitators, UN Task Force, RC M&E Unit | 1-16 July |
| Drafting of thematic analysis reports | CCA Thematic Groups | 31 July |
| National Planning and Implementation Mechanisms (Financial Systems, M&E Systems, Planning Systems) | RCO + UN Task Force + Thematic Groups + IAU | 31 July |

| Drafting of CCA Document | | |
|---|---|------------------------|
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| Drafting of CCA document v.1 | CCA Drafting Team | 1-15 August |
| NDP Conference | GOI, RCO, IAU, Sectoral review consultant | 15-20 August |
| CCA Consolidation with Partners | CCA Thematic Groups, RCO and IAU | 7-21 August |
| PSG Review of Draft CCA Document | PSG, DOCO, and RCO, Task Force | 22 August-15 September |
| CCA Finalization | IAU/RCO and UN Task Force | 30 September |
| Strategic Planning Retreat | | |
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| Strategic Planning Retreat, including formulation of UNDAF Outcome Groups | DOCO/RCO | October 2009 |
| UNDAF Formulation and Endorsement | | |
| Processes | Responsible | Deadline |
| UNDAF Formulation | UNDAF Outcome Groups, RC M&E Unit | December 2009 |
| 1 st JSM | RCO | March 2010 |
| 2 nd JSM | RCO | |
| UNDAF Official Endorsement | | |